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ABSTRACT
In “That confusion of who is who, flesh and flesh”: Mothers, Daughters, and the
Body in Postwar and Contemporary American Literature, I investigate how the body
limits, disrupts, ruptures, or recuperates the mother/daughter relationship in postwar and
contemporary texts by twentieth-century US women writers. These narratives portray the
construction of female subjectivity when the feminine self seems insufficiently distinct
from the mother (or daughter). In four chapters arranged chronologically by decade, I
examine texts by Flannery O’Connor, Eudora Welty, Sylvia Plath, Gwendolyn Brooks,
Margaret Atwood, Toni Morrison, Jamaica Kincaid, and Edwidge Danticat. On the one
hand, mothers in these texts often enforce a social order that defines the body as
excessive, abject, and in need of regulation. On the other hand, they themselves
frequently embody that excess, becoming the engulfing and off-putting bodies that
daughters want to reject. The women writers in my study draw upon this ambivalence to
cultivate a feminist poetics of the body that sees abjection as the shared state of mothers
and daughters. The starting point of abject embodiment ultimately offers an opportunity
for women to reject the myth of mind-body dualism and to value the intersubjective and
corporeal rather than patriarchal individualism. As Darieck Scott writes in his important
study of abjection and blackness, “abjection produces a ‘break’ in gender and sexuality—
and…therefore produces an opportunity for different configurations of gender and
sexuality.” Bringing together the insights of fat studies, critical race studies, and
corporeal feminism, this project proposes that these “different configurations” include the
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possibility of new relationships between mothers and daughters, escaping the painful
dyad of self-hatred and maternal surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
When I was going through some of my mother’s things a couple of years after she
died, I found a letter dated July 1, 1957 that my grandmother sent her when she was away
at summer camp. Granny ends the letter with an expression of love and a cruel
instruction: “today I was thinking about you all day, yesterday too, sweetiepie, see you
soon and try not to get any fatter. Love big hugs XXXX Mommy.” My mother was eight
years old.
Granny lived with us as I was growing up, which meant that I had a front row seat
to her volatile and dysfunctional relationship with my mother. Unsurprisingly, that same
volatility and dysfunction came to characterize my relationship with my mother because,
as they say, shit rolls downhill.
Now that the two women who raised me and taught me to hate my body are gone,
I find myself obsessed with that shit—that is, with the leaky, unpredictable, and, at times,
uncontainable abjection of the feminine body, and the harmful lessons regarding female
corporeality that are often passed down through matrilineages. In my family, those
lessons primarily focused on body size. The dictate to “try not to get any fatter” was ever
present, and the state of my body was a constant source of concern for both of the adult
women in my home. My mother told me that while it was important for me to be smart, it
was far more important for me to be skinny and pretty; when I pointed out that she was
not thin, she replied, “Well, I already have a husband.” Her message was clear: as a
woman, my physical appearance would determine my value in society, and any hope for
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a heteronormative future and social mobility was contingent on corralling and
suppressing my fat female body.
Based on many of the literary texts in this study (and based on my four decades of
living in a female body), I have to admit that Granny and my mother were not necessarily
wrong. As Susan Bordo, Naomi Wolf, Sabrina Strings, Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, and
many others have observed, in Western patriarchal culture, a woman’s worth (on the job
market, on the marriage market, in everyday interactions with strangers) is often
measured by her ability to comply with hegemonic beauty ideals, which establish
thinness and whiteness as the pinnacle of attractiveness and femininity. 1 Moreover, as
Monica Carol Miller, Susie Orbach, and Kim Chernin note, mothers are expected to
prepare their daughters to navigate the misogynistic gauntlet of public opinion. 2 Hence, a
mother’s worth is at least partially determined by her daughter’s perceived worth, which
is overwhelmingly determined by her body. Therefore, I understand that my grandmother
and mother’s obsession with my body was both culturally mandated and socially
enforced. Perhaps, in some perverse way, it was even an act of love.
In “That confusion of who is who, flesh and flesh”: Mothers, Daughters, and the
Body in Postwar and Contemporary American Literature, I investigate how the body
limits, disrupts, ruptures, or recuperates the mother/daughter relationship in postwar and
contemporary texts by twentieth-century US women writers. These narratives portray the
construction of female subjectivity when the feminine self seems insufficiently distinct
from the mother (or daughter). On the one hand, mothers in these texts often enforce a
social order that defines the body as excessive, abject, and in need of regulation. On the
other hand, they themselves frequently embody that excess, becoming the engulfing and
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off-putting bodies that daughters want to reject. The women writers in my study draw
upon this ambivalence to cultivate a feminist poetics of the body that sees abjection as the
shared state of mothers and daughters. The starting point of abject embodiment ultimately
offers an opportunity for women to reject the myth of mind-body dualism and to value
the intersubjective and corporeal rather than patriarchal individualism. As Darieck Scott
writes in his important study of abjection and blackness, “abjection produces a ‘break’ in
gender and sexuality—and…therefore produces an opportunity for different
configurations of gender and sexuality.”3 Bringing together the insights of fat studies,
critical race studies, and corporeal feminism, this project proposes that these “different
configurations” include the possibility of new relationships between mothers and
daughters, escaping the painful dyad of self-hatred and maternal surveillance.
Perhaps nowhere is the significance of the body between two women more
complex, more charged, or more potentially tragic than in the mother/daughter
relationship. As Adrienne Rich writes, “That earliest enwrapment of one female body
with another can sooner or later be denied or rejected, felt as choking possessiveness, as
rejection, trap, or taboo; but it is, at the beginning, the whole world.” 4 In modern fiction,
women writers dramatize this tension. On the one hand, the mother/daughter relationship
still retains elements of this infantile state, grounded in the body. Female flesh feels
simultaneously sensuous and inescapable. On the other, the mother is the educator and
enforcer, teaching her daughter to be dissatisfied with her own body. In Sula, for
instance, Helene urges Nel to “pull her nose” so it does not look so “broad” and “flat,”
thereby instilling white beauty standards in her black daughter.5 Because the mother is
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both the model of feminine fleshliness and the source of social discipline, the daughter
experiences overwhelming ambivalence, both about her mother and about her own body.
Fat and blackness are two of the focal points in my study because, much like the
paradoxical mother/daughter relationship, which embodies both intimacy and discipline,
these abject categories have been understood both as a sign of femininity and as a
mechanism of ungendering. As Richard Dyer argues in White, “the figure of the woman
as angel, enlightened and enlightening” relies upon a visual iconography of lightness—
encompassing thinness, transcendence, and luminousness.6 The writers in my study
ironize this desire to take flight and instead steep their characters in the corporeal,
reclaiming categories like fatness, blackness, and dirtiness.
Starting from the Kristevan concept of abjection, I use a psychoanalytical frame
to investigate the intersubjective relationship between mothers and daughters who create
one another through their fantasies, fears, and desires for the other person. I also find that
these fictions anticipate the insights of corporeal feminism, fat studies, and black
feminism—theoretical approaches which propose that the flesh itself becomes a medium
of productive excess. Through this combination of psychoanalysis and material
feminisms, I examine both the construction of subjectivity through fantasy and narration
as well as the role of the material body in that process—and indeed, in its unraveling.
In four dual author chapters arranged chronologically by decade, I trace the ways
in which fluctuating societal beliefs regarding the female body have been reflected in
literary representations of the mother/daughter relationship, and consider how emerging
trends in literary form have furthered those representations. I have chosen the postwar
and contemporary periods (specifically, the 1940s to 1990s) for historical, literary, and
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personal reasons. Over the course of those fifty years, the roles and expectations for
women—as mothers/reproductive bodies, sexualized/aestheticized objects, consumers,
and citizens—changed dramatically and rapidly. In terms of literary developments, the
era of the 1940s to the 1990s encompasses such trends as the modernist short story,
confessional poetry, the postmodern novel, and postcolonial literature. My project
explores how women writers employ these various genres to portray complicated and
dynamic relationships between mothers and daughters, because, in many instances, their
formal choices help them effectively render the fluid, mercurial nature of both the
mother/daughter relationship and subjectivity itself.
Finally, this historical period has personal significance for me, as it spans the time
frame during which the women in my matrilineage raised their daughters. My mother was
born in 1948, and I was born in 1978; thus, the mother/daughter relationships in my own
family paralleled the literary mothers and daughters that comprise this study. The process
of researching and writing this dissertation has helped me to consider how the
sociocultural forces working on my grandmother and mother shaped our relationships.
When I encounter, for instance, the resentment I felt towards my mother’s controlling
nature reflected in Sylvia Plath’s violent rejection of the maternal figure in her poem
“Medusa,” or the same power struggle over body size that existed between my mother
and grandmother mirrored in Joan and Frances’s conflict in Margaret Atwood’s Lady
Oracle, I can see that we were not unique. As I will discuss, for some of the authors in
this dissertation, complex mother/daughter issues in their own lives inspired the female
characters that appear in their fiction. Discovering such parallels and researching the
patriarchal machinations behind much of the animus between mothers and daughters in
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the mid to late twentieth century have encouraged me to redistribute the blame for the
toxic practices in my own matrilineage. In other words, like the literary mothers in this
study, Granny and my mother were oppressed and compelled by the same internal
conditioning and external pressures that have sought to influence and entrap me, and they
believed it was their job to teach me how to succeed within the system rather than to
inspire me to dismantle it.
In addition to positioning my primary texts historically and considering how form
contributes to their portrayal of mother/daughter relationships, I examine the texts
through the lens of feminist psychoanalysis, particularly through the work of Julia
Kristeva. In her essay “The Semiotic and the Symbolic” in Revolution in Poetic
Language, Kristeva identifies two (inseparable) modes of the signifying process, or the
process by which subjects acquire language: the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic
is the stage prior to language, prior to signification, when an infant feels inseparable from
its mother, which lasts from our time in the womb until about six months of age. Kristeva
calls the drives and energy we experience in this stage the “chora,” which is a rhythmic,
pulsating form of communication associated with the maternal that is typically repressed
when a subject enters the symbolic order. She writes, “the chora, as rupture and
articulations (rhythm), precedes evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality, and temporality. Our
discourse – all discourse – moves with and against the chora in the sense that it
simultaneously depends upon and refuses it.” 7 In other words, the chora is experienced as
sheer fluidity, timelessness, and connectedness; during this stage, the subject cannot
perceive of herself as separate from her mother. Once the subject transitions into the
realm of the symbolic, she enters into the world of language, which is ruled by the law of
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the Father. Whereas in the stage of the semiotic chora the subject is pure materiality and
experiences a oneness with her surroundings, in the symbolic stage the subject perceives
herself as separate from everything and everyone around her, and can therefore enter into
society. For some of the primary texts I explore in my dissertation (specifically, works by
Gwendolyn Brooks, Sylvia Plath, Toni Morrison, Edwidge Danticat, and Jamaica
Kincaid), this concept of a pre-lingual, pre-Oedipal form of communication between a
mother and child during the time they share the same body illuminates the ways in which
some mothers and daughters continue to feel connected to and/or haunted by this
originary relationship.
The oceanic connectedness of the semiotic chora stage of development precedes
that of the primal, repulsive abject, another Kristevan concept that figures prominently in
my project. In “Approaching Abjection” from Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes,
“Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of preobjectal relationship, in the
immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order
to be.”8 This “immemorial violence” is the separation of the infant from the mother, first
physically transitioning from one body to two, and then psychically separating when the
child begins to apprehend a separation between herself and the maternal figure, a period
occurring sometime between four and eight months of age that Kristeva associates with
the abject. Since the indistinct boundary between mother and infant is the primal
experience of both fascination and horror, the abject is closely associated with the
maternal body. Additionally, the abject is that which threatens to break down meaning
through a loss of the distinction between self and other, or subject and object. Examples
of such forces include vomit, feces, bodily fluids, the sight of a corpse, etc. Kristeva
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explains, “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what
disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The inbetween, the ambiguous, the composite.” 9 In other words, the abject is comprised of the
revolting (yet necessary) features of physicality—the fluids, the seepage, the general
messiness of being alive—aspects of the operations of the body that we need, but reject.
We reject and expulse the abject, yet it is us, too; we establish our sense of self through
our primal repression of the abject, yet it always haunts us, reminding us of death and
threatening to dismantle the division between subject and object. In essence, the mother’s
body and the abject (and the abjection of the mother’s body) are what we reject and
repress in order to form our subjectivity. In my study, I trace how maternal abjection
influences both mother/daughter relationships and women’s attempts at self-definition.
Also, I propose that in certain texts (e.g., Flannery O’Connor’s short stories, Margaret
Atwood’s Lady Oracle, and Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye), for some mothers, their
daughters’ bodies seem to possess a level of abjection (which I have termed “daughter
abjection”) tantamount to maternal abjection, adding yet another barrier to the
mother/daughter connection.
Most frequently, the daughters’ bodies are considered abject when they fail to
conform to the hegemonic expectations for feminine beauty that the mothers attempt to
enforce; in particular, for white mothers, daughter abjection often takes the form of fat,
while for black mothers it tends to be the result of internalized racist beliefs regarding
appearance. In my dissertation, I explore the concept of fat as a form of abjection by
building on Le’a Kent’s essay “Fighting Abjection” from Bodies Out of Bounds: Fatness
and Transgression. Kent writes, “in the public sphere, fat bodies, and fat women’s bodies
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in particular, are represented as a kind of abject: that which must be expelled to make all
other bodily representations and functions, even life itself, possible.” 10 Therefore, if
fatness is abject, then it becomes one of the forces against which subjectivity is formed
and delimited. Kent argues, “Within mainstream representations of the body, the fat body
functions as the abject: it takes up the burden of representing the horror of the body itself
for the culture at large.”11 In other words, the fat body becomes the Every Body;
demonizing and pathologizing the abject fat body helps society-at-large define itself as
the “not-her” and project its general distaste for physicality onto the fat body, thereby
establishing a hyper-visible delineation between self and other, subject and object. I
extend Kent’s claims regarding the abjection of fat bodies by theorizing their
ramifications for subject formation within the mother/daughter relationship, specifically
in texts by Flannery O’Connor, Eudora Welty, Sylvia Plath, and Margaret Atwood.
Whereas the abjection of white female bodies in my primary texts is usually due
to fat, physical disability, or maternity, the abjection of black female bodies is often
ascribed to race. In her discussion of the “captive body” in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Hortense J. Spillers draws a distinction between
“flesh” and “body,” arguing that the flesh of the captive black body exists outside of
ideology, and is denied subjecthood. Since “the procedures for the captive flesh
demarcate a total objectification,” and since, as Spillers establishes, the cultural
imaginary of the United States developed its “American grammar” through the legacy
and effects of slavery, modern-day black bodies are, in many ways, still perceived as
merely flesh.12 They are seen as objects, or they are not seen at all; as Vanessa D.
Dickerson writes, “The black female body is unseen because it is socially constructed as
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a body not worth the effort of seeing.”13 As Patricia Hill Collins, Camille Wilson Cooper,
and others have noted, this objectification, or erasure, has profound implications for
mothers of color, who have, until relatively recently, been left out of feminist theorizing
about motherhood.14 Indeed, feminists like Luce Irigaray, Nancy Chodorow, and Julia
Kristeva frequently essentialize women, speaking in terms of the universal feminine and
failing to recognize the intersectional nature of oppression and marginalization.
Significantly, Darieck Scott draws from Kristeva’s work to propose a theory of abjection
specific to the black experience. In Extravagant Abjection, he posits that “the abjection
in/of blackness endows its inheritors with a form of counterintuitive power,” because the
black subject has “had to be inside” abjection and therefore can develop a fluid
subjectivity outside the tropes of “identity, body, race, nation.”15 In my dissertation, I
incorporate the work of black feminist and postcolonial theorists like Darieck Scott,
Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Hortense Spillers, Audre Lorde, Gayatri Spivak, Nira
Yuval-Davis, and Pnina Werbner into my application of feminist psychoanalysis to texts
by Brooks, Morrison, Danticat, and Kincaid as I draw conclusions regarding the
significance of the black body in mother/daughter relationships.
My focus on bodily abjection dovetails with a consideration of the consequences
of Cartesian dualism for women, as I examine how both the material and the discursive
contribute to the subjectivity of the mothers and daughters in my primary texts. I draw
from Elizabeth Grosz’s work, in particular the concept of “embodied subjectivity” or
“psychical corporeality” that she presents in Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal
Feminism.16 Grosz strives to “displace the centrality of mind, the psyche, interior, or
consciousness (and even the unconscious) in conceptions of the subject through a
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reconfiguration of the body.”17 She argues that a feminist philosophical or theoretical
approach to the body “must avoid the impasse posed by dichotomous accounts of the
person which divide the subject into the mutually exclusive categories of mind and
body.”18 Given the pervasive association of the female body (especially the maternal
body) with abjection, it is crucial to consider how corporeality and the psyche contribute
to the selfhood of the mothers and daughters in my study. According to Grosz, if we are
able to resist the hierarchical relationship between mind and body that Cartesian dualism
claims is inherent in subject formation, then the body becomes a liminal space capable of
collapsing binaries: “instead of participating in – i.e., adhering to one side or the other of
– a binary pair, these pairs can be more readily problematized by regarding the body as
the threshold or borderline concept that hovers perilously and undecidably at the pivotal
point of binary pairs.”19 The concept of the body as “threshold” becomes especially
important when analyzing relationships between mothers and daughters, given Kristeva’s
theories regarding the semiotic chora.
My research has been guided by the following questions: In mother/daughter
relationships, how does the materiality of the body enter into constructions of the self? In
what ways do cultural and societal beliefs about the female body (particularly regarding
race and fatness) affect the mother/daughter relationship? How does the threat of
maternal abjection drive mothers and daughters apart, and is that threat caused by bodily
abjection, or by cultural fears and beliefs about motherhood? In their relationship, can the
deleterious effects of the abjection of the daughter’s body rival or exceed that of the
mother’s? And, conversely, can the abjection of the body somehow help to recuperate
what is lost when one becomes two?
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In chapter one, “‘I ain’t you’: Fat, Freedom, and the Female Body in Flannery
O’Connor and Eudora Welty,” I analyze short stories from O’Connor’s A Good Man is
Hard to Find (1955) and Everything that Rises Must Converge (1965) and Welty’s A
Curtain of Green (1941) and The Golden Apples (1949) to consider how two white,
postwar, Southern women writers portray the intersection between the body and the
mother/daughter relationship in the decades preceding the second wave of feminism.
Specifically, in O’Connor’s “A Circle in the Fire,” “Good Country People,” and
“Revelation,” and Welty’s “A Memory” and “June Recital,” I investigate how the
development of subjectivity is influenced by both discursive and material limitations and
fixations. Critics have tended to interpret these stories as tales of transcendence, reading
the characters’ epiphanies through religious or spiritual lenses that privilege the journey
of the mind over that of the body. By considering O’Connor’s and Welty’s stories
through new methodological frameworks, namely fat studies and corporeal feminism, I
propose that these stories trace the tensions between mothers and daughters as
fundamental discomfort with embodiment itself. Moreover, excess flesh becomes the
symbol of abject femininity, and the mothers’ aversion to this abjection ultimately limits
the daughters’ psychosocial development and drives a wedge between the two women.
The second chapter, “The ‘Ballooning Body’ in Sylvia Plath and Gwendolyn
Brooks,” pairs the poetry and autobiographical novels of Plath and Brooks, who both
explore ambivalence toward motherhood and the desire for self-definition through the
trope of the overwhelming and uncontrollable body. Specifically, I examine Plath’s novel
The Bell Jar (1963) and Brooks’s novel Maud Martha (1953), along with various poems
by both authors. In their work, Plath and Brooks dramatize the process of becoming a
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mother and admitting the abjection of the child-bearing body, in part as a way of
navigating their overly close relationships with their own mothers. Indeed, bodily
abjection shapes mother/daughter relationships in Plath’s and Brooks’s writing and lives
and demonstrates their racialized strategies for negotiating these broached boundaries.
Notably, their different approaches to pregnancy and childbirth, feminine abjection, and
the process of daughters becoming mothers illustrate the ways in which the construction
of whiteness as “invisible” and blackness as inescapable corporeality undergird notions
of femininity and reproduction, as white Plath imagines transcending the body, while
black Brooks turns abjection into a platform for activism.20
In chapter three, “Daughter Abjection and Queer Temporality in Margaret
Atwood and Toni Morrison,” I show how the postmodern elements of early novels by
Atwood and Morrison challenge static notions of identity through their portrayal of both
maternal and daughter abjection. Atwood’s Lady Oracle (1976) and Morrison’s The
Bluest Eye (1970) portray problematic mother/daughter relationships in which the
abjection of the daughters’ bodies has a more debilitating effect on the relationship than
does maternal abjection. While the mothers in these texts are frequently portrayed as
monstrous and distant, the daughters are often depicted as disappointing and inadequate,
particularly in their physical appearance. Consequently, in a reversal of the typical
psychoanalytical developmental narrative in which maternal abjection compels the
daughter to reject and separate from the mother, in Lady Oracle and The Bluest Eye it is
the mothers who reject their daughters, in part because their daughters’ failure to comply
with hegemonic, white supremacist beauty ideals threatens their own precarious position
in patriarchal society. Utilizing a variety of postmodernist literary techniques, such as
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temporal distortion, intertextuality, and multiple perspectives, Atwood and Morrison
reveal the ways in which young women considered physically ugly or grotesque (Joan for
her fatness, Pecola for her blackness) are precluded from a chrononormative experience
of time, because their abjection renders them illegible to hegemonic progress-driven
narratives. In my examination of these postmodern fictions of queer temporality, I
propose that Joan’s and Pecola’s exclusion from chrononormativity may ultimately be
read as liberating and subversive.
Finally, chapter four, “Carrying the Mother in Edwidge Danticat and Jamaica
Kincaid,” explores the effects of colonialization and imperialism on mothers and
daughters in Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory (1994) and Kincaid’s The Autobiography
of My Mother (1996). As products of their countries’ violent, colonial pasts, the women
in these texts experience the difficulty of achieving and maintaining bodily and psychical
autonomy when mothers and the motherland seek to suppress their identities and personal
liberties. Sophie (Breath, Eyes, Memory) and Xuela (The Autobiography of My Mother)
both attempt to reclaim and embrace the abjection of their feminine bodies and to
establish a positive connection to their matrilineage while simultaneously asserting their
own subjectivity, yet various obstacles—both material and psychological—threaten their
success. In these two postcolonial novels, institutional misogyny and imperialist ideology
infiltrate the relationships between mothers and daughters. Sophie and Xuela carry their
mothers around like “living corpses,” unable to commit the symbolic matricide that
Kristeva claims is necessary for individuation, in part because they never know their
mothers as fully “living.”21 However, an exploration of a paradox at the heart of feminist
object-relations theory reveals that such pathological conceptions of the mother-daughter
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relationship are rooted in phallocentrism, and that for two subaltern women living in
societies that seek to subjugate and silence them, “carrying” the mother may be a form of
resistance, a necessary component of subject formation, and an act of love.
Unraveling the complexity of the connection between mother and daughter has
been one of the driving forces of my life. As Adrienne Rich writes, “The loss of the
daughter to the mother, the mother to the daughter, is the essential female tragedy.” 22 No
person or experience in my life has broken my heart as profoundly and deeply as my
mother, and I imagine that she would say the same about me. This same heartache and
estrangement pervades the pages of the texts by O’Connor, Welty, Plath, Brooks,
Atwood, Morrison, Danticat, and Kincaid that I explore in this dissertation. Yet, there is
love, too—a love so powerful that it transcends personal resentment, cultural oppression,
and even death, for as Kincaid’s protagonist Xuela admits, “I had never known my
mother and yet my love for her followed her into eternity.” 23 To me, the mother/daughter
dyad is simply the most fascinating relationship that exists, and this study focuses on the
place where it all begins: the body.
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CHAPTER 1
“I AIN’T YOU”: FAT, FREEDOM, AND THE FEMALE BODY IN
FLANNERY O’CONNOR AND EUDORA WELTY
In Mystery and Manners Flannery O’Connor writes, “The fiction writer has to
realize that he can’t create compassion with compassion, or emotion with emotion, or
thought with thought. He has to provide all these things with a body.” 1 For O’Connor and
Eudora Welty, the task of portraying female bodies presented a particular challenge since,
as Sarah Gleeson-White has observed, “While the southern white woman’s value was
invested in her body, she was at the same time dis-embodied.”2 The lingering effects of
the antebellum South’s fetishization of the purity and sanctity of white women (and
simultaneous disregard for their agency and ability) combined with the postwar emphasis
on a slim, diminutive feminine form created an environment in which the white female
body was both idolized and disenfranchised, valorized and dismissed. Notably, these
paradoxical ideals have been reiterated by Southern women themselves, passed down
through matrilineages. The women of O’Connor’s and Welty’s mid-century short stories
embody this dichotomy. Hegemonic beauty ideals, particularly regarding body size,
pervade the relationships between mothers and daughters in O’Connor’s and Welty’s
fiction. Specifically, as mothers work to indoctrinate their daughters into patriarchal
society, they place considerable emphasis on disciplining the younger woman’s body,
onto which they oftentimes project their own insecurities and anxieties regarding
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femininity and agency. In what follows, I trace the role of the body in mother/daughter
relationships in short stories from O’Connor’s A Good Man is Hard to Find (1955) and
Everything that Rises Must Converge (1965) and Welty’s A Curtain of Green (1941) and
The Golden Apples (1949) as I investigate how the development of subjectivity is
influenced by both discursive and material limitations and fixations. Critics have tended
to interpret these stories as tales of transcendence, reading the characters’ epiphanies
through religious or spiritual lenses that privilege the journey of the mind over that of the
body. By considering O’Connor’s and Welty’s stories through new methodological
frameworks, namely fat studies and corporeal feminism, I propose that these stories trace
the tensions between mothers and daughters as fundamental discomfort with embodiment
itself. Moreover, excess flesh becomes the symbol of abject femininity, and the mothers’
aversion to this abjection ultimately limits the daughters’ psychosocial development and
drives a wedge between the two women.
As historians and scholars such as Anne Goodwyn Jones, Susan V. Donaldson,
and Louise Westling have noted, since the antebellum period, the bourgeois Southern
white woman has symbolized religious piety, the fecundity of the land, and racial purity
and superiority.3 Therefore, the surveillance and policing of her physical appearance has
been a matter of regional identity and pride, as well as a way of enforcing racial and class
boundaries. As “inheritors of an unworkable ideal,” Southern white women have been
expected to convey fragility, grace, and purity through their physical appearance. 4 In fact,
even well into the twenty-first century the South is still obsessed with feminine beauty; in
a 2014 study examining the effect of geographic region and gender on body image,
women in the Southeast “report[ed] the poorest body image of any group,” findings that
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the authors suggest “may be evidence of a long postulated idea that Southern culture,
particularly as it relates to women, holds harsher standards of beauty and places more
importance on appearance than other regions of the United States.” 5 This emphasis on the
female form has long been an important strategy of subjugation and regulation by the
patriarchy; as Susan Bordo points out, “Viewed historically, the discipline and
normalization of the female body…has to be acknowledged as an amazingly durable and
flexible strategy of social control.”6 For a region so concerned with the presentation and
purity of its white women, the Southern patriarchal society in which O’Connor and Welty
were raised remained concerned with creating “docile bodies” (to borrow Foucault’s
term) throughout the twentieth century. 7 The postwar drive for domesticity only
heightened this fixation on women’s appearance, a phenomenon which O’Connor and
Welty—two women writers who were not considered conventionally attractive—convey
in their fiction.
One of the primary methods through which these oppressive messages regarding
women’s bodies are disseminated is a mother’s socialization of her daughter. As Monica
Carol Miller points out in Being Ugly, Southern mothers are charged with raising young
women who will “maintain and recreate the status quo,” which they accomplish by
preparing their daughters to marry appropriately and perpetuate the white dominant
culture.8 In other words, the Southern mother is expected to prepare her daughter for
successful admittance into patriarchal society by teaching her how to be docile,
subservient, and beautiful. Significantly, by the early to mid-twentieth century, feminine
beauty had become synonymous with slimness. In what Peter Stearns terms the “The
Misogynist Phase” of fat prejudice, mid-century America was overly fixated on the size
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of female bodies, particularly those of young girls: “when overweight children were
discussed from the 1920s until the 1970s, the focus was almost invariably on girls.” 9
Thus, part of a mother’s job became monitoring and containing the size of her daughter’s
body.
This intense focus on the body has implications for both the daughter’s
psychosocial development and for the relationship between a mother and daughter. Luce
Irigaray posits that “the most ancient and most current relationship we know [is] the
relationship to the mother’s body, to our body.”10 Since mothers and daughters first
experience each other corporeally (and, according to theorists like Julia Kristeva, also
communicate with each other through the body in the earliest stages of life), the body can
become a highly charged emblem as a daughter grows up.11 In Of Woman Born, Adrienne
Rich writes of the mother/daughter relationship, “That earliest enwrapment of one female
body with another can sooner or later be denied or rejected, felt as choking
possessiveness, as rejection, trap, or taboo; but it is, at the beginning, the whole world.” 12
Once the daughter begins to individuate and separate from the mother (a process which
Rich calls “the essential female tragedy”), the mother often sees the daughter as a
reflection or double of herself.13 According to Rich, one consequence of this dynamic is
that “[mothers] carry their own guilt and self-hatred over into their daughters’
experiences… [The mother] identifies intensely with her daughter, but through weakness,
not through strength.”14 That is, due to her own unresolved issues, the mother fixates on
her daughter’s weaknesses, because she sees them as a reflection of her own. This
projection or doubling could be remnants of the “prolonged symbiosis and narcissistic
overidentification” that characterize early relationships between mothers and daughters,
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and which Nancy Chodorow suggests can continue to reemerge; according to Chodorow,
the resurfacing of preoedipal mother/daughter issues during adolescence—which can
include “maternal control of a daughter’s body”—serves as confirmation that aspects of
the early childhood relationship between the two women persist. 15 Consequently, the
daughter rebels by rejecting her mother, which can involve crafting a selfhood that stands
in direct opposition to the woman her mother wants her to become.
In what follows, I consider O’Connor’s and Welty’s fixation on fat females in
their fiction and examine how those fat bodies intersect with mother/daughter
relationships. In the first section, I apply a fat studies interpretation of Julia Kristeva’s
theories regarding abjection to O’Connor’s characters Sally Virginia Cope and Joy-Hulga
Hopewell to explore how their mothers’ disdain for their excessive bodies influences
their psychosocial development. In section two, I explore how mother/daughter pairs in
O’Connor’s “Revelation” and Welty’s “A Memory” facilitate epiphanies for the
protagonists of both stories. Finally, in section three, I show how Miss Eckhart, a fat,
German immigrant in Welty’s “June Recital,” becomes a sacrificial scapegoat so that a
small, Southern community can reaffirm its traditional, patriarchal boundaries.

“Bright Fat Girls”: The Abject Body and the Stunted Self
Flannery O’Connor’s frequent fictional depictions of the mother/daughter
relationship (which Louise Westling has referred to as “obsessive”) were unique for her
time and region.16 Barbara Bennett notes that the mother figure is often “simply missing”
in pre-1970 Southern fiction, making O’Connor the pre-1970 Southern author who deals
most frequently with the mother/daughter relationship.17 This obsession has been

22

attributed to O’Connor’s intense and complicated relationship with her own mother,
Regina, with whom she lived as an adult from the time she was diagnosed with lupus in
1952 until her death in 1964. As Westling has pointed out, in at least six of her thirty-one
published stories, O’Connor depicts a widowed mother who takes care of her “large,
physically marred girl” while also supervising a farm, and the daughter is usually
portrayed as contrary and intellectual—circumstances which mirror Flannery and
Regina’s life together. 18 While, as Loxley F. Nichols observes, there are “no one-on-one
parallels” between Flannery and Regina in any of the stories, both O’Connor’s fiction and
her letters reveal her preoccupation with strong, overbearing mothers and their
relationships with rebellious, disappointing daughters.19 Two such stories—“A Circle in
the Fire” and “Good Country People” from A Good Man is Hard to Find—chart the
trajectory of an unattractive (and noncompliant) girl’s fate in Southern culture. Sally
Virginia and Joy-Hulga fail to perform femininity in the ways their mothers expect (and
sometimes demand). In particular, the daughters’ bodies—depicted as fat, awkward, and
aesthetically disappointing—become the site where the conflict between the mothers’
anxieties regarding gender performance and the daughters’ process of individuation most
frequently collide.
Sally Virginia (whose name only appears once in the story—the rest of the time
she is referred to as simply “the child”) spends most of “A Circle in the Fire” hovering in
the background while her mother, Mrs. Cope, contends with three rude, mischievous boys
who have taken up residence on their land. She is described as “a pale fat girl of twelve
with a frowning squint and a large mouth full of silver bands.” 20 Her mother only “turn[s]
her attention to the child” when “one thing was finished and another about to begin,”
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which indicates that mothering is an afterthought for Mrs. Cope (148). When, on one of
these rare instances of attentiveness, she discovers her daughter dressed up as a man
armed with two pistols, she gives her a “tragic look” and declares, “I look at you and I
want to cry! Sometimes you look like you might belong to Mrs. Pritchard!” (148). Mrs.
Pritchard, Mrs. Cope’s employee (ergo, of a lower class), is described as a “large
woman” who is so fat she is able to fold her arms “on a shelf of a stomach” and is the
physical “opposite” of Mrs. Cope, who is described as being “very small and trim” (127).
Sally Virginia responds to her mother’s lamentations by telling her to “Leave me be. Just
leave me be. I ain’t you,” and then goes off into the woods “as if she were stalking out an
enemy” (148). As Westling observes, here Sally Virginia “deliberately speaks in poorwhite dialect” as an act of defiance against her mother’s attempts to feminize her. 21 In
both her body and behavior, Sally Virginia rebels by aligning with her mother’s lower
class employee. In The Reproduction of Mothering, Nancy Chodorow notes that
oftentimes in the mother/daughter relationship girls “seem to become and experience
themselves as the self of the mother’s fantasy.” 22 Sally Virginia, “the child” whom Mrs.
Cope seems to knowingly ignore, fails to serve as “her mother’s double and extension,”
to reflect back the “self of [her] mother’s fantasy.”23 Sally Virginia’s selfhood is shaped
by her rejection of her mother; as a “pale fat girl” who refuses to perform the kind of
femininity that her mother expects, she strives to distance herself from her mother (i.e., “I
ain’t you”), but her quest to define herself as the “not-her” will likely limit the
development of her subjectivity, as it does for Joy in “Good Country People.”
Joy, a “large blonde girl who [has] an artificial leg,” is about twice the age of
Sally Virginia (O’Connor calls Joy a “poor stout girl in her thirties”) (168, 171). Similar
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to “A Circle in the Fire,” Joy is often referred to as simply “the girl” and has a
contentious relationship with her mother, Mrs. Hopewell. Particular emphasis is placed
on descriptions of Joy’s corporeality. She is described as “the large hulking Joy,” and
“the big spectacled Joy-Hulga” (170, 172). Mrs. Hopewell appears to perceive her
daughter’s physical disability, the loud noises she makes when she walks, and her body
size as personal affronts. Joy has taken her quest to establish herself as the “not-her” to an
extreme by earning a PhD in philosophy, dressing herself in mismatched, comical
clothing, and even rejecting her birth name, legally changing her first name to Hulga,
“purely on the basis of its ugly sound” (172). At times it is difficult to discern whether
her life decisions have been motivated by sincere desire or whether they have been the
result of an instinctual impulse to reject her mother, who views her daughter’s
individuation as a process that has only served to alienate her: “It seemed to Mrs.
Hopewell that every year [Joy] grew less like other people and more like herself—
bloated, rude, and squint-eyed” (174). Significantly, Sally Virginia is also described as
having a “frowning squint,” which seems to suggest that the daughters’ struggle for
selfhood has affected their vision—perhaps a physical manifestation of their attempts to
see themselves clearly and as separate from their mothers. For Joy-Hulga (or Sally
Virginia), to grow “more like herself” means that she is growing less like her mother, a
fact that creates conflict in both stories.
However, in growing less like their mothers, the daughters in O’Connor’s stories
limit their own growth, and often end up simply developing into their mothers’ antithesis.
Gretchen Dobrott Bernard concurs that the dysfunctionality in O’Connor’s fictional
mother/daughter relationships “stunts any emotional growth, any possibility of daughter
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or mother fully reaching maturity.”24 Both Sally Virginia and Joy-Hulga intentionally
increase their ugliness through their mannerisms, attire, and attitudes, all to resist
becoming their “mother’s double and extension.” To repel the boys who refuse to leave
her mother’s property, Sally Virginia sticks her head out of her window and says,
“‘Ugggghhrhh,’ in a loud voice, crossing her eyes and hanging her tongue out as far as
possible as if she were going to vomit,” which is a far cry from the genteel manners and
passive aggressiveness that Mrs. Cope employs in her dealings with the boys (140).
Through her “ugly” sounding name, choosing to dress in “a six-year-old skirt and a
yellow sweat shirt with a faded cowboy on a horse embossed on it,” and “stump[ing],
with about twice the noise that was necessary” around the house with her artificial leg,
Joy-Hulga presents herself as the opposite of the woman her mother wants her to be,
which suggests that her life choices have been motivated purely by rebellion and spite
(174, 183). Given Sally Virginia’s resistance to her mother’s attempts at gender
conditioning, it seems plausible that she, in time, will do the same. Notably, in “A Circle
in the Fire,” Sally Virginia is almost the same age as Joy-Hulga was when she lost her
leg, which was “shot off in a hunting accident when Joy was ten” (171). As a result of
this physical and emotional trauma, Joy-Hulga’s psychosocial development remains
frozen in adolescence, and she becomes a perpetual angry teenager who resists
independence (“Joy had made it plain that if it had not been for her condition, she would
be far away from these red hills and good country people”) and perspective: “the large
hulking Joy, whose constant outrage had obliterated every expression from her face,
would stare just a little to the side of her [mother], her eyes icy blue, with the look of
someone who has achieved blindness by an act of will and means to keep it” (174, 170).
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For Sally Virginia and Joy-Hulga, resisting conscription into the Southern feminine ideal
also compromises their personal growth.
Significantly, in 1956 (one year after A Good Man is Hard to Find was
published), O’Connor wrote to a friend, “When I was twelve I made up my mind
absolutely that I would not get any older”—a remark that is reminiscent of Joy-Hulga’s
refusal to mature.25 While she attributes this decision to the fact that she was “a very
ancient twelve” and found teenagers “repulsive,” one could argue that O’Connor
ultimately (and ironically) got her wish by living with her mother until her death. 26 The
frustration that mothers like Mrs. Cope and Mrs. Hopewell exhibit towards their
aesthetically disappointing daughters takes on new significance when examining the
relationship between O’Connor and her own mother. In his extensive biography of
O’Connor, Brad Gooch writes, “Regina’s devotion to her daughter often took the form of
trying, unsuccessfully, to mold her into the perfect Southern-style little girl.”27 Similar to
Mrs. Cope, Mrs. Hopewell, and the mothers of other O’Connor short stories, Regina ran a
farm (Andalusia) after her husband died of lupus when Flannery was fifteen. As an
intellectual, shy, socially awkward, “mousy looking young lady” who later walked with a
limp (and eventually, on crutches), Flannery was not the marriageable Southern beauty
that her mother had hoped for when raising her in Savannah society. 28 Many visitors to
Andalusia would later remark on the tension that they observed between Regina and
Flannery during their stay; this tension is also apparent in Flannery’s collected letters, in
which her comic portrayals of her mother sometimes seethe with restrained resentment.
Similar to her characters Sally Virginia and Joy-Hulga (and, as we will see later,
Mary Grace in “Revelation”), O’Connor’s body and physical aesthetics became a point of
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conflict between her and her mother. In an early autobiographical collection of stories
from the mid-1930s called “My Relitives,” Flannery depicts Regina at the kitchen sink,
barking orders: “‘Your father will be here any minute,’ her mother said, ‘and the table
won’t be set. Hold your stomach in.’”29 This indicates that Regina, an attractive, “hidebound Southern lady, [who] always wore hat and gloves in public,” had already been
instructing Flannery to be concerned with her figure by the time she was ten years old. 30
At age twelve, she wrote in her journal, “R. said I was clumsie,” which suggests that
Regina’s criticism of Flannery’s physicality continued into adolescence. 31 And by the
time Flannery was an adult writer returning home from a visit with Robert and Sally
Fitzgerald in 1952, Regina was still monitoring her daughter’s body: “As soon as she saw
me my mamma said, ‘Oh you’ve gotten fat.’”32 A letter to Elizabeth and Robert Lowell
two years later seems to suggest that Flannery had internalized Regina’s aversion to fat:
“I didn’t mean I was fat when I said I was disgustingly healthy. I’m not fat yet but I don’t
have any room to grow. I just meant I don’t look very intelligent.” 33 Two years after that,
in 1956, she writes to a friend, “it’s doubtful if there will ever again appear in my works
anybody weighing over 92 pounds…Now I don’t love these fat women and I do love
Mrs. May, Mrs. Cope, Mrs. Hopewell & Bailey’s mother”—all four of whom are thin
characters.34
In Being Ugly, Miller argues that writers like O’Connor depict ugly female
characters who are not “suitable” for marriage and motherhood as a way of resisting and
subverting patriarchal expectations for women. 35 She clarifies that, in addition to
describing physical appearance, the phrase “being ugly” has a “specifically southern
definition,” which is “rude, rebellious, or other inappropriate behavior.” 36 Miller writes,
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“Though Flannery O’Connor claimed that southern literature is rife with freaks because
only southerners were still able to recognize the freakish, I maintain that writers such as
O’Connor created so many ugly women as their own way of ‘being ugly.’” 37
Significantly, so many of O’Connor’s “ugly women” (like Sally Virginia, Joy-Hulga, and
Mary Grace) are “bright fat girls” whose lives and dispositions closely mirror their
author’s, which seems to suggest that O’Connor may have viewed her own body as fat
(or, at least, as large and unruly). 38 While I agree with Miller’s assertion that O’Connor’s
habit of creating ugly female characters was an act of rebellion against Southern gender
norms, I also believe that the fact that so many of these characters are specifically fat (or,
big and awkward) signals that Regina succeeded in conditioning her daughter to believe
that “fat” was tantamount to “ugly,” that body size was an integral aspect of female
beauty. So, while O’Connor’s frequent depictions of women who are not “properly
feminine marriage material” do subvert hegemonic patriarchal expectations and thereby
constitute a rebellion against the Southern status quo, the preponderance of corpulent
female bodies (that she clearly meant to be perceived as “ugly”) in her stories suggests
that her subversion of the status quo only went so far.39 Ultimately, O’Connor
internalized the fat stigma that her mother—and the rest of mid-century American
society—enforced.
In Fat Shame: Stigma and the Fat Body in American Culture, Amy Erdman
Farrell traces the intense, pervasive fat hatred in the US back to the Industrial Revolution
and notes that “[f]atness in the United States ‘means’ excess of desire, of bodily urges not
controlled, of immoral, lazy, and sinful habits,” and that “women…bear the particular
brunt of our culture’s disgust with fatness.”40 By the time Regina was raising Flannery in

29

Georgia in the 1920s and 30s, “slenderness [had become] a sign of modern virtue.” 41 Still
today, fat is generally perceived to be both a physical disease and a moral failing. As
aforementioned, a fear and hatred of fat is often passed down through matrilineages as
mothers attempt to prepare their daughters to succeed within a patriarchal, fat-hating
society. In her study “Fat Women: The Role of the Mother-Daughter Relationship
Revisited,” sociologist Maya Maor interviewed a group of self-identified fat women to
determine whether the mother/daughter relationship is a prominent factor in the
development of a negative fat identity. 42 She concluded that the mothers were central to
the daughters’ development of fat hatred and self-loathing: “The relationship with
interviewees’ mothers was a very prominent and central theme in participants’
recollections of how they were defined as ‘fat’, and how they came to understand that
‘fat’ has a negative meaning.”43 For most participants in the study, their first awareness of
their “difference” caused by their fatness was prompted by “comments made by their
mothers.”44 O’Connor portrays this dynamic in her fiction, possibly as a reflection of her
experiences with her own mother. And since the female characters she intends to be
perceived as “ugly” are so often also fat, it appears as if Regina’s conditioning succeeded.
When Sally Virginia and Joy-Hulga receive negative messages about their (fat)
bodies from their mothers, this contributes to the formation of their selfhood—in
particular, to the tension between their subjectivity and embodiment—because it renders
their bodies abject. Julia Kristeva’s theory of the “abject” contends with our visceral
reaction to forces that threaten to break down meaning through a loss of the distinction
between self and other, or subject and object. Examples of such forces include vomit,
feces, bodily fluids, the sight of a corpse, etc. Kristeva explains, “It is thus not lack of
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cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What
does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the
composite.”45 That is, the abject is comprised of the revolting (yet necessary) features of
physicality—the fluids, the seepage, the general messiness of being alive—aspects of the
operations of the body that we need, but reject. We reject and expulse the abject, yet it is
us, too; we establish our sense of self through our primal repression of the abject, yet it
always haunts us, reminding us of death and threatening to dismantle the division
between subject and object. In her essay “Fighting Abjection,” Le’a Kent posits that
fatness is a form of abjection. 46 She writes, “in the public sphere, fat bodies, and fat
women’s bodies in particular, are represented as a kind of abject: that which must be
expelled to make all other bodily representations and functions, even life itself,
possible.”47 Therefore, if fatness is abject, then it becomes one of the forces against
which subjectivity is formed and delimited. The fat body becomes the Every Body;
demonizing and pathologizing the abject fat body helps society-at-large define itself as
the “not-her” and project its general (Cartesian-validated) distaste for physicality onto the
fat body, thereby establishing a hyper-visible delineation between self and other, subject
and object.
If the fat (female) body functions as a kind of abject, then this has profound
implications for the cathectic split that occurs between mother and daughter. The abject is
closely associated with the maternal body, since the indistinct boundary between mother
and infant is the primal experience of both fascination and horror. Kristeva writes, “The
abject confronts us…with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even
before ex-isting outside of her.”48 The mother’s body and the abject (and the abjection of
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the mother’s body) are what we reject and repress in order to form our subjectivity. In
other words, the process of individuation and creation of selfhood necessitates a
repression of the abject and rejection of the mother; if the mother resents this split and
thus aligns the daughter’s body with the abject by teaching the daughter that she is fat
(and by teaching her daughter that fat is bad), and if the daughter internalizes this
negative fat identity, she can never really escape the abjection of the body, and can
therefore never establish clear boundaries of selfhood. As a fat woman living in a fathating society, abjection becomes who she is, not simply aspects of physicality to repress
or avoid. And, if as Kristeva writes, the abject is the “in-between, the ambiguous, the
composite,” the daughter then hovers in a sort of developmental purgatory. She will
likely become trapped in the same cycle of self-loathing and stunted emotional growth
that produced her mother, even if she crafts herself into the antithesis of her mother, as
Joy-Hulga does (and as Sally Virginia likely will).
This tension between the daughters’ subjectivity and embodiment is evident in the
epiphanies they experience at the end of the stories. As Philip Stevick has noted, the
epiphany, or “moment of self-awareness at the end of a fiction,” became a characteristic
component of American stories after World War I, and Susan V. Donaldson has argued
that the epiphany “serves as the central distinguishing mark of the modernist short
story.”49 O’Connor referred to this trope as a moment of “grace”: “There is a moment in
every great story in which the presence of grace can be felt as it waits to be accepted or
rejected.”50 Of course for O’Connor, a devout Catholic, the idea of the “presence of
grace” has religious, or, at least, spiritual connotations, but for many other modernist
writers, the epiphany became an opportunity for depicting a moment of transcendence
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during “a period notably deficient in religious faith.” 51 Therefore, in both its religious and
literary sense, the epiphany tends to ratify the mind and soul over the body (and in most
readings of O’Connor’s work that acknowledge the central role of the body in many of
her characters’ epiphanies, the emphasis tends to be on the ways in which materiality and
spirituality coalesce). However, I posit that we can view the moment of epiphany in these
stories as an experience that plunges the characters further into the body.
For Sally Virginia in “A Circle in the Fire,” this moment occurs after the
trespassing boys have set fire to her mother’s land; she tries to run to her mother, “but her
legs were too heavy and she stood there, weighted down with some new unplaced misery
that she had never felt before” (151). Significantly, Sally Virginia’s fall from innocence
to experience is accompanied by a corporeal shift. Her “heavy” legs and the “weighted
down” sensation she feels when she discovers her and her mother’s relative
powerlessness in the face of misogyny signals that she is beginning to feel the weight of
the patriarchy’s limitations on and expectations for women; additionally, this allusion to
heaviness and weight may foreshadow that this “pale fat girl of twelve” will soon grow
into a fat woman. When she reaches her mother, she stares “up at her face as if she had
never seen it before. It was the face of the new misery she felt, but on her mother it
looked old and it looked as if it might have belonged to anybody” (152). Here, Sally
Virginia apprehends how living as a woman in Southern society has marked her mother’s
body; she has now been indoctrinated into the patriarchy, and on her mother’s face she
sees a potential future self.
Joy-Hulga’s epiphany also involves a corporeal change and a harsh awakening.
Due to the presence of her artificial leg, her abject fat body ventures into the realm of the
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grotesque. Mary Russo defines the grotesque body as “open, protruding, irregular,
secreting, multiple, and changing.”52 The grotesque is associated with the uncanny, with
that which is both familiar and unfamiliar; it represents a deviation from the norm—
something (or someone) who is comically and/or disturbingly ugly or different. 53 Because
Joy-Hulga’s “hulking” body has the added anomaly of an amputated leg, she attracts the
interest of a traveling bible salesman who has a fetish for grotesque female bodies and
their prosthetics (“One time I got a woman’s glass eye,” he tells her [194]). Thinking, as
her mother does, that he is just “good country people”—innocent, simple, and Godfearing, she agrees to accompany him on a picnic, where he seduces her, convinces her to
remove her artificial leg, and then runs off with the leg.54 The man succeeds in
persuading Joy-Hulga to remove her prosthetic leg—which “she was as sensitive
about…as a peacock about his tail,” and which she sees as tantamount to her “soul”—by
telling her that “it’s what makes you different. You ain’t like anybody else” (191). After
he has gotten what he wants, however, he sneers, “I’m as good as you any day in the
week,” and “you ain’t so smart” (193, 194). Through her failure to see the bible
salesman’s true nature and thereby anticipate his sudden reversal, Joy-Hulga learns that
she is not as smart and perceptive as she has always believed herself to be; ultimately, she
is “like anybody else”—a lesson that Sally Virginia also learns when she sees her own
newfound misery on her mother’s face, a misery that “could have belonged to anybody.”
By retreating into her mind through a lifetime of intellectual pursuits, Joy-Hulga has tried
to distance herself from her body; her epiphany at the end of “Good Country People” is
the painful realization that, to patriarchal culture, her abject body is who she is, and her
attempt to cultivate a selfhood that transcends or denies the body has, at least in this
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instance, put her at a disadvantage: “Her brain seemed to have stopped thinking
altogether and to be about some other function that it was not very good at” (192).
Sally Virginia and Joy-Hulga—two “bright fat girls” who defy their mothers’
attempts at gender conditioning—demonstrate one way in which O’Connor’s fiction
exceeds her own beliefs. By depicting fat as one of the qualities antithetical to feminine
beauty, O’Connor seems to simply reify the fat prejudice of mid-century America.
However, her stories may give us avenues of resistance that she might not have
recognized herself. In her portrayals of complex mother/daughter relationships, neither
the rebellious daughters nor the overbearing mothers emerge as clear antagonists. Rather,
the antagonists in these stories are the hegemonic forces that compel these women to
comply with arbitrary and oppressive beauty and behavioral standards. Examining these
stories through the lenses of fat studies and corporeal feminism reveals that “A Circle in
the Fire” and “Good Country People” illustrate the ways in which patriarchal
expectations for women can infiltrate and sour relationships between mothers, daughters,
and their bodies—a potentially recuperative (albeit likely unintentional) message from a
woman writer who famously contended with a complex mother/daughter relationship of
her own.

“A Hog and Me Both”: Epiphanic Mothers and Daughters
In O’Connor’s “Revelation” and Welty’s “A Memory,” fat bodies and
mother/daughter conflicts facilitate epiphanies for the stories’ narrators. In the case of
both stories, a great deal of critical attention has been paid to the “revelations” that Mrs.
Turpin and the narrator of “A Memory” experience, but little has been ventured about the
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secondary mother/daughter characters that serve as catalysts for those epiphanies. For
both narrators, witnessing an uncanny exchange between a mother and daughter unearths
fears that had previously been repressed.
“Revelation” grants readers access to the bigoted, self-righteous mind of Mrs.
Ruby Turpin.55 The story is meditated through Mrs. Turpin’s myopic vision and dogmatic
world view, in which individuals are instantly hierarchized based on race, perceived
socio-economic class, and sartorial proclivities. “Revelation” begins as Mrs. Turpin and
her husband Claud enter a “very small” doctor’s office waiting room, which “Mrs.
Turpin, who was very large, made…look even smaller by her presence” (191). When she
squeezes herself into a chair “which held her tight as a corset” and expresses a desire to
“reduce,” a “stylish lady” (also sometimes referred to as “the pleasant lady”) sitting
across from her assures her, “Oh, you aren’t fat”—the pointed emphasis on “you”
seeming to imply that her own daughter sitting next to her, “a fat girl of eighteen or
nineteen,” is fat (193). As Mrs. Turpin appraises the daughter’s scowling face that is
“blue with acne,” she reflects that she “herself was fat but she had always had good skin,
and, though she was forty-seven years old, there was not a wrinkle in her face except
around her eyes from laughing too much” (194). Similar to Ruby Hill in O’Connor’s “A
Stroke of Good Fortune,” Ruby Turpin prides herself on her youthful appearance, which
has been made possible by both her corpulent frame and avoidance of motherhood. 56
As Mrs. Turpin converses with the “stylish/pleasant lady” (the only other
occupant of the waiting room whom she deems worthy of her attention, besides her own
husband), the “big fat girl with her face all broke out,” Mary Grace, grows increasingly
agitated and rancorous (212). Like Joy-Hulga in “Good Country People,” Mary Grace is
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a physically-marred intellectual surrounded by nitwits; a college student home on a break
from school, she attempts to read her Human Development textbook in silence, but her
mother’s and Mrs. Turpin’s classist, racist, passive-aggressive, and cliché remarks ignite
in her an epic fury. She begins to express this rage through steady glares at Mrs. Turpin:
“the ugly girl’s eyes were fixed on Mrs. Turpin as if she had some very special reason for
disliking her” (197). Finally, when her anger reaches its apex, she hurls Human
Development at Mrs. Turpin’s head right before charging and sinking her fingers “like
clamps into the soft flesh of [Mrs. Turpin’s] neck” (206). In the chaos that ensues, Mary
Grace, restrained by her mother and a nurse, delivers one of her only two lines in the
entire story to Mrs. Turpin: “Go back to hell where you came from, you old wart hog”
(207). After Mary Grace is sedated and taken away in an ambulance with her mother, the
Turpins return to their farm, where Mrs. Turpin attempts to process the experience and
reconcile Mary Grace’s harsh pronouncement with her own narcissistic Christian
cosmology.
Critical responses to “Revelation” tend to focus on Ruby Turpin’s spiritual
journey, which culminates in a vision of “whole companies of white-trash…bands of
black niggers…and battalions of freaks and lunatics”—the very demographic groups she
derides throughout the story—“rumbling toward heaven” ahead of her, which she
experiences as she cleans out the hog pen on her farm.57 Certainly, Mrs. Turpin’s vision
serves as the climax of the story. However, this “most powerful of O’Connor’s
revelations” is only made possible by Mrs. Turpin’s brush with a volatile
mother/daughter relationship into which she unknowingly intrudes in a doctor’s office
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waiting room.58 Additionally, another smaller climax and epiphany (which precede Mrs.
Turpin’s) cause Mary Grace and her mother to reconnect at an unlikely moment.
From the stylish lady’s first passive aggressive comment about her daughter’s
weight to the moment that the two ride off together in an ambulance, the tension in the
mother/daughter pair is palpable. The reassuring comments that the stylish lady makes to
Mrs. Turpin regarding her “good disposition” double as subtle jabs at her “scowling”
daughter seated next to her: “I don’t think it makes a bit of difference what size you are.
You just can’t beat a good disposition” (193). Their contrasting footwear conveys the
mother’s fastidiousness about appearance and Mary Grace’s disdain for it: “The welldressed lady had on red and grey suede shoes to match her dress.…The ugly girl had on
Girl Scout shoes and heavy socks” (194). Mary Grace, like Joy-Hulga, defies her mother
through her attire. However, even though she goes to great lengths to distance herself
from her mother aesthetically and intellectually, it remains obvious to an outside observer
that the two belong to each other: “She was obviously the lady’s daughter because,
although they didn’t look anything alike as to disposition, they both had the same shape
of face and the same blue eyes. On the lady they sparkled pleasantly but in the girl’s
seared face they appeared alternatively to smolder and to blaze” (196). Dumas and
Wilson interpret this intense “smoldering” gaze as evidence that Mary Grace is “an
embodiment of spiritual presence” and can offer Mrs. Turpin “enlightenment.” 59 Within
the context of the mother/daughter dyad, however, this gaze likely has little to do with
Mrs. Turpin.
Seated right next to each other yet psychically miles apart, Mary Grace and her
mother use Mrs. Turpin as an intermediary for their problems with each other. The great
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extremes to which Mary Grace goes to disassociate from her mother (i.e., the unattractive
attire, her intentionally “ugly” disposition, and her attendance at a Northern liberal arts
college) signal her desire to individuate and separate from her mother. This process has
clearly been difficult for the mother, who vents her frustration through passive aggressive
comments to Mrs. Turpin. After Mary Grace makes a “loud ugly noise through her
teeth,” “[h]er mother’s mouth grew thin and tight” before she begins her lament to Mrs.
Turpin: “‘I think the worst thing in the world,’ she said, ‘is an ungrateful person…. I
know a girl…who can never say a kind word to anyone, who never smiles, who just
criticizes and complains all day long’” (205). Ironically, of course, here it is the mother
herself who criticizes and complains about Mary Grace. It is noteworthy that the mother’s
diatribe is preceded by Mary Grace’s “loud ugly noise through her teeth” and her own
mouth growing “thin and tight”; the two seem to want to communicate their frustrations
openly with each other, but the words that could possibly connect them cannot make it
past their lips. Interestingly, this is the final exchange between the mother and daughter
before Mary Grace hurls her book at Mrs. Turpin’s head. Critics have typically read the
book tossing as motivated by Mary Grace’s anger at Mrs. Turpin for proclaiming “Oh
thank you, Jesus, Jesus, thank you!” because God didn’t make her white-trash or black,60
but I propose that this random violent act is actually a response to the mother’s passive
aggressive comments that immediately precede Mrs. Turpin’s joyful outburst.
Throughout the story, Mary Grace projects her resentment of her mother and her own
self-loathing onto Mrs. Turpin, who serves as a double of both her mother and herself. In
Mrs. Turpin’s fat frame, Mary Grace sees a future self reflected back to her; Mrs.
Turpin’s age and aggressively positive disposition also render her a stand-in for Mary
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Grace’s mother. This helps explain why “[t]here was no doubt in [Mrs. Turpin’s] mind
that the girl did know her, knew her in some intense and personal way, beyond time and
place and condition” (207). To Mary Grace, Mrs. Turpin embodies the hypocrisy of her
mother, the bigotry of the region she has tried to escape, and her own fat, abject body.
Mary Grace hurls her book at Mrs. Turpin because she cannot throw it at her mother, the
South, or herself.
After the attack, the energy between Mary Grace and her mother changes. The
doctor enters the waiting room and gives Mary Grace a shot (presumably a sedative),
after which her eyes “seemed a much lighter blue than before, as if a door that had been
tightly closed behind them was now open to admit air and light” (207). The protective
shield that Mary Grace erected as a psychic barricade to her mother has been lowered
through the cathartic release of anger and the swift administration of pharmaceuticals.
The mother sits on the floor, “her lips pressed together, holding Mary Grace’s hand in her
lap. The girl’s fingers were gripped like a baby’s around her thumb” (208). Again, the
mother’s tightened lips hold back her words. Mary Grace’s fingers “gripped like a
baby’s” around her mother’s thumb suggest that she has regressed to an infantile state
following the outburst. Chodorow posits, “A girl alternates between total rejection of a
mother who represents infantile dependence and attachment to her, between identification
with anyone other than her mother and feeling herself her mother’s double and
extension.”61 This vacillation between rejection and attachment, projection and symbiosis
is evident in the drama that plays out between mother and daughter in the waiting room.
The great lengths to which Mary Grace goes to physically present herself as distinct from
her mother and to publicly disavow the sentiments expressed in her mother and Mrs.
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Turpin’s conversation are thrown into sharp contrast by her sudden childlike dependence
on her mother. The fact that their connection and reconciliation is expressed bodily rather
than through language is notable, for it is reminiscent of Kristeva’s concept of the chora,
the pre-linguistic communication between a mother and her infant prior to the child’s
acquisition of language. Indeed, in this brief period of connection following Mary
Grace’s outburst, neither mother nor daughter seems capable of communicating through
language: “Until the ambulance came, the only sounds in the room were the tremulous
moans of the girl’s mother, who continued to sit on the floor” (208). The mother’s
moaning conveys the agony of the thetic split, of the daughter’s loss to the mother. The
two women are reconnected through their shared pain and dependence on each other.
Therefore, while Mrs. Turpin’s encounter with Mary Grace serves as the catalyst for a
spiritual vision that expands her understanding of God and her own place in the universe,
Mrs. Turpin herself facilitates a reconciliatory experience for a mother and daughter who
have grown unable to communicate.
Similar to “Revelation,” Welty’s “A Memory” features an encounter between a
protagonist and secondary mother/daughter characters that inspires an epiphany. In “A
Memory,” the narrator recalls her fall from innocence to experience during an afternoon
at a lake as an adolescent. It is one of only two stories in Welty’s first collection, A
Curtain of Green, to employ a first-person narrator, which has prompted critics to venture
that the story “functions as a memoir or fanciful redaction of Welty’s own memories.” 62
Early on Welty establishes that the story is, at least in part, about perception; the narrator
shares that “[e]ver since I had begun taking painting lessons, I had made small frames
with my fingers, to look out at everything.”63 During the summer in question, she spends
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her days lying “on the sand beside the small lake, with [her] hands squared over [her]
eyes, finger tips touching, looking out by this device to see everything: which appeared as
a kind of projection” (148, emphasis mine). Just as in O’Connor’s “Revelation,”
psychological projection plays a central role in “A Memory.” Lionel Kelly notes that
Welty’s use of “projection” here is “telling, both in its cinematic and painterly resonance
and in its psychological significance as a term signifying the extension outward from the
self to the other.”64 In “A Memory,” the narrator’s youthful fantasies of unrequited love
are undercut by the unruly bodies of a family of fellow beachgoers, onto which she, like
Mary Grace, projects her own fears of maternal abjection, fat, and class boundaries.
Before relaying the tale of her first love, the narrator reflects on her mental and
emotional state at the time that the story takes place. She recalls that she “was at an age
when [she] formed a judgment upon every person and every event which came under
[her] eye, although [she] was easily frightened” (148). This fear, she clarifies, was caused
by a disconnect between expectation and reality: “When a person, or a happening,
seemed to me not in keeping with my opinion, or even my hope or expectation, I was
terrified by a vision of abandonment and wildness which tore my heart with a kind of
sorrow” (148). Just as she makes “small frames with [her] fingers” through which to view
the world, the narrator imposes rigid conceptual and emotional frames on her experiences
and encounters, and anyone who exceeds those frames has the power to dismantle the
careful scaffolding of her psyche. She goes on to emphasize that her mother and father
were unaware of the scope of her vision, that they thought she “saw nothing in the world
which was not strictly coaxed into place like a vine on our garden trellis to be presented
to my eyes,” indicating that she (like Mary Grace) is in the midst of individuating and
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psychically separating from her parents at the time that the story begins (148). By
establishing the narrator’s precarious perceptional apparatus and pubescent narcissism
early in the story, Welty foreshadows the revelation that lies ahead.
As the narrator reminisces about her young crush, we learn more about her fears
and prejudices. After touching the wrist of a boy with whom she has never spoken while
passing him on the stairs in school, she fell “in love then for the first time” (149). The
“love” that she proceeds to detail is an adolescent infatuation that takes place entirely in
her own head. Her obsession with this boy heightens her powers of observation and
indoctrinates her “almost into a dual life, as observer and dreamer. I felt a necessity for
absolute conformity to my ideas in any happening I witnessed” (149). She recalls with
“exact clarity” the day in class when she is introduced to the horror of abjection; she sees
“red—vermilion—blood flow” from the boy’s nose when he gets a nose bleed, which
causes her to faint and makes her forever “unable to bear the sight of blood” (150). As
Patricia Yaeger implies, the fact that “several of the older girls laughed at the confusion
and distraction” suggests that the blood seeping from the boy’s nose is reminiscent of
menstrual blood, hence the narrator’s dramatic aversion to the sight of the blood may hint
at unconscious fears of indoctrination into the realm of sexual reproduction and maternal
abjection (150).65 Immediately following the nose bleed story, the narrator admits that the
fact that she never knew “where this boy lived, or who his parents were” caused a
“constant uneasiness” in her (150). The possibility that “his house might be slovenly and
unpainted,” or that “his mother and father might be shabby—dishonest—crippled—dead”
makes her anxious and wary, which reveals her class consciousness and prejudice (150).
As Yaeger observes, “The girl’s position within a rigid class hierarchy is the most
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predatory worry confronting her small sense of self.” 66 By this point in the story, Welty
has firmly established the narrator’s classism, psychological fragility, and general teen
myopia. Like Mrs. Turpin, the narrator in “A Memory” is primed for a revelation. Enter:
the fat people.
When the narrator emerges from her daydreams about the boy, she realizes that “a
group of loud, squirming, ill-assorted people” have taken up residence near her spot on
the beach (152). A family of five who are “brown and roughened, but not foreigners” and
wearing “old and faded bathing suits which did not hide either the energy or the fatigue
of their bodies, but showed it exactly” have settled on the beach so close to the narrator
that she feels invaded by their presence (152). She determines right away from their
demeanor and attire that they are “common”; like Mrs. Turpin, the narrator is quick to
hierarchize others based on external characteristics. As she scrutinizes her new neighbors,
she fixates on their bodies. Of the two boys, one is “greatly overgrown…his cheeks were
ballooned outward and hid his eyes,” and the other “smaller boy was thin and defiant”;
the man (presumably the father) has “flabby” arms, and the girl has a “narrowed figure”
(152-53). She devotes the bulk of her attention and contempt, however, to the body of the
mother, who lies still while the man scoops sand upon her legs:
She was unnaturally white and fatly aware, in a bathing suit which had no relation
to the shape of her body. Fat hung upon her upper arms like an arrested earthslide
on a hill. With the first motion she might make, I was afraid that she would slide
down upon herself into a terrifying heap. Her breasts hung heavy and widening
like pears into her bathing suit. Her legs lay prone one on the other like shadowed
bulwarks, uneven and deserted, upon which, from the man’s hand, the sand piled
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higher like the teasing threat of oblivion. A slow, repetitious sound I had been
hearing for a long time unconsciously, I identified as a continuous laugh which
came through the motionless open pouched mouth of the woman. (153)
The length of this descriptive passage and its dearth of observations and metaphors
evince how deeply disturbed the narrator is by this unruly feminine body. With her first
observation, that the woman is “unnaturally white and fatly aware,” she seeks to
emphatically delineate herself from the giant body; whereas the narrator herself is white,
the fat woman is “unnaturally” so, meaning that she believes the two are not members of
the same racial caste, and whereas the narrator is a fastidious “observer” of the world and
her own psyche, the woman on the beach is aware only “fatly,” suggesting that her
corpulence hinders her perception. Her fat is so volatile that it threatens a natural disaster
in the form of an “earthslide”; notably, when the overweight Mrs. Turpin is attacked by
hefty Mary Grace, she feels “certain that she was about to be in an earthquake” (206).
While women have historically been associated with “earth” (and men with the
“heavens”), these corpulent women are so disruptive to the natural order that they
threaten geological events. For Welty and O’Connor, fat female bodies are so calamitous,
so menacing that they have the power to rupture the very earth itself.
After watching the “common,” unappealing family’s antics that afternoon by the
lake, the narrator experiences an unwelcome epiphany. When she attempts to revisit her
“most inner dream” of touching the boy she loves on the stairs once the family has
departed, she finds it impossible to inhabit that moment again: “I felt the heavy weight of
sweetness which always accompanied this memory; but the memory itself did not come
to me” (156). The memory of the boy and the memory of the unsavory family on the
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beach have become intrinsically intertwined, which Stephen M. Fuller argues “exposes
the gossamer of interconnected narratives that constitute a living memory.” 67 Similar to
“Revelation,” critical responses to “A Memory” overwhelmingly focus on the narrator’s
emotional and mental journey. Yaeger asserts that “[a]lthough nothing happens, a little
girl’s secure southern world comes crashing down around her,” because “Welty’s
giantess is the terrible harbinger of change” (117, 118). Fuller argues that the narrator
actually dreams the family of bathers, who “assume the position of her own family and
who embody an oedipal scenario,” thereby enabling her to process her latent hostilities
toward her parents (332). According to Courtney Bailey Parker, Welty’s story “depicts
the development of an artist,” and the narrator’s reluctant discovery is “reminiscent of the
iconic Joycean epiphany.”68 This “epiphany” that the narrator experiences is her
discovery of the incompatibility of the concrete, imperfect reality of the world with the
intangible, ethereal realm of fantasy and desire. As Parker and others have noted, Welty
facilitates this epiphany through the abjection of the human body, thereby inviting
“readers to forge connections between parallel narratives, the narrative of young love and
the narrative of initiation into the physicality of sex and love, death and decay of the
body.”69 Specifically, it is the body of the mother—a body ravaged by time and
maternity—that induces the greatest repulsion, the most abject horror in the narrator.
However, as with “Revelation,” I argue that it is not one body but two that instigate this
story’s revelation; the narrator’s observations of and reactions to the complex and fraught
relationship dynamics on display between the fat woman and her daughter suggest that
though the abject body and boorish behavior of the mother repulse and frighten the
narrator, the daughter’s resilience and rebellion inspire her.
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From the description of the daughter that immediately follows the narrator’s long,
churlish appraisal of the fat mother, it becomes evident that the girl feels trapped and
conflicted. Welty portrays her as a powder keg about to explode: “The younger girl, who
was lying at the man’s feet, was curled tensely upon herself. She wore a bright green
bathing suit like a bottle from which she might, I felt, burst in a rage of churning smoke”
(153). Unlike the other family members’ bathing suits that are so ill-fitting they “did not
hide either the energy or the fatigue of their bodies,” the daughter’s suit seems to
simultaneously confine and ignite her. Additionally, the image of a “bathing suit like a
bottle” contrasts severely with the mother’s bathing suit, which “had no relation to the
shape of her body.” As the narrator continues to observe the girl, she “could feel the
genie-like rage in her narrowed figure as she seemed to both crawl and to lie still,
watching the man heap the sand in his careless way about the larger legs of the older
woman” (153). The bottle-like bathing suit symbolizes a genie’s bottle, signifying both
power and imprisonment. Interestingly, the Arabic term jinn, from which the word
“genie” derives, means “to hide” or “conceal.” 70 Also, traditionally genies are only
permitted to grant the wishes of others, not their own. Therefore, the description of the
green bathing suit implies both that the daughter must hide or conceal her true self from
her family members, and that she is expected to cater to the desires of others while
denying her own. The appearance of being torn between stasis and action (“she seemed to
both crawl and to lie still”) communicates her ambivalence toward her family, as well as
her discomfort with her father’s activity; piling sand atop her mother’s “larger legs”
draws even more attention to her mother’s enormous body, and is sexually suggestive.
When her father pours sand inside her mother’s bathing suit “between her bulbous

47

descending breasts,” the daughter reacts oddly, almost violently: “Even the angry girl
laughed, with an insistent hilarity which flung her to her feet and tossed her about the
beach, her stiff, cramped legs jumping and tottering” (154). Through these erratic, jerky
movements, the daughter appears almost possessed, unable to control her bodily
movements. Every observation that the narrator makes about the girl’s body language
paints her as a conflicted outlier in her family.
As the daughter is “tossed…about the beach” after the man pours sand down the
front of the fat woman’s bathing suit, the man smiles and looks directly at the narrator,
which causes her resentment toward the bathers to increase: “He even looked at me, and
included me. Looking back, stunned, I wished that they all were dead” (154). If we
accept Fuller’s claim that the family of bathers represents the narrator’s own “oedipal
scenario,” then in this moment the narrator rejects her entire family outright. In the very
next moment, however, the girl causes the narrator to reconsider: “But at that moment the
girl in the green bathing suit suddenly whirled all the way around” (155, emphasis
added). This “But” following directly after “I wished that they all were dead” indicates
that the girl may have the power to somewhat redeem her family in the narrator’s eyes.
Indeed, as the narrator then describes the girl chasing after the two boys, her language is
almost laudatory: “The girl in green then came running toward the beach as though she
would destroy it, and with a fierceness which took my breath away, she dragged herself
through the air and jumped over the bench” (155). In this description, the girl is a warrior
attacking the very earth itself with an arresting “fierceness” that seems to inspire the
narrator; given the fact that the fat mother is described in earthy metaphors, this moment
could be read as the daughter’s unconscious expression of oedipal rage toward her
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mother. If the narrator does indeed project her family drama onto this family of bathers,
then this girl’s powerful rebellious spirit serves as a model for the narrator as she seeks to
separate from her own parents. Significantly, however, “no one seemed to notice” the girl
storming the beach “except the smaller boy” (155). Ultimately, both the girl and the
narrator are alone in their struggles against their families and the world.
The narrator’s fixation on the mother’s corpulent body and actions of the
daughter’s body intimates that this mother/daughter relationship is integral to the
epiphany she experiences by the lake. Regarding “A Memory,” Welty writes, “The
tableau discovered through the young girl’s framing hands is unwelcome realism.” 71 It is
significant that this “unwelcome realism” intervenes via her encounter with the fat, crude
family that ruins her love memory, because the boy and the fantasy he inspires signal a
heteronormative future of marriage, sex, motherhood, and death—a futurity that will
consume and ravage her young, thin body, and risk making her “common” like them. As
Miller notes in Being Ugly, “What we understand as ‘ugliness’ is often history rendered
visible: stretch marks, scars, wrinkles, and posture are all potentially revelatory of a
woman’s life. Life leaves marks on their bodies that can be read as an archive or a
palimpsest.”72 This kind of “ugliness” marks the fat woman’s body, and it is an image
which becomes forever linked to the narrator’s memory of her “first love.”
As a grown woman looking back on this watershed moment in her adolescence,
the narrator reveals through her obsession with the mother’s fat body that the abjection
she witnesses that day on the beach haunts her into adulthood. From the conclusion of
“Revelation,” it is apparent that Ruby Turpin, too, will be haunted by her encounter with
Mary Grace and her mother; as she cleans out the hog pen later that day, she addresses
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God with “concentrated fury”: “‘How am I a hog and me both? How am I saved and from
hell too?’” (215). I propose that the secondary mother/daughter characters in
“Revelation” and “A Memory” induce uncanny experiences for the stories’ protagonists,
which, in turn, catalyze their epiphanies. Freud defines the uncanny as “that species of
the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar,”
which is similar to Kristeva’s theory of abjection.73 In The Uncanny, Freud explains that
the act of doubling—of dividing or interchanging the self, often through projection onto
another—was “originally an insurance against the extinction of the self” during the stage
of primary narcissism, but with time and age “the meaning of the ‘double’ changes” and
it becomes “the uncanny harbinger of death.” 74 We repress the uncanny, but it can
resurface “either when repressed childhood complexes are revived by some impression,
or when primitive beliefs that have been surmounted appear to be once again
confirmed.”75 As aforementioned, according to Kristeva, the mother’s body is our earliest
experience of the abject, and it becomes that which we must reject and repress in order to
develop our own subjectivity. In “A Memory,” the fat woman’s maternal body signifies
both the “maternal entity” that the narrator has repressed and a potential future self.76
With the family of bathers representing the narrator’s own “oedipal scenario,” the
encounter with her “doubles” (i.e., a current self and a future self) causes the narrator to
apprehend her future, which will end in decay and death. In “Revelation,” Mary Grace’s
violent outburst followed by her intimate, pre-Oedipal exchange with her mother trigger
an uncanny experience for Mrs. Turpin, causing her to contemplate her eventual death.
Additionally, the experience compels her to lash out against the repressed maternal,
which is evident in her torturing of “an old sow a few weeks off from farrowing” in the
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hog pen by “blindly pointing the stream of water in and out of [its] eye” (215); indeed,
perhaps even Mrs. Turpin’s childlessness could be read as an attempt to repress the
maternal. Now, tormenting a pregnant hog and imagining herself in the grotesque image
of “a hog and me both,” Mrs. Turpin comes face to face with her eventual death, inspired
by the encounter with her double—Mary Grace, “the uncanny harbinger of death.”

Sacrificing the Fat Daughter
Similar to “Revelation” and “A Memory,” Eudora Welty’s “June Recital”
contains a mother/daughter duo that helps facilitate an epiphany for a narrator. However,
in this instance it is not just the narrator but rather an entire community that projects its
insecurities regarding fat, freedom, and the female body onto the pair. As Germans living
in the South, Miss Eckhart and her elderly, infirm mother inspire a revelation for Cassie
Morrison, one of the story’s two narrators and the Eckharts’ next-door neighbor.
Although Miss Eckhart serves as a sort of surrogate mother figure to her students, her
childless, spinster status and her role as caretaker to an elderly mother confined to a
wheelchair render her a perpetual daughter in the eyes of the community. By the end of
the story we learn that Miss Eckhart serves as a scapegoat for the whole town, as she is
sacrificed in order to reaffirm the patriarchal boundaries of Morgana, Mississippi.
Miss Eckhart’s tale serves as the centerpiece of “June Recital,” the second story in
Welty’s second short story collection, The Golden Apples (1949). Once the town piano
teacher, an older, mentally precarious Miss Eckhart has returned to her former home to
set it on fire. Through Cassie’s narration we get a glimpse into Miss Eckhart’s history in
the Morgana community—from the height of her piano tutelage (which culminated in a
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formal recital every June for “all female Morgana”) to her eventual admittance to a
mental facility.77 “June Recital” establishes the importance of matrilineage, conformity,
and surveillance in the Morgana community—themes that recur throughout the other
interrelated stories of The Golden Apples, which follow the same characters for decades.
As their next-door neighbor and one of Miss Eckhart’s pupils, Cassie Morrison
regularly witnesses the relationship between Miss Eckhart and Old Mrs. Eckhart:
Cassie would rather look at the two of them at night separated by the dark and the
distance between. For when from your own table you saw the Eckharts through
their window in the light of a lamp, and Miss Eckhart with a soundless ebullience
bouncing up to wait on her mother, sometimes you could imagine them back far
away from Morgana, before they had troubles and before they had come to you—
plump, bright, and sweet somewhere. (62)
In addition to giving us a glimpse of the dynamic between daughter and mother when the
Eckharts are alone, this passage also illustrates the prevalence of surveillance in this
community. In particular, the women of the town enforce behavioral and aesthetic
standards by emphasizing matrilineage: “As each daughter thus struggles to define
herself in the shadow of her mother, all Morgana watches to see how she fulfills her
role.”78 In the Eckharts, Cassie sees an alternative model for the mother/daughter
relationship that, at times, confuses and alarms her. For instance, when Old Mrs. Eckhart
interrupts a lesson with Virgie Rainey—Miss Eckhart’s best (and favorite) student—by
screaming at her one day, her daughter responds swiftly: “When she reached her mother,
Miss Eckhart slapped the side of her mouth. She stood there a moment more, leaning
over the chair—while it seemed to Cassie that it must, after all, have been the mother that
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slapped the daughter” (62). Such a display of anger and dominance by a daughter against
her mother is so unfamiliar to Cassie that she has trouble believing her own eyes, even
when the encounter happens right in front of her.
In her relationship with her own mother, Cassie feels insecure and neglected. Mrs.
Morrison is portrayed as a flighty yet proper Southern lady—a conformist who secretly
longs to be an artist. To Cassie, it seems as if her mother is constantly disappearing:
“when she got back to their place her mother would be gone. She always lost her
mother”; “And her mother had slipped away” (53, 55). Mrs. Morrison’s emotional and
physical distance causes her daughter anxiety and uncertainty. Additionally, Cassie
notices the tension that exists between her mother and Miss Eckhart. She can tell that her
mother “could not help but despise Miss Eckhart,” possibly “just for living, a poor
unwanted teacher and unmarried,” and she senses that “her mother despised herself for
despising” (64). At one point, Mrs. Morrison even likens Miss Eckhart to the witch from
Hansel and Gretel (39). Cassie supposes that this is why her mother continues to make
her take piano lessons, even after all of the other mothers have stopped sending their
daughters: “The child had to make up for her mother’s abhorrence, to keep her mother as
kind as she really was” (64). In other words, in the Morgana community, the sins of the
mother are visited upon the daughter: “Daughters remain in the social caste of their
mothers from their birth to her death or beyond.”79 This idea is also apparent in the way
the community responds after Miss Eckhart is sexually assaulted by a black man; when
Miss Perdita Mayo says that “Miss Eckhart’s differences were why shame alone had not
killed her and killed her mother too” in the aftermath of the assault, it suggests that the
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fates of mothers and daughters in Morgana are believed to be intrinsically tied (57,
second emphasis added).
In addition to exposing Cassie to an alternative mother/daughter dynamic, Miss
Eckhart represents a level of feminine independence and power that is both new and
somewhat frightening to her young female students. As Michael Kreyling observes, Miss
Eckhart brings her pupils “an ominous foreshadowing of their own possibilities as
daughters and women.”80 This is perhaps most apparent in a scene that takes place one
summer morning during a thunderstorm when Cassie, Virgie Rainey, and Jinny Love end
up trapped in the studio with Miss Eckhart as they wait out the rain. Miss Eckhart sits
down at the piano and begins to play a long, complicated piece; it is the first time her
students have seen her play. Her performance is passionate and visceral: “The thunder
rolled and Miss Eckhart frowned and bent forward or she leaned back to play; at
moments her solid body swayed from side to side like a tree trunk” (56). This act of
artistic expression begins to physically transform her: “Her skin flattened and drew across
her cheeks, her lips changed. The face could have belonged to someone else—not even to
a woman, necessarily. It was the face a mountain could have, or what might be seen
behind the veil of a waterfall” (56). Miss Eckhart becomes so lost in the music that, when
Jinny Love steps forward to turn the sheet music for her, “Miss Eckhart did not even see
her—her arm struck the child, making a run” (56). The three girls are overwhelmed and
discomfited by this sudden artistic expression: “Coming from Miss Eckhart, the music
made all the pupils uneasy, almost alarmed; something had burst out, unwanted, exciting,
from the wrong person’s life” (56). It becomes “too much for Cassie Morrison,” who
stands back in the room “with her whole body averted” from Miss Eckhart’s raw,
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powerful energy (57). The young girls have never witnessed such a passionate display of
feminine strength before, and it makes them so uncomfortable that they long for “escape”
(57). Interestingly, it is at this moment that we first learn about Miss Eckhart’s sexual
assault, as Cassie begins “to think of an incident that had happened to Miss Eckhart
instead of about the music she was playing” (57). Patricia Yaeger has argued that this
illustrates how the children have already internalized the rigid values of their community
and instinctively seek to squash female independence: “When Miss Eckhart raises herself
to great heights, revealing a musical brilliance reserved for great men, her pupils find a
way to restore her abjection and lowliness.” 81
Significantly, the description of Miss Eckhart’s performance emphasizes her large
body, which Yaeger has referred to as “gargantuan”: “Miss Eckhart threatens her pupils
because her body suggests a different world in which women are allowed to be noisy and
grand. The gargantuan body both maps its own limits and refuses to stay within bounds,
to serve asked-for ends.”82 Indeed, throughout “June Recital” Miss Eckhart is depicted as
a fat woman whose unruly, abject body spills out into the surrounding space: “Miss
Eckhart, a heavy brunette woman whose age was not known, sat during the lessons on the
non-descript chair, which her body hid altogether, in apparent disregard for body and
chair alike” (39). Her “great lump of a body,” which “sit[s] there blotting out her chair,”
will not be contained by either furniture or clothing: “The unexpected creamy flesh on
her upper arms gave her a look of emerging from [her recital dress]” (58, 46, 72).
Notably, the language Welty uses to describe Miss Eckhart’s piano playing (“like a tree
trunk,” “the face a mountain could have,” “her fingers like foam on rocks” [56, 58]) and
her physicality during piano lessons (“you were under her bosom like a traveler under a
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cliff” [40]) recalls the earthy metaphors used to describe Mrs. Turpin in “Revelation” and
the fat woman in “A Memory.” A large woman, it seems, is a force of nature. However,
as we will see, Miss Eckhart pays for this strength.
During her concert, Yaeger argues, “Miss Eckhart’s body swells to enormous
proportions; she represents new and frightening parameters for southern women’s lives”
(122). These “parameters” defy the standards for both feminine ability and aesthetics that
have been set by this small, Southern community. In other words, both the brilliance of
Miss Eckhart’s performance and her fat body are “too much” because they exceed her
students’ frame of reference; for the young girls, the experience is akin to emerging out
of Plato’s cave and trying to apprehend reality for the first time: “And when he came into
the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn’t he be unable to see a single one of the
things now said to be true?”83 But, similar to Plato’s cave dwellers, the girls are resistant
and reluctant to embrace a new reality, which is why Cassie recalls the rape when Miss
Eckhart’s playing begins to threaten her world view. As a good citizen of Morgana, in
that instant she is projecting her community’s fears of female strength, miscegenation,
and fat female bodies by interjecting Miss Eckhart’s “shameful,” disenfranchising
experience into her most powerful moment. Rather than expand Cassie’s realm of
possibility, Miss Eckhart’s performance begins to expose how constrained her vision
really is; by the time, as a teenager, she hears a broken, demented Miss Eckhart play Für
Elise next door, Cassie already knows that unlike adventurous, capricious individuals like
Virgie Rainey, her brother Loch, or her mother, “She could not see herself do an
unknown thing” (77). Ultimately, the epiphany that Miss Eckhart and her mother inspire
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for Cassie reveals her own confinement in the community and her inability to go against
the status quo.
As I have already established, in the “maternal carceral network” of Morgana, the
lives and fates of mothers and daughters seem inescapably intertwined—an idea which is
evident in the ends of Miss Eckhart and her mother.84 Through Cassie’s narration, we
learn of the rumors surrounding Old Mrs. Eckhart’s demise:
Then stories began to be told of what Miss Eckhart had really done to her old
mother. People said the old mother had been in pain for years, and nobody was
told. What kind of pain they did not say. But they said that during the war, when
Miss Eckhart lost pupils and they did not have very much to eat, she would give
her mother paregoric to make sure she slept all night and not wake the street with
noise or complaint, for fear still more pupils would be taken away. Some people
said Miss Eckhart killed her mother with opium. (65)
Miss Eckhart’s attempts to placate the community prove fatal for her mother, and Miss
Eckhart ends up disappearing from Morgana, likely into a mental institution. Recalling
Cassie’s line “Should daughters forgive mothers (with mothers under their heel)?”,
Rebecca Mark argues that, in the Homeric tradition, Old Mrs. Eckhart represents her
daughter’s Achilles’s heel, that she is “her most vulnerable point.” 85 Mark writes, “Miss
Eckhart’s mother is not only her biological mother, she is her self, the woman she might
become. Her mother’s pain is her own pain. Her mother’s stifled screams are her own
stifled screams.”86 Indeed, Old Mrs. Eckhart may be perceived as Miss Eckhart’s greatest
weakness as well as an extension of herself. However, upon closer examination, the heel
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metaphor may also signal a subtle corporeal connection between mother and daughter
that ultimately seals their fate in the Morgana community.
Miss Eckhart’s large body, as I have noted, is monitored, disparaged, and
fetishized by the town. One particular area of interest is her lower body—specifically, her
ankles and legs: “Miss Eckhart had pretty ankles for a heavy lady like herself. Mrs. Stark
said what a surprise it was for Miss Eckhart, of all people, to turn up with such pretty
ankles, which made it the same as if she didn’t have them” (50). Significantly, at the end
of the story when Cassie sees Miss Eckhart being dragged down the street after
attempting to set fire to her old residence, it is the sight of her ankles that inspires the
moment of recognition: “She wore shoes without stockings—and she had such white,
white ankles. When she saw the ankles, Cassie flung herself in full view at the window
and gave a cry” (88). Similar to the day of the impromptu piano performance, when Miss
Eckhart’s mountainous, “solid,” powerful body was too much for Cassie to comprehend,
recognizing Miss Eckhart through the sight of one small body part seems to indicate that
Cassie is still unable to apprehend her teacher in her entirety. Notably, Old Mrs.
Eckhart’s lower body is also emphasized: “She had wasting legs that showed knifelike
down her long skirt, and clumsy-shaped, suffering feet that she placed just so out in front
of her on the step of her chair, as if she wanted you to think they were pretty” (61).
Unlike her daughter’s “pretty ankles” and large legs, Mrs. Eckhart’s lower body is
depicted as unattractive (“clumsy-shaped, suffering feet”), overly thin (“wasting”), and
dangerous (“knifelike”). As aforementioned, Rebecca Marks asserts that Old Mrs.
Eckhart is her daughter’s Achilles’s heel, and that “Her mother’s pain is her own pain,”
implying that the alleged opium overdose was an act of mercy on the part of a devoted
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daughter. However, some scholars have argued that an element of jealousy exists in this
mother/daughter relationship. Regarding the moment when Old Mrs. Eckhart breaks a
doll given to Miss Eckhart by a man whom she secretly loves and desires from afar,
Helen Hurt Tiegreen writes, “Miss Eckhart’s mother was jealous of all that her daughter
loved, even though her daughter, whose ‘spirit drooped its head’ (41), did not have much
love in her life.”87 In response to the scene where Miss Eckhart slaps her mother for her
outburst during Virgie Rainey’s lesson, Donna Jarrell posits, “[Miss Eckhart] will not
allow her mother to suppress Virgie Rainey’s gift, as we suspect her mother may have
once done to her.”88 I argue that this jealousy and resentment possibly played a role in
Old Mrs. Eckhart’s death; rather than caring for her “most vulnerable point” by putting
her mother out of her misery, Miss Eckhart may have been expressing latent hostilities
toward her mother by committing an act of elder abuse.
Additionally, I propose that the attention paid to the Eckharts’ ankles, feet, and
legs highlights the community’s desire to limit the women’s social and economic
mobility—to cut them off at the knees, so to speak—and to emphasize their outsider
status in the town. The lower body enables physical mobility, but in the case of the
Eckharts I argue that it becomes a metaphor for socio-economic mobility as well.
Furthermore, in various Eastern religious traditions, the lower body signifies the root
chakra, which connects us to tribal identity and power: “It is our connection to traditional
familial beliefs that support the formation of identity and a sense of belonging to a group
of people in a geographic location.”89 The reason why Mrs. Stark is so surprised by Miss
Eckhart’s “pretty ankles” is because she believes that a fat, unmarried Other should not
have the same ability to traverse the different strata of society as other members of the
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community (and, as Cassie notes, her “surprise” erases or negates that ability—i.e.,
“which made it the same as if she didn’t have them”). Significantly, when Miss Eckhart
returns years later to burn down her old home, Cassie’s brother Loch, while watching her
through his bedroom window, notes that “He could not see her feet; she behaved a little
like a wind-up toy on wheels” (29). In addition to losing her home, her only family
member, her profession, and her freedom, Miss Eckhart has also lost her connection to
the earth—the source of her strength. The community has finally succeeded in cutting her
off at the knees, in severing her root chakra. When Loch watches her run from across the
street, he observes that “She pulled up the corners of her skirt up like a girl, and she was
thin beneath in her old legs,” which recalls Old Mrs. Eckhart’s “wasting,” “knifelike”
legs (31). Without a firm foundation or sense of belonging in the community, both
mother and daughter waste away into nothing: “[Miss Eckhart] was not connected with
anything else, with anybody” (31, emphasis added). In the end, both her body and her
identity are erased: “It don’t signify nothing what your name is now, or what you
intended, old woman…We know where you belong at, and that’s Jackson [i.e., the nearby
mental institution],” Mr. Fatty Bowles tells her before he and the town marshal cart her
away (87).
Ultimately, the entire community projects its fear of fat, freedom, and the female
body onto Miss Eckhart, whose abject body becomes a scapegoat that helps reify and
reaffirm the traditional, patriarchal boundaries of the community. As Jacques Derrida
points out in his discussion of the pharmakos (which, he notes, “has been compared to a
scapegoat”), “The city’s body proper thus reconstitutes its unity, closes around the
security of its inner courts, gives back to itself the word that links it with itself within the
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confines of the agora, by violently excluding from its territory the representative of an
external threat or aggression.”90 Yet, as Derrida also notes, the scapegoat is actually
constituted by the community, and therefore never truly external to it; the scapegoat
“represents evil both introjected and projected.”91 To return briefly to Le’a Kent’s
argument regarding fat and abjection, the fat female body is “that which must be expelled
to make all other bodily representations and functions, even life itself, possible.” 92 As a
fat, unmarried, German woman living in a Southern patriarchal community, Miss Eckhart
is triply erased—as a fat body, as a childless woman, and as an ethnic Other. In expelling
Miss Eckhart, Morgana sacrifices a perpetual daughter (i.e., a childless woman) to
appease the gods of convention, racism, and misogyny.

In One Writer’s Beginnings, Eudora Welty confesses that though it was never her
intention to create a character who would speak for her, in The Golden Apples she “did
bring forth a character with whom [she] came to feel oddly in touch. This is Miss
Eckhart.”93 She shares that “Miss Eckhart came from me,” and “Exposing yourself to risk
is a truth Miss Eckhart and I had in common.” 94 Welty, like Flannery O’Connor, never
married or had children, so perhaps it is not surprising that she identified so deeply with
Miss Eckhart, a spinster artist and teacher. Interestingly, though, Welty also makes a
point to distance herself from the character: “Not in Miss Eckhart as she stands solidly
and almost opaquely in the surround of her story, but in the making of her character out
of my most inward and most deeply feeling self, I would say I have found my voice in
my fiction.”95 This language is reminiscent of Welty’s description of Miss Eckhart’s
physicality during her piano performance (“her solid body swayed from side to side like a
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tree trunk”), and the term “opaquely” recalls the image of Miss Eckhart’s fat body
“blotting out her chair” at the piano. By emphasizing that her kinship with Miss Eckhart
is psychical and not corporeal, Welty seems to exhibit subtle (perhaps even unconscious)
fat prejudice. This observation notwithstanding, Welty’s portrayal of Miss Eckhart’s
“gargantuan” body in “June Recital” (and that of the fat female bather in “A Memory”)
suggests that she was aware of the ways in which fat female bodies are abjected and
marginalized in Western society.
Welty was a very private figure who shared little of her personal life with her
audience, but from the limited biographical information available it appears as if she had
a positive, loving relationship with her own mother, Chestina Andrews Welty, who was
incredibly supportive of her daughter’s pursuits: “It was my mother who emotionally and
imaginatively supported me in my wish to become a writer.” 96 Similar to O’Connor,
Welty moved from New York (where she had been studying advertising at Columbia
University) back to her home in Jackson, Mississippi around the time her father died in
1931; she remained there for most of her life and cared for her mother until her death in
1966. When asked once in an interview if she were “Mother oppressed,” Welty replied,
“Not at all.”97 However, in One Writer’s Beginnings, a collection of her autobiographical
writing, a subtle current of tension undergirds some of her stories about her mother. For
instance, at times Chestina comes across as a martyr (“All my life I continued to feel that
bliss for me would have to imply my mother’s deprivation or sacrifice”), or as an
overbearing perfectionist (“A way had to be found around [my mother’s] love
sometimes”).98 From the prevalence of mothers and daughters in her fiction, it is evident
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that Welty continued to be preoccupied with the complexity and intimacy of the
mother/daughter relationship throughout her career.
Notably, in the short stories of both O’Connor and Welty that I have examined
herein, the focus of the narratives tends to be on the voices and experiences of the
daughter characters rather than the mothers. The same could be said about many of the
authors’ other works as well; for instance, Welty’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel The
Optimist’s Daughter (1972) is told from the point-of-view of a daughter coming to terms
with her father’s death, and even in stories told from the perspective of a mother (for
example, the grandmother in “A Good Man is Hard to Find”), O’Connor tends to subtly
mock and deride her mother characters (although, to some extent, the same could be said
about many of O’Connor’s character). As women who never became mothers
themselves, perhaps it is unsurprising that their primary investment in the
mother/daughter relationships they depict tends to reflect their own positioning in that
dyad. However, in so doing they reiterate a problematic trope that Marianne Hirsch
examines in The Mother/Daughter Plot: Narrative, Psychoanalysis, Feminism. Hirsch
writes, “It is the woman as daughter who occupies the center of the global reconstruction
of subjectivity and subject-object relation. The woman as mother remains in the position
of other, and the emergence of feminine-daughterly subjectivity rests and depends on that
continued and repeated process of othering the mother.”99 By silencing or omitting the
voice of the mother (for instance, we never hear either Old Mrs. Eckhart or the fat woman
in “A Memory” speak) and/or “othering the mother” (as O’Connor tends to do with her
mother characters), Welty and O’Connor transpose the same type of disenfranchisement
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and projection that they critique through their daughter characters onto their fictional
mothers.
O’Connor once summarized her “subject in fiction” as “the action of grace in
territory held largely by the devil.”100 I believe that these five short stories demonstrate
that the “devil” is neither the mother nor the daughter, but rather a patriarchal society that
demands a repression of the maternal, that renders the daughter’s body a battleground in
mother/daughter relationships. As Luce Irigaray writes, “Neither the little girl nor the
women needs to give up the love for her mother. To do so is to sever women from the
roots of their identity and their subjectivity.”101 Perhaps the “action of grace,” then,
comes in the moments of recognition, such as when Sally Virginia looks up at her
mother’s face as their farm blazes and is able to place the “new unplaced misery” that has
just made her a woman.
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CHAPTER 2
THE “BALLOONING BODY” IN SYLVIA PLATH
AND GWENDOLYN BROOKS
As women living and writing during the “cult of domesticity” of the 1950s and
60s, mid-century poets Sylvia Plath and Gwendolyn Brooks contended with hegemonic
racial and gender expectations in their roles as writers, daughters, and mothers. Plath’s
profound maternal ambivalence and infamously tumultuous relationship with her mother
Aurelia figure prominently in her poetry and autobiographical novel The Bell Jar (1963).
Brooks’s experiences as a dutiful (and precocious) daughter, devoted mother, and black
rights activist inflect her poetry and semi-autobiographical novel Maud Martha (1953). In
their work, both authors dramatize the process of becoming a mother and admitting the
abjection of the child-bearing body, in part as a way of navigating their overly close
relationships with their own mothers. Indeed, bodily abjection shapes mother/daughter
relationships in Plath’s and Brooks’s writing and lives and demonstrates their racialized
strategies for negotiating these broached boundaries. Notably, their different approaches
to pregnancy and childbirth, feminine abjection, and the process of daughters becoming
mothers illustrate the ways in which the construction of whiteness as “invisible” and
blackness as inescapable corporeality undergird notions of femininity and reproduction,
as white Plath imagines transcending the body, while black Brooks turns abjection into a
platform for activism.1
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Due to their fifteen-year age gap and racial differences, Plath and Brooks are
rarely paired in critical studies; however, I argue that the similar aesthetic trajectory of
their work and their shared preoccupation with mothers and daughters provide a unique
opportunity to examine how race and maternal abjection intersect in mid-century writing
by women authors. Both married and mothers of two children, the two writers initially
adhered to a patriarchal, Eurocentric formalism and universality in their early poetry,
writing for a primarily white, male critical audience. However, as Malin Pereira observes,
Plath and Brooks “each use their single novel to effect an aesthetic transition to admitting
domestic detail in their work,” and this “focus on domestic detail is part of the twentiethcentury transition to an anti-Idealist aesthetic of everyday detail.”2 Plath and Brooks’s
transition to an embrace and exploration of domestic life and Plath’s shift to an
impassioned confessionalism in her later poetry exemplify the mid-century struggle of
women attempting to locate and assert a sense of self in a racist and misogynistic society.
Their focus on the mother/daughter relationship is particularly significant and groundbreaking because, as Adrienne Rich notes in Of Woman Born, this dyad “has been
minimized and trivialized in the annals of patriarchy” since “the relationship between
mother and daughter has been profoundly threatening to men.” 3 Therefore, Plath and
Brooks’s emphasis on mother/daughter relationships becomes a subversive swipe at the
male critical audience that they initially sought to appease. However, what repeatedly
emerges from their explorations of this originary relationship are elements of
matrophobia, or the fear of becoming one’s mother, which is often fueled by societal
influences that infiltrate the relationship. Rich points out that it is “[e]asier by far to hate
and reject a mother outright than to see beyond her to the forces acting upon her.” 4 Yet,
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this matrophobia can also signal a much greater fear, as it “may also be a deep underlying
pull toward [the mother], a dread that if one relaxes one’s guard one will identify with her
completely.”5 In what follows, a consideration of French feminist Julia Kristeva’s
psychoanalytic theories regarding abjection, the maternal body, and the cathectic split
between mother and daughter will reveal how the “deep underlying pull” and fear of
overidentification with the mother manifest in works by Plath and Brooks. In particular,
the leaking, swollen, unpredictable pregnant body instills fear and resentment, and often
serves as a barrier between mothers and daughters, even as it links them by projecting the
imminent transformation of the daughter into the mother.

“All Ready to Spill Out”: Birth and the Specter of Abjection
In works by Plath and Brooks, maternal abjection incites dread and disgust in both
mother and daughter characters. According to Julia Kristeva, the abject both threatens
and constitutes an individual’s identity. As that which “is radically excluded” and draws
us “toward the place where meaning collapses,” the abject exists at the border between
subject and object, life and death. 6 While bodily fluids, excrement, and corpses are
examples of abjection, Kristeva clarifies that the ramifications of the term exceed the
material: “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what
disturbs identity, system, order.”7 Since “[t]he abject has only one quality of the object—
that of being opposed to I,” we necessarily reject it to establish and maintain subjectivity,
yet it forever lurks in “the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” as a force that can
rupture or annihilate that subjectivity. 8 Significantly, our initial experience of abjection is
the maternal body.
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As Kelly Oliver observes, “Human life, human society, is founded on the abject
separation of one body from another at birth.”9 Though inescapable requirements for the
creation of life, pregnancy and birth are culturally coded as abject. From the bulging,
excessive form of a pregnant body, to the leaking, seeping fluids of birth and lactation, to
the womb “phantasized as a devouring mouth,” the maternal body resides at the very
border between subject and object. 10 Sara Ruddick notes, “Regarded ungenerously, a
woman’s birthing body—bloody, swollen out of shape, exposed in its pain, its otherwise
concealed parts broken open—is repellent.”11 Beyond these material aspects of maternal
abjection lie its psychological and existential implications for both mother and child.
Kristeva refers to pregnancy as “the radical ordeal of the splitting of the subject:
redoubling up of the body, separation and coexistence of the self and of an other.” 12 The
pregnant woman becomes more than one, but not quite two. After birth, the child begins
the gradual process of recognizing herself as separate from her mother, which ultimately
necessitates the rejection of the maternal body in order to enter the symbolic order, or the
realm of language. Kristeva writes, “The abject confronts us…with our earliest attempts
to release the hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the
autonomy of language.”13 In other words, the maternal body will forever remain linked to
the abject—to that which threatens the boundary between subject and object.
Consequently, it “is a horrifying, devouring body…a body that evokes rage and fear.”14
In The Bell Jar, Esther Greenwood’s aversion to pregnant and fat bodies
exemplifies this fear of maternal abjection. Originally published under the pseudonym
Victoria Lucas in the U.K. in 1963, The Bell Jar is a semi-autobiographical account of
Plath’s first suicide attempt and subsequent hospitalization in 1953. The novel is a
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bildungsroman that, as Linda Wagner-Martin notes, “charts what it means to be wife,
mother, daughter. Every detail in the novel speaks to some ritualized feminine
behavior.”15 Early in the novel, Esther visits her boyfriend Buddy Willard, a medical
student, and the two observe a woman giving birth. The cold, sterile, torturous
environment of the birthing room renders Esther speechless (“I was so struck by the sight
of the table where they were lifting the woman I didn’t say a word”), and the sight of the
pregnant woman repulses her: “The woman’s stomach stuck up so high I couldn’t see her
face or the upper part of her body at all. She seemed to have nothing but an enormous
spider-fat stomach and two little ugly spindly legs propped in the high stirrups.”16 In this
description of the anonymous woman’s physicality, the abjection of pregnancy has erased
her identity (“I couldn’t see her face”) and humanity (“spider-fat”), illustrating Ruddick’s
claim that “[b]irth, more than any other experience except perhaps sexuality, undermines
the individuation of bodies.”17 Esther describes the crowning of the head in grotesque
terms: “finally through the split, shaven place between her legs, lurid with disinfectant, I
saw a dark fuzzy thing appear” (66). Later, she describes a pregnant woman in her
neighborhood as having “a grotesque, protruding stomach,” and she declares that
“children made me sick” (116, 117). For Esther, a pregnant body is “the grotesque body,”
which Mary Russo defines as “the open, protruding, extended, secreting body, the body
of becoming, process, and change.”18 Pregnancy, birth, and their by-products (i.e.,
children) repulse Esther, as they remind her of this “body of becoming” that she so fears.
Esther’s loathing of swollen, “enormous” pregnant bodies is so intense that it
extends to fat bodies as well. When she gains weight as a result of her insulin treatment,
she conflates pregnancy and fatness: “I just grew fatter and fatter. Already I had filled the
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new, too-big clothes my mother had bought, and when I peered down at my plump
stomach and my broad hips I thought it was a good thing Mrs. Guinea [Esther’s
benefactor] hadn’t seen me like this, because I looked just as if I were going to have a
baby” (192). Throughout the novel, Esther exhibits fat prejudice. During her summer
internship at a fashion magazine in New York City, she prides herself on her thin,
unfeminine figure (“I was skinny as a boy and barely rippled”) and judges the women
around her on diets (“Almost everybody I met in New York was trying to reduce”)
because she has always been naturally slim: “No matter how much I eat, I never put on
weight. With one exception I’ve been the same weight for ten years” (7, 25, 24). She
inwardly mocks the “tall fat medical student” she meets during her visit with Buddy (“[I]
had thought up a cutting remark about how only a mother loves a fat man”), judges
Buddy harshly for his previous interest in Joan (“She was big as a horse, too. I began to
think Buddy had pretty poor taste”), and is disgusted when Buddy gains weight during
his stay at the sanatorium: “The last thing I expected was for Buddy to be fat…But
everything concave about Buddy had suddenly turned convex. A pot belly swelled under
the tight white nylon shirt and his cheeks were round and plump and ruddy as marzipan
fruit. Even his laugh sounded plump” (64, 59, 90). Esther expresses as much fear and
disdain for fat bodies as she does for pregnant ones. In her essay “Fighting Abjection,”
Le’a Kent posits, “Within mainstream representations of the body, the fat body functions
as the abject: it takes up the burden of representing the horror of the body itself for the
culture at large.”19 For Esther, fat represents that which “disturbs identity, system, order,”
and is therefore abject; the fat body signifies the same volatility and excess of the
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pregnant body, and both types of bodies incite “horror” because of how easily Esther
herself could become one of those bodies—an anxiety which Plath herself shared.
Plath’s preoccupation with fat, pregnant, and overly feminine bodies is evident in
her prose, poetry, and journals. During her college years, Plath expresses her conflicting
feelings about her body in her journal. In 1951, her freshman year at Smith College, she
writes, “even as I long for full breasts and a beautiful body, so do I abhor the
sensuousness which they bring,” and “Being born a woman is my awful tragedy. From
the moment I was conceived I was doomed to sprout breasts and ovaries rather than penis
and scrotum; to have my whole circle of action, thought and feeling rigidly circumscribed
by my inescapable femininity.”20 As Kathleen Margaret Lant has noted, Plath drew from
masculine models of creativity for inspiration, and equated “the fullness of the female
body with loss of creative power.”21 Whereas scholars such as Jacqueline Rose and Sarah
Juliet Lauro have asserted that Plath’s “words plunge into the body, and writing is a
sexual act,” and her “language seems…to insist upon the connection of the body and the
word,” when considering Plath’s writing about maternal, fat, and/or overly feminine
bodies (especially in writing about her own body), Alicia Suskin Ostriker’s observation
that Plath’s obsession with corporeality stemmed primarily from her desire to transcend
the body seems more apt: “To understand the connection between physical vulnerability
and ironic self-rejection in women poets, it is useful to consider Sylvia Plath, who
appears most thoroughly to have internalized the larger culture’s principles of fleshrejection and aspiration toward transcendence.” 22 Being born female is a “tragedy” for
Plath because, unlike her male counterparts whose gender is a non-issue, as a woman
poet in mid-century America, her gender defined and limited her. The “inescapable
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femininity” that Plath resents is only increased by bodily “sensuousness”—a fact which
helps shed light on her aversion to corpulence. Letters and journals indicate that Plath
subscribed to the same fat hatred that the protagonist of her novel displays. In a May
1952 letter, she brags to her mother, “I have at last gotten thinner, and you should see my
tan!”23 In her journals, she frequently (and disdainfully) remarks on fat people she
encounters, such as the “fat stocky Germans” on a bus and the “fat tan bulging women”
she sees on a beach “rubbing oil into mounds of flesh packed into tight black bathingsuits
[sic],” both spotted during a trip to Spain with Ted Hughes in 1956.24 In her 1962 poem
“The Fearful,” she depicts a woman who fears fat more than death: “She hates/ The
thought of a baby—/ Stealer of cells, stealer of beauty—/ She would rather be dead than
fat,/ Dead and perfect, like Nefertit.”25 Here, it is the prospect of the physical
transformation caused by pregnancy that instills terror, which mirrors Plath’s own
misgivings about becoming a mother.
Journal entries and poems reveal that Plath felt profound ambivalence about
motherhood and maternal bodies. While in her journals she often displays a longing to
have children, she just as frequently expresses fear and resentment for the limitations they
would cause: “Graduate school and travel abroad are not going to be stymied by any
squalling, breastfed brats.”26 Additionally, Plath indicates that she considers the pregnant
body to be grotesque, even when it is hers; when describing a dream in 1959, she writes,
“Sitting with three pregnant women. My mother furious at my pregnancy, mockingly
bringing out a huge wraparound skirt to illustrate my grossness.”27 Plath’s ambivalence is
evident in her poetry as well. As Lauro notes, Plath “often emphasized the physical
presence of pregnancy and the ‘fatness’ of birth.” 28 Her depiction of birthing and caring
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for a newborn in “Morning Song” presents a bulky, burdened new mother: “One cry, and
I stumble from bed, cow-heavy and floral/ In my Victorian nightgown.”29 The description
of the speaker’s body as “cow-heavy” suggests that pregnancy and giving birth have
animalized the woman, and the detail of the prudish “Victorian nightgown” implies that
the physical transformation has desexualized her. Pregnant-woman-as-animal is a trope
that also appears in an earlier poem, “Metaphors,” in which the pregnant speaker refers to
herself as “a cow in calf” and “An elephant, a ponderous house,” as well as a “fat
purse.”30 The link between animality and pregnancy in Plath’s work emphasizes the
dominance of body over mind in her conception of motherhood.
In Plath’s writing, a notable tension exists between a repulsion for maternal
bodies and a powerful desire to become one. While Plath often remarks on the
grotesqueness of pregnant and/or fat bodies and the limitations caused by motherhood in
her journals, she also frequently discusses her overwhelming desire to become a mother.
In 1959, shortly before finding out she was pregnant with her first child, Plath writes,
And for a woman to be deprived of the Great Experience her body is formed to
partake of, to nourish, is a great and wasting Death. After all, a man need
physically do no more than have the usual intercourse to become a father. A
woman has 9 months of becoming something other than herself, of separating
from this otherness, of feeding it and being a source of milk and honey to it. To be
deprived of this is a death indeed. 31
In this passage, Plath’s longing—for pregnancy, for merging with and then separating
from another, for nurturing that other—is quite evident. Her association of childlessness
with death implies that she recognizes the necessity of bodily abjection in perpetuating
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the circle of life, even if inhabiting such abjection through pregnancy would transform
her body into the “inescapable femininity” that terrifies her. There is evidence of this
acknowledgement of the necessity of abjection in her poetry. In “The Munich
Mannequins,” Plath writes, “Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children./ Cold as snow
breath, it tamps the womb.”32 Here, perfection is sterile and cold—antithetical to the
messy, warm, unpredictable maternal body. Similar to “The Fearful,” in Plath’s final
poem “Edge,” perfection is only possible in death: “The woman is perfected./ Her dead/
Body wears the smile of accomplishment.” 33 Crossing over the line between subject and
“perfected” object through the act of death, the woman has transcended the messy
imperfection of bodily abjection, only to, ironically, become the very manifestation of the
abject: a corpse. She brings her children with her: “Each dead child coiled, a white
serpent,/ One at each little/ Pitcher of milk, now empty,/ She has folded/ Them back into
her body as petals.”34 In this unnatural, perfected form of femininity and motherhood, her
children have become serpents and her breasts have run dry. Significantly, the children
are pointedly “white” (as is the mother, who elsewhere in the poem is described as a
Greek statue wearing a toga), suggesting that their racial whiteness is somehow preserved
and protected by the transcendence of bodily abjection. Also, she has absorbed her
offspring back into her body, which exemplifies the idea of the abject maternal body as a
“devouring body.”35 It seems that even in her final days Plath understood that there is no
escape from abjection, even in death.
Similar to Plath’s longing for pregnancy, Gwendolyn Brooks shares in her
autobiographical Report from Part One that her decision to have children was at least
partially motivated by her desire for “the Great Experience” of pregnancy. Brooks writes,
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“I was happy to have children. I had always intended to have children…because I
respected and marveled at and admired my body—I wanted my body to do everything its
composition suggested it was supposed to do. I did not want my body to fail. I wanted my
body, as well as my mind and spirit, to succeed, to reach an appropriate glory.” 36 Unlike
Plath, Brooks exhibits respect and awe for her body, which she places on par with her
“mind and spirit.” I propose that the two authors’ divergent views of the body were
determined by the very disparate ways that their skin color has been historically coded.
As a white woman, Plath had the privilege of inhabiting the “invisibility” of
whiteness. As Richard Dyer discusses in White, in Western culture white people
“function as a human norm,” as unraced individuals aspiring for physical transcendence,
whereas people of color are coded as inescapably embodied others.37 Although women
have historically been aligned with the body, as aforementioned Plath turned to
masculine models of creativity and subjectivity, which necessitate a rejection of the body,
therefore explaining her desire to transcend her feminine embodiment.38 Additionally,
since whiteness is also constructed through thinness,39 Plath’s aversion to fat reinforces
her racial “invisibility.” While her femininity precluded her from actually inhabiting a
body that signifies “a shimmering emblem of the soul’s glory” like her male counterparts,
Plath’s subject position as a white, middle-class woman afforded her the privilege of
aspiring to it.40
Brooks, on the other hand, did not aspire to transcend or deny her corporeality; as
a black woman living in mid-century America, however, such an option would not have
been available to her even if she had. Regarding the effects of the legacy of slavery on the
conceptualization of black bodies in the United States, Hortense J. Spillers draws a
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distinction between “flesh” and “body.” Whereas the “body” is a socially constructed
entity that belongs to a subject, “flesh” denotes the “captive body” reduced to a “thing,”
or object.41 In other words, the flesh of the captive black body exists outside of ideology,
and is denied subjecthood. Since, as Spillers establishes, the cultural imaginary of the
United States developed its “American grammar” through the legacy of slavery, modernday black bodies are, in many ways, still perceived as merely flesh. Consequently, black
bodies have historically been construed as primitive, overly sexual, and inferior to white
bodies. Furthermore, Darieck Scott argues that “blackness is constituted by a history of
abjection, and is itself a form of abjection.”42 Thus, for Brooks, embracing and
celebrating the “glory” of her body becomes a subversive act, since black women have
traditionally been “doubly effaced” (to borrow Spivak’s term), their bodies rendered
abject by virtue of both their femininity and their blackness.43
Specifically, the physical “abjection” that Brooks contends with most frequently
in her work (and in her own life) is the cultural coding of black skin (especially dark
black skin) as inferior. While she herself did not consider her dark skin unattractive (“I
had always considered it beautiful”), she experienced “an almost angry rejection of [her]
dark skin by some of [her] brainwashed brothers and sisters.”44 Thus, colorism and darkskin-as-abject emerge as reoccurring themes in Brooks’s work, in the way that the
abjection associated with maternal and fat bodies shows up in Plath’s writing, perhaps
because both issues risk relegating an individual to the margins of a mostly white, male
dominated society—a fate that Plath fears and Brooks challenges.
As a result of the identification of (white) masculinity as the source of
intellection, Plath perceives writing and motherhood as mutually exclusive, while Brooks
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insists on the continuity between the two practices. In a 1979 interview, Brooks was
asked if her writing had ever conflicted with her work as a “wife and mother,” and if she
agreed with “Sylvia Plath in The Bell Jar” that being a writer and being a mother was “an
either-or proposition.” Brooks replied, “No, I certainly disagree. I feel that writing is part
of life…Being a wife and mother and having other interests in life did not do anything
except enrich my work—nourish it.”45 Significantly, in Maud Martha, her only novel
(which, like Plath’s, is semi-autobiographical), Brooks’s depiction of a strong, black
woman giving birth and celebrating the powerful capabilities of her body contrasts
sharply with Plath’s ambivalent portrayals of pregnancy and birth. Given the history of
the disenfranchisement of black mothers in the US—first as slaves who had no rights to
their children, and thereafter as “second-class citizens” deemed “unfit” as compared to
white middle class mothers—Brooks’s portrayal of birth and motherhood in the novel is
both poignant and subversive. 46
As Barbara Christian observes, Maud Martha is notable for presenting “for the
first time a black woman not as a mammy, wench, mulatto or downtrodden heroine, but
as an ordinary human being in all the wonder of her complexity.” 47 Published in 1953,
ten years before The Bell Jar, Maud Martha continues the work that Brooks begins in her
poetry collections A Street in Bronzeville (1945) and the Pulitzer Prize winning Annie
Allen (1950) of representing compelling, complex African American characters living in
urban (and often impoverished) settings. While Brooks admits that “[t]here’s fact-meat in
the soup, among the chunks of fancy” in Maud Martha, she stresses that the book “is not
autobiographical in the usual sense.”48 However, she does confess that the chapter in
which her protagonist gives birth “is a fairly good mirror of the birth of my first child”
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(192). In this chapter, “a birth,” an at-home delivery devolves into a chaotic, messy scene
that underscores the convoluted and inevitable role of abjection in mother/daughter
relationships.
For Maud Martha, a character who has always been devalued because of her toodark skin and plain appearance, the act of giving birth to her daughter becomes an
empowering experience. The description of her first signs of labor implies that the
experience she is about to undergo will somehow bifurcate her: “On her way back down
the squeezing dark of the hall she felt—something softly separate in her.”49 The
“squeezing dark of the hall” is suggestive of the birth canal, and feeling “something
softly separate in her” reflects Kristeva’s claim that “A mother is a continuous separation,
a division of the very flesh.”50 Interestingly, in The Bell Jar Esther views this idea of
internal separation as evidence that she is unfit for motherhood, when she observes that
she is “so unmaternal and apart” as compared to other women (222). For Maud Martha,
however, this sensation of apartness or detachment serves as her signal that the journey of
motherhood is about to commence.
Ironically, Maud Martha’s own mother turns out to be “unmaternal” and
unhelpful during the birth of her granddaughter. When her husband wants to call her
mother, Maud Martha resists: “‘Don’t do that, Paul. She can’t stand to see things like
this. Once she got a chance to see a stillborn baby, but she fainted before they even
unwrapped it. She can’t stand to see things like this’” (91). Notably, “useless mothers” is
a theme that appears in both Maud Martha and The Bell Jar, perhaps because both novels
are bildungsromans about young women attempting to establish their independence from
their mothers. Esther looks for alternative mother figures like Jay Cee, her boss at the
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magazine, and Doctor Nolan, the woman who treats her at the mental hospital, because
“[her] own mother wasn’t much help” (39). In every scene in which she appears, Mrs.
Greenwood is ineffectual and inadequate, and she eventually disappears from the
narrative altogether. Likewise, once she arrives at Paul and Maud Martha’s apartment for
the birth, Mrs. Belva Brown proves to be every bit as useless as Maud Martha predicted
she would be. As soon as her mother arrives, Maud Martha temporarily forgets the pain
of labor, “tighten[s] her lips,” and says, “‘Listen. If you’re going to make a fuss, go on
out. I’m having enough trouble without you making a fuss over everything’” (95). For
both protagonists, a crucial component of their process of individuation and maturation is
learning not to count on their mothers for emotional support.
In a scene which Tracy Floreani has referred to as “a graphic blood-and-wailing
nod to literary naturalism,” the birth itself becomes a spectacle of abjection. 51 Maud
Martha’s labor progresses so quickly that there is not enough time to get her to a hospital,
so her mother and Mrs. Cray, a neighbor from down the hall, become her impromptu
birthing attendants while Paul runs out to fetch a doctor. Before he goes, Paul stands at
the foot of the bed and sees “the creeping insistence of what he thought was the head of
the child,” a moment that is reminiscent of Esther seeing “a dark fuzzy thing appear”
through the “split, shaven place” between the legs of the anonymous, enormous pregnant
woman at the hospital during her visit with Buddy (92). In both instances, witnessing “the
immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in other
to be” instills fear and horror in the viewer. 52 Paul screams, “‘Oh my Lord!...It’s coming!
It’s coming!’” and then runs out of the building (after stopping to comb his hair at the
mirror, which causes Maud Martha to stare at him in “speechless contempt”) (92). When
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Belva arrives, “The baby [is] all ready to spill out,” an observation that emphasizes the
gooey fluidity of the abject birthing body (95, emphasis added). Belva and Mrs. Cray
stand on either side of the bed, “purposelessly holding a sheet over Maud Martha, under
which they peeped as seldom as they felt was safe” (96). Even though both women have
given birth before, they cannot bring themselves to look at Maud Martha’s splitting,
secreting body. She keeps asking, “Has the head come?”, but no one will check and see
(96). In the act of giving birth, the roles have been reversed—the daughter is now the
abject maternal body that terrifies the mother. Finally, she feels “as though her whole
body were having a bowel movement,” and then the baby slips out (96). Both Belva and
Mrs. Cray refuse to look at the baby, as if she were the results of a bowel movement. In
this moment, mother and newborn daughter are connected through their shared abjection,
yet Maud Martha and her mother are further alienated from each other, which seems to
contradict Kristeva’s claim that “in childbirth a mother identifies with her own mother.” 53
Instead, Maud Martha seems to more fully step into herself.
After her baby, Paulette, arrives, Maud Martha feels rejuvenated and empowered.
She wonders if she has “ever in her life felt so well?” and “fold[s] her arms triumphantly
across her chest” when another female neighbor from down the hall enters the apartment,
to whom she brags about her accomplishment and strength: “I just had a baby, and I feel
strong enough to go out and shovel coal!” (98). A new Maud Martha has emerged from
the birthing experience—one who will not be silenced, and who is stronger because of
the presence of her daughter. As Betsy Erkkila writes, in Maud Martha “motherhood
becomes a form of self-realization registering a movement from silence to voice.”54
When Maud Martha hears her baby crying in the kitchen, where the doctor (who arrived
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shortly after the birth) is cleaning and dressing her, “a bright delight had flooded through
her upon first hearing that part of Maud Martha Brown Phillips expressing itself with a
voice of its own” (99). Both a “part” of Maud Martha yet also an individual “with a voice
of its own,” Paulette is both self and other—an extension of her mother, but also not her
mother.
The moment is similar to Plath’s “Morning Song,” which Lauro has called “a
celebration of the child’s birth and her vocalized claim that she is her own self.” 55 Plath
begins the poem, “Love set you going like a fat gold watch./ The midwife slapped your
footsoles, and your bald cry/ Took its place among the elements.”56 Also a home birth
(implied by the presence of a midwife), the scene begins with the baby’s vocal assertion
of individuality. However, as in Maud Martha, the border between mother and baby is
malleable and ambiguous: “I’m no more your mother/ Than the cloud that distils a mirror
to reflect its own slow/ Effacement at the wind’s hand.”57 Here again we see the language
of ethereality, invisibility, and dispersal in Plath’s poetry, revealing the aspirational
transcendence of “whiteness.” The child is a mirror emulating the mother from afar; the
negative construction of “I’m no more your mother,” however, suggests that the
boundaries of this relationship are not clearly and neatly defined. Similarly, in the final
moment of “a birth,” when Maud Martha and Paulette apprehend each other for the first
time, they appear to mirror each other as separate yet conjoined individuals: “But now the
baby was quiet and returned its mother’s stare with one that seemed equally curious and
mystified but perfectly cool and undisturbed” (99). Through this experience, both mother
and daughter have asserted their voice and discovered each other. Just as Brooks herself
wanted her “body…mind and spirit” to “reach an appropriate glory,” Maud Martha views
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her transition into motherhood as an experience that necessitates and celebrates every
aspect of her being.
In addition to reflecting the personal beliefs and experiences of their authors,
Maud Martha and The Bell Jar underscore racial and class disparities in mid-century
America through their different representations of birth. The impersonal, intimidating,
antiseptic environment of the hospital delivery room in The Bell Jar contrasts
dramatically with the intimate domestic space in which Maud Martha delivers her baby.
Esther’s boyfriend Buddy Willard is a student at an unnamed medical school that is
probably as prestigious as Yale, his undergraduate institution, which means that it is
likely limited to white patients at the time that the novel takes place. In many ways, the
treatment of the anonymous, presumably white woman giving birth in the hospital
mirrors the treatment of white, middle-class American women by patriarchal society in
the 1950s. By “lifting” her body onto a tall table with “high stirrups,” she is quite literally
“put on a pedestal,” which imitates the way that white women (especially in the South)
have historically been idolized as symbols of beauty, grace, and purity. The medical
practitioners attempt to minimize the abjection of her unkempt, secreting maternal body
by shaving off her pubic hair and rendering her vagina “lurid with disinfectant,” which
reflects the Western construction of the female body “as a leaking, uncontrollable,
seeping liquid”—a body that requires containment and modification.58 Finally, by
administering “twilight sleep” to the pregnant woman so that she forgets the pain of
giving birth, the doctors gaslight the woman, similar to the way that middle-class white
women in postwar society were manipulated and misled to believe that their self-worth
and happiness—“true feminine fulfillment”—was measurable through their success as
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housewives and mothers. 59 Esther points out the misogyny of the drug: “I thought it
sounded just like the sort of drug a man would invent. Here was a woman in terrible pain,
obviously feeling every bit of it or she wouldn’t groan like that, and she would go straight
home and start another baby, because the drug would make her forget how bad the pain
had been” (66). The anonymous, pregnant white woman’s racial and class privilege
comes at a cost—she must relinquish her body, autonomy, and memory to receive the
protection and approval of the patriarchy.
Birth in Maud Martha, on the other hand, is an entirely female affair that affirms
the power and strength of the maternal body and displays Maud Martha’s resilience and
independence. Though the couple intended to have the birth occur in a hospital, the lastminute change of venue proves advantageous for Maud Martha, as the experience of
essentially acting as her own midwife empowers and enlightens her. Additionally, a
hospital for “colored” people in Chicago in the 1940s and 50s had fewer resources than
its white counterparts.60 In this sense, the home birth illustrates bell hooks’s claim that
historically “[h]omeplace has been a site of resistance” for African Americans, because it
is a “private space where [they] do not directly encounter white racist aggression.” 61
Paulette’s birth takes place in an environment free of the inherent racism and misogyny
of the medical industry. In Plath’s and Brooks’s texts, the different representations of
childbirth reflect the different ways in which “womanhood is being deployed within the
larger American culture.”62 Thus, whereas the delivery of the pregnant women in The
Bell Jar is hidden from sight and controlled by male doctors, her hard work is lauded by
others, and the resultant white baby is revered. Maud Martha’s “production of a black
child into the postwar cultural economy,” on the other hand, “seems truly devalued by
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anyone but herself.”63 Indeed, even Paul, Paulette’s own father (and the person for whom
she is named), seems disappointed in the little black baby that he thinks looks “gray and
greasy” and stillborn (97). While the birthing experience is transformative and
empowering for Maud Martha, and her daughter beautiful and strong, to the rest of the
world Paulette is just another black baby who will discover that “[l]ife was hard”—a
thought that passes through her father’s head as he looks down at her little “gray and
greasy” body lying on the bed (97).
This detail that Paulette’s newborn body appears “gray” is part of an extended
metaphor Brooks employs in Maud Martha to convey the abjection involved in living in
impoverished, segregated conditions in urban Chicago. The neighborhood in which Maud
Martha grows up is marked by “gray and decay,” as is the kitchenette apartment she and
Paul move into after their wedding: “The color was gray, and the smell and sound had
taken on a suggestion of the properties of color, and impressed one as gray, too” (5, 63).
The intermingling of the smells of dozens of bodies inhabiting the tight living quarters of
an apartment building is also described in terms of this color: “the smells of various types
of sweat, and of bathing and bodily functions…and of fresh or stale love-making…these
were gray” (64). The synesthetic quality of Brooks’s “gray” suggests that it pervades
every aspect of life in Maud Martha’s community, and using it to describe bodily
functions and secretions implies that the term itself is synonymous with abjection. This
becomes evident in the chapter “tim,” when Maud Martha examines her uncle’s corpse in
its coffin at his funeral and decides that he looks like “a gray clay doll,” which prompts
her to declare that “It all came down to gray clay” (25). Kristeva confirms Maud
Martha’s observation: “[abjection] is experienced at the peak of its strength when [the
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subject finds]…that it is none other than abject.”64 In other words, the horror of abjection
is most pronounced in those moments when we realize that, as mortal, messy, secreting
bodies, we are abject. Brooks’s portrayal of the realities of Maud Martha’s world as gray,
or abject, suggests that living black and impoverished in segregated mid-century Chicago
means abjection is ubiquitous—a veritable way of life, which exemplifies Darieck Scott’s
claim that “blackness-as-abjection” can “be understood or experienced as an aspect of
historical experience.”65
Significantly (and ironically), becoming a mother helps Maud Martha transcend
this grayness. Even though birth and motherhood render her the “abject mother” that her
daughter must eventually reject, they also make Maud Martha a stronger, more hopeful
individual with a clear vision for her future. This is evident in the final chapter, “back
from the wars!”, when “Maud Martha, with her daughter, got out-of-doors”—out of the
grayness of the apartment building, and even though the abject sight of veterans missing
limbs and “parts of faces” makes her cry, she expresses powerful optimism and gratitude
for the good yet to come, because she is about to become a mother of two: “And, in the
meantime, she was going to have another baby” (179, 180). For Maud Martha,
motherhood becomes the medium through which she can surpass the gray realities of her
everyday life.
In Brooks’s and Plath’s writing, maternal abjection induces both fear and hope,
while also revealing the ways in which the social construction of race circumscribes
female bodies. To Plath, the voluptuous pregnant body signifies a distasteful necessity,
for, as Dyer observes, “Whites must reproduce themselves, yet they must also control and
transcend their bodies. Only by (impossibly) doing both can they be white.”66 To Brooks,
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pregnancy, birth, and motherhood can empower black women, who have historically
been disenfranchised by white society. In this sense, Brooks’s portrayal of maternal
abjection illustrates Scott’s theory that “the abjection in/of blackness endows its
inheritors with a form of counterintuitive power,” which is located “at the point at which
the constellation of tropes that we call identity, body, race, nation seem to reveal
themselves as utterly penetrated and compromised, without defensible boundary.” 67
Maud Martha experiences this “power” by fulfilling her artistic yearning to “donate to the
world a good Maud Martha” by giving birth to her daughter, who becomes “the offering,
the bit of art that could not come from any other” (22). However, as the next section will
show, the relationship between mother and daughter can also devolve into a power
struggle, as the daughter attempts to break free from the maternal body.

“Bottle in Which I Live”: Mothers, Daughters, and Matricide
Elizabeth Grosz observes that, in the West, the female body has been constructed
as “a formlessness that engulfs all form, a disorder that threatens all order.” 68 Since men
have historically been aligned with the “transcendent” mind and women have been coded
as “leaking” body, femininity itself has often been perceived as abject. Thus, even when
not a pregnant, “maternal” body, female corporeality has the power to “threaten order”
and conjure fears of abjection. Additionally, Kristeva contends that the daughter becomes
abject through the process of rejecting the mother. Kelly Oliver writes, “But when the
female makes her mother abject in order to reject her, she also makes herself abject,
rejects herself, and not just temporarily.”69 The daughter must “reject” the mother in
order to enter the symbolic order and the realm of language, yet because she identifies
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with the maternal body (and can never properly mourn its loss), “she hates that body,
because she cannot be free of it. It is a horrifying, devouring body.” 70 Kristeva argues that
this process necessitates a symbolic “killing” of the mother: “For man and for woman the
loss of the mother is a biological and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to
becoming autonomous. Matricide is our vital necessity, the sine-qua-non condition of our
individuation.”71 If the daughter does not “get rid” of her mother, she carries her around
like a “living corpse,” yet in so doing, she kills a part of herself (“For women, matricide
is a form of suicide”) and “also makes herself abject.”72 Hence, the daughter is faced with
a double bind when it comes to her relationship with her mother: can’t live with her, can’t
live without her, can’t kill her. Plath and Brooks explore and embody this seemingly
impossible conundrum in their poetry. For Plath, navigating this tricky triad became a
central preoccupation of both her work and her life.
Sylvia and Aurelia Plath’s close and contentious relationship has been well
documented and exhaustively explored. 73 In her correspondence with her mother (which
Aurelia published as Letters Home by Sylvia Plath in 1975), Sylvia comes across as a
dutiful, doting daughter who desperately seeks her mother’s approval and love. Her
journals, poetry, and novel, however, are dominated by the voice of a young woman who
just as desperately wants to extricate herself from that relationship and unburden herself
of the “living corpse” of her mother. Indeed, journal entries indicate that she perceived
that separation as an either/or (and life-or-death) proposition: “I wish her death so I could
be sure of what I am: so I could know that what feelings I have, even though some
resemble hers, are really my own. Now I find it hard to distinguish between the
semblance and the reality.”74 The tension created by these ostensibly oppositional desires
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is perhaps most effectively conveyed in “Medusa,” which appears in Plath’s final poetry
collection, Ariel.
In the poem, the speaker attempts to break free from a suffocating, paradoxical
relationship with her mother. The title’s significance is two-fold: while “Medusa” is
clearly an allusion to the serpent-headed female monster of Greek mythology, it is also
another term for the jellyfish (medusozoa). As many scholars have noted, 75 Aurelia,
Plath’s mother’s first name, is also a genus of jellyfish (aurella aulita). Nephie
Christodoulides points out that the original title was “Mum: Medusa,” which leaves little
room to doubt that the “unnerving head” of the poem’s title character belongs to Aurelia
Plath.76 The mother/Medusa is portrayed as a devouring maternal body stalking the
speaker: “You steamed to me over the sea,/ Fat and red, a placenta.” The originary,
physical connection in the womb (“Old barnacled umbilicus,” “a placenta”) still haunts
the speaker, and has now been replaced by the “Atlantic cable.” Furthermore, Plath’s
conflicting representations of motherhood reflect the ambivalence the speaker feels
toward her mother. The religious references in the second stanza (“Red stigmata at the
very center”) and third stanza (“Dragging their Jesus hair”) suggest that Medusa’s
“stooges” represent Jesus, and therefore the speaker seems to compare her mother to the
Virgin Mary. In the fourth stanza, the speaker begins to describe her mother as a jellyfish:
“Curve of water upleaping/ To my water rod, dazzling and grateful,/ Touching and
sucking.” Later in the poem, the speaker cries, “Off, off eely tentacle!” The mother-asjellyfish is invasive and clingy, sucking life force out of her daughter. By portraying the
mother as Medusa, the Virgin Mary, and a jellyfish, Plath presents a shifting, unstable
identity, which imbues the mother with a menacing, unpredictable quality.
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Therefore, Kristeva’s insistence that “matricide is our vital necessity” seems
justified in “Medusa,” as the speaker, who can “draw no breath,” must save herself by
rejecting the mother. She seems to still be trapped in the maternal body, desperate to get
out: “I shall take no bite of your body,/ Bottle in which I live.” 77 As Christodoulides has
noted, “All Plath’s mother poems delineate the fusion and separation resulting from the
struggle to release the abject mother’s hold.”78 In “Medusa,” this “fusion and separation”
constitute the speaker’s central conflict. Though the speaker proclaims “There is nothing
between us,” Plath’s use of various literary devices traps the reader in the middle of this
mother/daughter relationship, where it becomes clear that the energy existing between the
two women is far from “nothing.” Pairs of adjectives like “dazzling and grateful,” “fat
and red,” and “dead and moneyless” are sprinkled throughout the poem and create a
sense of parallelism. Internal rhymes like “You steamed to me over the sea” and the
repetition of “I didn’t call you/ I didn’t call you at all” work together with the parallelism
to create a sense of attraction and repulsion that mirrors the inescapable and paradoxical
nature of the relationship between daughter and mother. In regards to the final line of the
poem (“There is nothing between us”), Barbara Johnson observes, “If there is nothing
between the self and the other, there is no space of separation, no difference, perfect
oneness…The desire to have ‘nothing between us’ may be a deep wish as well as a
disconnection.”79 Aurelia herself expresses concern about this lack of separation when, in
Letters Home, she refers to the “psychic osmosis” she experienced with Sylvia.80 The
intense (and unmistakable) push-and-pull that Plath generates in “Medusa” implies that
the final line is both a “deep wish” and a “disconnection,” thus effectively conveying the
double bind of mother/daughter relationships: the daughter must reject the abject mother,
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yet that process also entails a “suicide” of sorts, and causes a longing for the lost maternal
object that will never be fulfilled.
For Brooks, this double bind is further complicated by racial and class oppression,
which limit women’s professional and personal potential in life, thereby trapping both
mother and daughter in a seemingly endless cycle of poverty and second-class
citizenship. In “Jessie Mitchell’s Mother,” maternal abjection and colorism estrange a
mother and daughter pair, and draw them deeper into the hegemonic forces that seek to
subjugate and oppress them. From Brooks’s 1960 collection The Bean Eaters, “Jessie
Mitchell’s Mother” depicts a pregnant mother and her daughter Jessie Mitchell, who
appears to be a teenager or adolescent. The poem begins from the daughter’s perspective,
as she enters “her mother’s bedroom to wash the ballooning body.” 81 To the daughter, the
mother has neither name nor subjectivity—she is solely defined through her relationship
to Jessie Mitchell and has been reduced to a mere “ballooning body,” which illustrates
Marianne Hirsch’s claim that “the figure of mother is determined by her body more
intensely than the figure of the woman.”82 Jessie is disgusted by her mother’s swollen
body. Brooks gives us a peek into her mind as she enters the bedroom: “‘My mother is
jelly-hearted and she has a brain of jelly:/ Sweet, quiver-soft, irrelevant. Not essential./
Only a habit would cry if she should die.’” 83 The jelly imagery is reminiscent of Plath’s
portrayal of the speaker’s mother as a jellyfish in “Medusa,” and in The Bell Jar Esther
also compares her mother to jelly when she visits her at the hospital: “‘They said you
called for me.’ She seemed ready to cry. Her face puckered up and quivered like a pale
jelly” (172). This description of mothers “quivering” like “jelly” connects to the
reoccurring theme of “useless mothers,” in that their lack of solidity and strength renders
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them unhelpful and “irrelevant.” Additionally, as not quite liquid and not quite solid, jelly
occupies an indeterminate state, similar to the abject, which inhabits the space between
subject and object. Therefore, assigning mothers the textural quality of jelly emphasizes
their maternal abjection. Jessie Mitchell’s mother is also described as a “stretched yellow
rag”—another example of the maternal body as malleable (“stretched”) and abject
(“rag”).
It is this “yellow” characteristic of the mother’s body that drives an additional
wedge between the two women, as the light-skinned mother perceives herself as being
superior to her dark-skinned daughter. The mother, sensing Jessie’s disgust and
resentment, apprises her young, thin daughter and considers her inevitable future: “But
poor men would bend her, and doing things with poor men,/ Being much in bed, and
babies would bend her over,/ And the rest of things in life that were for poor women.” 84
As a poor black woman, Jessie’s future is one full of poverty, struggle, and maternal
abjection. These comparisons to the mother’s own life “shattered her heart” and “ate at
her bulwarks,” yet they also incite resentment and pettiness: “she, almost hating her
daughter,/ Crept into an old sly refuge: ‘Jessie’s black/ And her way will be black, and
jerkier even than mine,’” because she is not “lovely” and light-skinned like her mother. A
passage from Kristeva’s “Stabat Mater” regarding a mother’s animosity toward her
daughter in early childhood can help shed light on Jessie Mitchell’s mother’s seemingly
dichotomous reactions to her daughter’s bleak future: “Never straight-forward, always
held back, as if, although the unmanageable child deserved it, the daughter could not
accept the mother’s hatred—it was not meant for her. A hatred without recipient or rather
whose recipient was no ‘I’ and which, perturbed by such a lack of recipience, was toned

96

down into irony or collapsed into remorse before reaching its destination.” 85 In other
words, the hatred that the mother expresses toward Jessie is actually “not meant for her”
but rather for the racist, misogynistic forces that “bend” and subjugate both women—a
recipient that is “no ‘I.’” The mother mollifies this hatred by daydreaming about “Her
exquisite yellow youth,” a past full of “flowers” and “Triumphant long-exhaled
breaths.”86 She momentarily escapes the abjection of her “ballooning body” and the
acrimony she feels toward her resentful daughter by mentally returning to a time when
she was admired by men for her light skin and physical beauty—an act which emphasizes
the fact that the conflict between the two women is driven more by the outside forces that
shape their worldview than by the other.
As aforementioned, Brooks herself was ridiculed for her dark skin (as is Maud
Martha), and the idea of society perceiving dark skin as undesirable, or even abject,
appears throughout her work. In “Jessie Mitchell’s Mother,” colorism and fear of
maternal abjection collide, and neither woman can see that their animosity towards the
other is fueled by beliefs that only reify the societal forces that oppress them.
Additionally, while Jessie Mitchell rejects her mother and is repulsed by her pregnant
body, and the mother “almost hat[es] her daughter,” the fact that the two are engaged in a
very intimate act suggests that a connection still exists between the two women, and the
daughter’s willingness to “wash the ballooning body” may indicate that she still cares.
However, the washing of the mother’s body also implies the ritualistic act of washing a
corpse immediately following death. In this sense, the scene we witness in “Jessie
Mitchell’s Mother” may be viewed as the aftermath of a symbolic matricide, “the sinequa-non condition of our individuation,” as Kristeva claims. Having renounced and
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rejected the maternal body, Jessie Mitchell enters the room to wash the corpse, even as it
readies to bring forth new life. The mother’s ambivalence and recognition of the fate that
awaits her daughter signals an awareness of this symbolic separation. Therefore, the
visceral resentment that the two women feel toward each other may in fact mask a deeper
sadness—a mourning for their lost connection.

Speaking for the Daughter
Although a daughter must break with her mother as a necessary component of the
process of individuation (or else risk carrying the mother around like a “living corpse,”
according to Kristeva), the mother is not bound to the same dictum. Interestingly, the
ways in which Plath’s and Brooks’s own mothers insert themselves into their daughters’
narratives—or commandeer them altogether—reveal a reluctance to release their hold
over their daughters. Brooks’s mother Keziah has been described as “a quick-walking,
careful, Duty-Loving mother” who was incredibly supportive of her daughter’s writing
career, just as Aurelia Plath was of Sylvia’s.87 In A Life of Gwendolyn Brooks, George E.
Kent characterizes Keziah as follows: “[Gwendolyn’s] mother was kind but did not exude
kindness as her father did. Duty, rectitude—for her mother, these were foremost.”88 In his
preface to Report from Part One (which was written and published while Keziah was still
living), Don L. Lee writes, “[Gwendolyn] has always had unusual encouragement from
her mother, who to this day is still quite active in ‘watching over’ her daughter’s
output.”89 These descriptions of Keziah paint her as an upright, overly attentive, dutybound woman whose “unusual encouragement” and “watching over” of her daughter’s
writing may have mirrored the obsessive involvement of Aurelia Plath. Notably, when
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Gwendolyn asks her mother to write down memories to be included in Report from Part
One, Keziah does so in her daughter’s voice: “I ask my mother to write for me some of
her own memories of early Gwendolynian life. And presently she offers, with pride, a
Document. In it she presents herself, though she pretends that I am speaking.”90 In the
pages that follow, Gwendolyn occasionally inserts corrections and reactions to the things
her mother writes in parentheticals, which she signs “G.B.” This linguistic
ventriloquism—which Gwendolyn refers to as “An unscheduled partial-portrait of
Keziah!”—illustrates how the mother feels that she knows her daughter well enough to
speak for her (and the parentheticals indicate that she, in fact, does not). 91
Aurelia attempted to speak for her daughter in a much more comprehensive and
dramatic way with her publication of Letters Home by Sylvia Plath twelve years after her
daughter’s death. Specifically, Aurelia published her daughter’s letters “as a corrective to
what she describes as the ‘raging adolescent voice’ of The Bell Jar,” as she compiled the
collection after Sylvia’s novel was published in the United States in 1971 (in Plath’s
name this time, not under a pseudonym). 92 Jacqueline Rose observes, “The mother
therefore intervenes to correct the daughter’s fictionalised self-narrative.”93 The
collection begins with a long introduction written by Aurelia, in which she details her
past, her relationship with Otto Plath, and Sylvia and her brother Warren’s childhood.
Aurelia’s voice continues to appear throughout the collection when she introduces certain
letters, often refuting things that Sylvia writes in her letters. Also, in addition to the
inherent one-sidedness of the correspondence (since Sylvia, apparently, did not hold on to
her mother’s letters), Aurelia censors the letters, removing “anything at the level of
psychic and political life that might jar.” 94 Letters Home, therefore, becomes a mother’s
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attempt to revise, refute, and occasionally erase her daughter’s voice. The anger that The
Bell Jar’s publication in the US incited in Aurelia (who, in a letter to the publisher in
1971, writes that the book “represents the basest ingratitude”) was fueled by the fact that
the portrayal of Mrs. Greenwood, Esther’s mother, is clearly based on her. 95 Barbara
Johnson posits that this unveiled, scathing portrait of Aurelia (and of Sylvia’s mental
illness) was an intentional attempt on Sylvia’s part to reclaim and assert her own voice:
“when Plath realized that her mother expected and appropriated everything she wrote, so
that in a sense only something the mother didn’t want would be the daughter’s, she wrote
The Bell Jar.”96 Janet Malcolm argues that Aurelia’s mission ultimately fails, however, as
Letters Home only seems to confirm the toxic mother/daughter relationship that The Bell
Jar suggests: “Instead of showing that Sylvia wasn’t ‘like that,’ the letters caused the
reader to consider for the first time the possibility that her sick relationship with her
mother was the reason she was like that.”97 Rather than resurrect her dead daughter, or
revise her life narrative, Aurelia’s publication of Letters Home only leaves their
relationship “Overexposed, like an X ray,” just as the speaker of “Medusa” fears. In an
ironic reversal of Kristeva’s theory of matricide, Sylvia becomes the “living corpse” that
Aurelia cannot release.
In The Mother/ Daughter Plot: Narrative, Psychoanalysis, Feminism, Marianne
Hirsch identifies a fundamental problem in texts “written from daughterly perspectives”:
mothers often appear as objects, rather than subjects, who have no voice of their own. 98
When the daughter does insert her mother’s voice into the narrative, however, it still
entails an erasure of the mother, because it is only the daughter’s approximation of her
mother’s voice. Hirsch writes, “To speak for the mother…is at once to give voice to her
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discourse and to silence and marginalize her.”99 Yet, what are we to make of mothers
speaking for their daughters, as Keziah and Aurelia do? Should we view this as a
corrective measure—an example of mothers reacting to daughters who erased or
appropriated their voices? Or does the license that these mothers take with their
daughters’ narratives show how mothers can still feel a sense of ownership over their
daughters well into their adulthood, or even after their death?
The narcissistic overidentification that compels mothers to speak for their
daughters, and vice versa, is rooted in the corporeal origins of their relationship. As we
have seen, the maternal body is a site of both new life and vile abjection, nurturing love
and unspeakable horror. What Plath’s and Brooks’s fictive and autobiographical writing
show is that the daughter may never really break with that maternal body entirely, for that
“bottle in which [she] lives[s]” continues to compel her to create, to reject that originary
connection over and over again until the act of rejection resurrects and reifies the lost
maternal object through new life, whether in artistic creation or motherhood, or both. By
repeatedly inserting the maternal body into their body of work, by portraying the
symbolic matricide that daughters must commit in order to form their own subjectivity,
Plath and Brooks contravene the “original matricide” on which our society and culture
operate.100 And by trying to speak for their daughters, by unsuccessfully attempting to
reclaim the daughter’s voice as their own, perhaps Keziah and Aurelia exemplify the
sorrow of the “essential female tragedy”: the lost connection between mother and
daughter.101
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CHAPTER 3
DAUGHTER ABJECTION AND QUEER TEMPORALITY IN
MARGARET ATWOOD AND TONI MORRISON
In novels written early in their careers, North American literary legends Margaret
Atwood and Toni Morrison examine how a young fat girl and a young black girl are
sexualized, marginalized, and stripped of the protection of childhood innocence by virtue
of their fatness and blackness, both in society and in their own homes. Atwood’s Lady
Oracle (1976) and Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970) portray problematic
mother/daughter relationships in which the abjection of the daughters’ bodies has a more
debilitating effect on the relationship than does maternal abjection. While the mothers in
these texts are frequently portrayed as monstrous and distant, the daughters are often
depicted as disappointing and inadequate, particularly in their physical appearance.
Consequently, in a reversal of the typical psychoanalytical developmental narrative in
which maternal abjection compels the daughter to reject and separate from the mother, in
Lady Oracle and The Bluest Eye it is the mothers who reject their daughters, in part
because their daughters’ failure to comply with hegemonic, white supremacist beauty
ideals threatens their own precarious position in patriarchal society. Atwood and
Morrison reveal the ways in which young women considered physically ugly or
grotesque (Joan for her fatness, Pecola for her blackness) are precluded from a
chrononormative experience of time, because their abjection renders them illegible to
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hegemonic progress-driven narratives. In my examination of these postmodern fictions of
queer temporality, I will propose that Joan’s and Pecola’s exclusion from
chrononormativity may ultimately be read as liberating and subversive.
Both Atwood and Morrison employ postmodernist techniques to convey the
indeterminacy and fluidity of the subjectivity of their protagonists, two marginalized
female characters who would have typically been erased or stereotyped by the dominant
discourse at the time that the novels were written and published. By interweaving the
Gothic, the Harlequin Romance, the sentimental novel, and the picaresque, Lady Oracle
resists generic categorization and utilizes intertextuality as a method for exploring the
self. As Eleonora Rao notes, this multiplicity of styles “signifies authorial freedom from
any unitary or singular discourse,” which enables Atwood to playfully present Joan’s
synchronous “selves” while considering the social constructedness of the fat subject.1
Morrison’s temporal distortion and multiple perspectives in The Bluest Eye are
postmodern techniques that help to convey the complexities of the self. According to
Susan Sniader Lanser, through her use of a double narrative structure, Morrison
“change[s] the terms of narrative authority by deconstructing the rationalist humanism
that grounds the realist novel and reconstructing authoriality in ways that…exploit the
space where a hegemonic postmodern sensibility converges with an African-American
politics.”2 In other words, Morrison strategically utilizes postmodern literary techniques
to destabilize the historically white, male narrative authority and give voice to
disenfranchised black characters, while also avoiding the tendency of postmodern
critiques of the “subject” to destabilize or erase the identities of “subjugated people [who]
feel themselves coming to voice for the first time.” 3 bell hooks has noted that while the
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postmodern critique of identity can have debilitating consequences for marginalized
individuals, “Postmodern critiques of essentialism which challenge notions of
universality and static overdetermined identity within mass culture and mass
consciousness can open up new possibilities for the construction of the self and the
assertion of agency.”4 The postmodern elements of Atwood’s and Morrison’s novels
work to critique such essentialism by contributing to a mode of character development
that draws from the experiences of both the mind and the body. Moreover, the authors
choose to center their stories on two very marginalized, subjugated characters: a fat girl
and a little black girl.
The choice of these protagonists responds to the cultural moment in which the
novels were written and published. While second wave feminists fought for equal rights
and bodily autonomy for women in the 1960s and 70s, in many ways the movement also
reinscribed Cartesian dualism through its attempts to distance woman from body/nature,
where she has historically been relegated. 5 In this sense, by admitting and emphasizing
the body in their configurations of Joan’s and Pecola’s subjectivity, Atwood and
Morrison anticipate Elizabeth Grosz’s concept of embodied subjectivity, which attempts
“to displace the centrality of mind…in conceptions of the subject through a
reconfiguration of the body.”6 Additionally, the authors’ focus on the mother/daughter
relationship reflects an ideological shift in feminist thought. As Elaine Showalter has
observed, “Hating one’s mother was the feminist enlightenment of the 50’s and 60’s; but
it is only a metaphor for hating oneself. Female literature of the 70’s goes beyond
matrophobia to a courageously sustained quest for the mother.” 7 As we will see, although
the mothers in Lady Oracle and The Bluest Eye are “monstrous,” they are also depicted as

108

complex individuals who have suffered their own misfortunes at the hand of patriarchal
power, and the daughters long for an emotional connection that their mothers are
incapable of giving.
In their depictions of fatness, racism, and colorism, these two novels call attention
to marginal societal issues. As bell hooks, Audre Lorde, Barbara Christian, and many
other black feminist theorists have noted, women of color were largely excluded from
both the first and second waves of mainstream feminism.8 The Bluest Eye, which
Morrison started writing in 1962 and published in 1970, stands as a potential literary
corrective to the absence of black voices in the second wave of the feminist movement. In
her 1993 afterward to The Bluest Eye, Morrison shares that the novel was influenced by
the 1960s Black Power movement and its emphasis on “the reclamation of racial beauty”
in response to the African American community’s “damaging internalization of
assumptions of immutable inferiority originating in an outside gaze” (210). Questioning
why black beauty was not “taken for granted” in the black community, in writing The
Bluest Eye Morrison set out to explore “how something as grotesque as the demonization
of an entire race could take root inside the most delicate member of society: a child; the
most vulnerable member: a female” (210). Significantly, Pecola is a “very black girl”
who is bullied and mocked by other black children for her dark skin. 9 Through her
depiction of Pecola, Morrison illustrates the devastating effects of internalized racism and
colorism.
In Lady Oracle, Atwood responds to a growing awareness of diverse bodies and
anticipates early twenty-first century fat studies theories that emphasize the social
construction of fat bodies. In a 1984 interview, Atwood explains that Lady Oracle came
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about because she “got interested in the connection between mothers and fatness. It is
there. It is real.”10 She goes on to describe an Ann Landers column she read in which a
mother complains about her “terribly overweight” daughter, who she has “tried to force”
to go on diets and offered to buy nice clothing if she would lose weight; Ann Landers
responds to the mother by telling her, “you are causing her fatness.” 11 Atwood’s approach
to depicting a fat female protagonist is indicative of the mainstream second wave feminist
attitude toward fat female bodies. On the one hand, while feminists were pushing the
boundaries of what women “should” look like, on the other hand “thin feminists often did
not see the connections between fat oppression and gender oppression.” 12 The fat
acceptance movement commenced in New York City in 1967 (and NAAFA, or the
National Association to Aid Fat Americans, was formed two years later) but remained a
fringe feminist cause until the National Organization for Women (NOW) adopted a
resolution regarding size acceptance more than twenty years later. 13 At the time that Lady
Oracle was written, fat was frequently framed as a deliberate choice rather than as a
naturally occurring physical difference. For instance, Susie Orbach’s Fat is A Feminist
Issue (which was published just two years after Lady Oracle) asserts that feminism
understands fat to be “an attempt to break free of society’s sex stereotypes,” and that
becoming fat “can thus be understood as a definite and purposeful act.” 14 Therefore, at
first glance, Atwood’s portrayal of Joan’s weight gain as a conscious rebellion against her
draconian, thin-obsessed mother would seem to simply reify the cultural stereotypes
surrounding fat in the 1970s. However, by also framing fat as a permanent state or
identity category that Joan cannot escape (even after she loses weight and begins lying
about her fat past), and as a method for understanding her subjectivity as polymorphic
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and fluid, Atwood forecasts fat studies and corporeal feminist theories that reconfigure
the primacy of the body and consider the ways in which identity is socially and
rhetorically constructed.
In Lady Oracle and The Bluest Eye, Atwood and Morrison respond to the cultural
moment by rendering the effects of misogyny, fatphobia, and racism corporeally—
specifically, on the bodies of two young women. In what follows, I show how racist and
sexist beauty standards cause two mothers to abject their daughters, thus denying them
the protection of childhood innocence and influencing the development of their
subjectivity. Additionally, the mothers’ treatment of their daughters queers their
experience of temporality, illustrating the ways in which fatness and blackness oppose
teleological narratives of development. Finally, I propose counter readings of both texts
by arguing that the protagonists’ preclusion from chrononormativity may ultimately be
read as liberating and redemptive.

Monstrous Mothers and Disappointing Daughters
In Lady Oracle, Atwood presents a toxic mother/daughter relationship that
reconfigures the role of abjection between the two women. Joan explains that she is “the
embodiment of her [mother’s] own failure and depression, a huge edgeless cloud of
inchoate matter which refused to be shaped into anything for which she could get a
prize.” This paradoxical description of Joan—embodied, yet an “edgeless cloud”—
foreshadows the liminal, fluctuant connection between the body and mind that both she
and her mother, Frances Delacourt, possess. Frances’s repulsion at the sight of Joan’s fat
body and consequent rejection of her daughter subvert Julia Kristeva’s theories regarding
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the role of maternal abjection in mother/daughter relationships, while Joan’s inability to
release her psychic hold on her mother (which manifests in the continued haunting of
Frances’s “astral body”) illustrates the Kristevan concept of the daughter’s struggle to
separate from the “maternal Thing.”
According to Kristeva, abjection “is a precondition of narcissism,” a necessary
developmental stage prior to entering the symbolic realm of language. 15 As “the inbetween, the ambiguous, the composite,” abjection both threatens and constitutes our
identity as it unsettles the boundaries between self and other, subject and object. 16 Our
initial experience of abjection is the maternal body. Kristeva writes, “The abject
confronts us…with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even
before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the autonomy of language. It is a violent, clumsy
breaking away, with the constant risk of falling back under the sway of a power as
securing as it is stifling.”17 Because the maternal body represents the first and greatest
threat to the division between self and other, we reject it yet forever mourn that lost
connection. Since, as Kelly Oliver notes, “both the subject and society, which depend on
the Symbolic order, depend on the repression of this maternal authority,” the maternal
body, “the body without borders,” becomes a “horrifying, devouring body” to the child in
order to facilitate her separation from her mother. 18
However, this separation is not simple, especially for daughters. As Nancy
Chodorow has observed, symbiosis and primary identification between mothers and
daughters tend to be stronger than that between mothers and sons, and consequently a
mother often experiences her daughter “as an extension or double” of herself. 19
Additionally, within the heterosexual psychoanalytic framework of development, a
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daughter must transfer her primal, erotic desires for the mother to the opposite gender,
while a son need only transpose his longing to another female. Regarding this transition,
Oliver writes, “Whereas the son splits the mother in order to unify himself, if the
daughter splits the mother, she splits herself.”20 Yet, the daughter must separate from the
mother, or else risk “carr[ying] the maternal Thing with her locked like a corpse in the
crypt of her psyche.”21 This double bind haunts Joan in Lady Oracle, as she contends
with the emotional effects of being rejected by her mother at a young age for her abject
body.
With the novel’s first line, “I planned my death carefully,” Atwood introduces a
protagonist who carefully crafts fictions in both her real life and in the romance novels
that she publishes under a pseudonym.22 We soon learn that Joan’s “death” (which she
fakes to escape the consequences of her various hijinks throughout the novel) is not her
first, when she relates the tale of her first “self”—a lonely little fat girl who is
emotionally abused by her mother. Frances names her daughter “after Joan Crawford,” a
fact which proves ironic on two counts: first, being named after someone else causes Joan
to ceaselessly wonder, “Did she give me someone else’s name because she wanted me
never to have a name of my own?”, a question which becomes a sort of self-fulling
prophecy, as Joan assumes different names and different personae while navigating her
adult life (38). Secondly, “Joan Crawford was thin” and Joan Delacourt is not, a
difference that becomes “one of the many things for which [her] mother never quite
forgave [her]” (39).23 Indeed, Joan’s failure to live up to Frances’s (and, by extension,
society’s) thin ideal ignites the central tension of the novel: “The war between myself and
my mother was on in earnest; the disputed territory was my body” (66).
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Frances works diligently to inculcate her daughter with hegemonic beauty ideals,
teaching Joan early in life that her fat body is repulsive and shameful. She stops taking
pictures of her daughter at the age of six, which, Joan believes, “must have been when
my mother gave up on me…perhaps she no longer wanted my growth recorded. She had
decided I would not do” (39). This indicates that Frances rejects her daughter when she is
still quite young. Joan’s experience with her first (and final) dance recital illustrates the
ways in which Frances works as an agent of the patriarchy and reveals how Joan herself
internalizes the lessons her mother tries to teach her. Frances enrolls Joan in a dance class
because “she hoped it would make [her] less chubby,” but as the recital grows near she
becomes mortified at the prospect of her daughter appearing in public wearing a butterfly
costume with a tight bodice and short skirt (39). Her mortification is so great that she
alerts Miss Flegg, the dance teacher, to Joan’s appearance in the costume; in response,
Miss Flegg dresses Joan in a large, shapeless teddy bear costume with a sign around her
neck that reads “MOTHBALL,” denying her the opportunity to dance as a beautiful
butterfly like she had dreamed. Looking back on the event, Joan recalls the butterfly
costume as follows:
The problem was fairly simple: in the short pink skirt, with my waist, arms and
legs exposed, I was grotesque. I am reconstructing this from the point of view of
an adult, an anxious, prudish adult like my mother or Miss Flegg; but with my
jiggly thighs and the bulges of fat where breasts would later be and my plump
upper arms and floppy waist, I must have looked obscene, senile almost, indecent;
it must have been like watching a decaying stripper. (42)
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Here, young Joan’s fat not only makes her “grotesque” but also sexualizes her, thereby
denying her the presumed innocence and protections of childhood by insinuating that she
is complicit in her own oppression. Also, this retrospective glance reveals that adult Joan
has adopted her mother’s views regarding physical aesthetics; indeed, the novel is full of
examples of Joan denigrating her former fat body and the bodies of others (for instance,
when she moves to London and is disappointed by the “large number of squat people
with bad teeth”) (141). As a child and adolescent, however, Joan rebels against her
mother’s attempts to mold her into an “appropriately” thin, attractive woman.
Joan’s rebellion through compulsive eating and sartorial defiance intensify her
mother’s resentment. Similar to the concerned mother in the Ann Landers column that
inspired Atwood to write Lady Oracle, Frances leaves diet booklets around the house for
Joan to find and tries to bribe her with offers of pretty new clothes if she loses weight.
Joan responds by consuming “another Mars Bar or a double helping of french fries. I
swelled visibly, relentlessly, before her very eyes. I rose like dough, my body advanced
inch by inch towards her across the dining-room table” (66). Moreover, although Frances
encourages Joan to use her clothing allowance to “buy clothes that would make [her] less
conspicuous,” Joan seeks out “clothes of a peculiar and offensive hideousness, violently
colored, horizontally striped” (83). The sight of Joan “in a new lime-green car coat with
toggles down the front, flashing like a neon melon” finally succeeds in bringing Frances
to tears, which serves as proof of Joan’s power, “my only power” (84). As
aforementioned, this conceptualization of weight gain as intentional rebellion reflects a
dated feminist view of fat, which, though progressive for the 1970s, would be considered
problematic by modern day feminist and fat activists. However, as Joan observes, when
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she was fat, “nobody regarded being fat as a misfortune; it was viewed simply as a
disgusting failure of will,” which makes Atwood’s portrayal of weight gain as a
conscious act of resistance seem subversive (86). Additionally, it imbues Joan with
agency and a sense of purpose. However, her compulsive eating is also rooted in
existential anxiety: “I ate to defy her, but I also ate from panic. Sometimes I was afraid I
wasn’t really there, I was an accident; I’d heard her call me an accident. Did I want to
become solid, solid as stone so she wouldn’t be able to get rid of me?” (74). Joan’s
descriptions of herself as formless (i.e., “a huge edgeless cloud of inchoate matter”) and
her expressed desire for solidity seem fueled by Frances’s view of Joan as an abject body
that disgusts her.
In a reversal of Kristeva’s concept of maternal abjection, I propose that Frances
and Joan’s relationship serves as an example of what I have termed “daughter abjection,”
or the mother’s rejection of the daughter’s body in response to some perceived physical
blight that reflects poorly on the mother’s ability to mold her daughter in compliance with
Western patriarchal expectations of feminine beauty. In addition to ceasing any
photographic evidence of Joan’s growing (fat) body at the age of six, Frances also avoids
physically touching her daughter. Joan explains, “On her hands, in her hair, these were
the metaphors my mother used about me, despite the fact that she seldom touched me”
(85). Their physical estrangement is so severe that Joan has no sense memory of her
mother’s touch: “I could always recall what my mother looked like but not what she felt
like” (85). In fact, Frances refuses to touch her daughter’s skin even while wearing
gloves: “My mother didn’t hold me by the hand, there were her gloves to think of. She
held me by the arm or the back of the collar” (85). To Frances, Joan represents the abject,
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both in the sense that she is repellent, disgusting, and shameful (she tells Joan, “If I
looked like you I’d hide in the cellar” [84]), and in the way that she threatens the
boundary between self and other. As her daughter, Joan may be viewed as an “extension”
of her mother—a fact which terrifies Frances, since Joan’s failure to adhere to hegemonic
expectations of femininity is so very epic that it could endanger her own position within a
phallocentric society. Kristeva writes, “if [the abject] is a jettisoned object, it is so from
the mother,” and Oliver elaborates: “The child is this jettisoned object, the waste
violently expelled from the mother’s body.”24 This figuration of the child as “waste” from
the mother’s body supports my concept of “daughter abjection,” as it opens up space
within Kristeva’s theory of maternal abjection to consider how the child can become the
phobic “object” that facilitates the necessary separation from one entity into two.
Although Joan walks out of her mother’s house at the age of seventeen and never
returns nor speaks to her again, she cannot shake her psychic connection with Frances,
which takes the form of an “astral body.” As a teenager, Joan accompanies her Aunt Lou
to a gathering of Spiritualists, where she meets the psychic and medium Leda Sprott.
During the service, Leda receives an “urgent message” from a woman who fits Frances’s
description and who is “very unhappy about something…. I get the name Joan” (106).
When Joan informs her that her mother is still alive, Leda replies that “it must’ve been
her astral body,” which she defines as a body that everyone possesses (in addition to their
“material body”) that can “float around by itself, attached to you by something like a long
rubber band” (107). Initially, Joan brushes off this disturbing idea, remarking that she
“didn’t like the thought of my mother, in the form of some kind of spiritual jello, drifting
around after me from place to place” (107). Later, when Joan is living in London, she
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opens her apartment door one day to discover her mother’s astral body standing on her
rug, “crying, soundlessly, horribly” (172). Unbeknownst to Joan at the time, her mother
has just died in Canada. Joan resents the intrusion: “Why couldn’t she keep the goddamn
thing at home where it belonged? I pictured my mother floating over the Atlantic Ocean,
her rubber band getting thinner and thinner the farther it was stretched” (172). This
description of a mother haunting her daughter across the Atlantic Ocean is reminiscent of
Sylvia Plath’s poem “Medusa,” in which the connection between the speaker and her
mother is an “Old barnacled umbilicus, Atlantic cable”; the mother is “always there,/
Tremulous breath at the end of my line,” and she “steam[s] to me over the sea.”25 In both
Plath’s poem and Atwood’s novel, the psychic connection between mother and daughter
is imagined as a type of invisible cord that can cross oceans…whether the daughter likes
it or not.
Also similar to Plath’s “Medusa” is the way that Joan envisions her mother as a
monster. On the “good days” of their relationship during Joan’s childhood, Frances lets
Joan watch her “put on her face” in front of a triple mirror that reflects the front and both
sides of her face (62). Joan has recurring dreams about the experience: “In the dream, as I
watched, I suddenly realized that instead of three reflections she had three actual heads,
which rose from her toweled shoulders on three separate necks. This didn’t frighten me,
as it seemed merely a confirmation of something I’d always known,” which she refers to
as “the secret that I alone knew: my mother was a monster” (63). Later, as an adult, Joan
continues to feel haunted by her monstrous mother: “All this time I carried my mother
around my neck like a rotting albatross. I dreamed about her often, my three-headed
mother, menacing and cold” (213). This image of Frances as a three-headed monster
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could be read as an allusion to Cerberus, the three-headed dog from Greek mythology
that guards the entrance to Hades, who admits new souls but blocks any from returning to
the world. Similarly, Medusa, the mythological creature that Plath positions as the mother
in her poem, prevents those who venture onto the island where she lives from leaving by
turning them into stone with her gaze. These mythological metaphors, along with the
image of the invisible cord connecting mothers and daughters, suggest that the mother is
a monstrous guardian, entrapping the daughter and preventing her from moving forward
in her life.
However, just as the story of Medusa (a victim of rape transformed into a monster
by a jealous goddess) is more complex than it at first seems, the adversarial dynamic
between Frances and Joan is actually rooted in an ancient longing that originates in the
body. In “And the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other,” Luce Irigaray explores the preOedipal connection between mother and daughter. Through the voice of a daughter
addressing her mother, the piece depicts the painful, visceral processes of separation and
individuation. The daughter is a reflection of the mother (“I came out of you, and here, in
front of your very eyes, I am another living you”), and the mother depends on that
reflection to confirm her existence (the daughter asks, “Was I not the…guardian of your
nonexistence?”).26 Like Frances “putting on her face,” the mother in Irigaray’s essay sits
in front of a mirror and “strip[s] off [her] disguises”: “You take off your face of a
mother’s daughter, of a daughter’s mother. You lose your mirror reflection. You thaw.
You melt. You flow out of your self.”27 Here, disconnected from both sides of her
matrilineage, the mother loses her solidity and her sense of self—the “menacing and
cold” mother “melts.”
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Therefore, perhaps in Lady Oracle it is not just a matter of a maternal “monster”
guardian versus a daughter who is a “huge edgeless cloud of inchoate matter,” but rather
a daughter who also serves as “guardian of [her mother’s] nonexistence,” and a mother
suffering the same existential crisis as the daughter. Indeed, the recurring appearance of
Frances’s astral body (both when she is alive and after she is dead) conveys the liminality
and fragility of her embodied identity. 28 Frances’s stalking and haunting of Joan through
her astral body illustrates Irigaray’s idea of the mother “wandering without identity,
discharging upon [the daughter] this endless, and at each step excruciating, wandering.” 29
Perhaps the two women are, as Irigaray posits, “living mirrors” of each other, which Joan
realizes at the end of the novel when she tries to finally let her mother go: “How could I
renounce her? She needed her freedom also; she had been my reflection too long” (330).
Frances’s astral body is ultimately a gift for Joan, as it facilitates a connection and
understanding between the two women that they are never able to achieve while Frances
is alive. While Atwood does not go to great lengths to humanize Frances, she does imply
that her life has not been a happy one. She has a loveless relationship with Joan’s father,
Phillip, who is away at war until Joan is five years old, and is silent and distant once he
returns. Joan overhears a conversation between her parents in which she learns that she is
the result of an unintended pregnancy and a reluctant marriage, and later she speculates
that Phillip may have caused Frances’s death by pushing her down the cellar stairs while
she was drunk. Though Frances had devoted her life to her family, “had made her family
her career as she had been told to do,” “nobody appreciated her,” and her husband was
“ashamed of her,” refusing to move back “to Rosedale, that stomping ground of
respectable Anglo-Saxon money where his family had once lived” (177). Born into a
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lower socio-economic class than Phillip and possessing little education or employable
skills, Frances had to leverage her physical beauty to achieve stability and social mobility
in a patriarchal society, which explains her fixation on policing Joan’s appearance. 30
After her death, however, Frances is able to express her longing for a connection with her
daughter through her astral body: “‘What do you want?’ I said, but she didn’t answer.
She stretched out her arms to me, she wanted me to come to her; she wanted us to be
together” (329). Once she has dropped her material body, Frances is also able to shed the
ideological imperatives that compelled her to surveil her daughter’s appearance, and all
that remains is a primal desire to reunite with her child. This gives Joan the opportunity
to discover that she actually did love her mother, and that Frances had “never really let go
of me because I had never let her go” (330). These realizations help Joan begin to heal
and construct an identity that is separate from her mother.
Although Atwood does give Frances a few redeeming moments in the novel, she
is primarily depicted as a cold and distant monster, and for the most part we are left to
infer how she became so monstrous. 31 In The Bluest Eye, on the other hand, Morrison
presents a more complex, multi-layered mother character in her portrayal of Pauline
Breedlove.32 Whereas in Lady Oracle Joan serves as an unsettling reflection of her
mother and “guardian of her nonexistence,” in Morrison’s novel Pauline tries to ignore
and repress the ways in which her daughter reflects her, and instead seeks proof and
validation of her existence through the white family for whom she works. In The Bluest
Eye, Morrison shows how institutional racism and Western beauty ideals transform
Pauline Breedlove into a monstrous mother—a transformation that has devastating
consequences for her young daughter, Pecola.
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Unlike Frances, whose backstory is only presented in brief glimpses, Pauline
receives an entire chapter, in which we learn the history of her bodily infirmities, her
relationship with her husband Cholly, and her exposure to racist ideology and debilitating
conceptions of feminine beauty. Pauline’s section represents a formal departure from
earlier chapters in the novel, as it alternates between the voice of an authorial narrator and
Pauline’s internal monologue. 33 The chapter’s opening line, “The easiest thing to do
would be to build a case out of her foot,” positions Pauline on the defensive; the rest of
the chapter offers evidence that attempts to explain how a mother could become so
monstrous (110). Regarding this chapter, Susan Sniader Lanser writes, “All of this
information overdetermines [Pauline’s] role in Pecola’s tragedy and makes it impossible
to assign causes to effects or to delineate clear boundaries of responsibility.” 34 Moreover,
as a poor black woman with a lame foot and a worthless, abusive husband living in a
bitterly racist society, Pauline emerges from this chapter almost as much of a victim as
her daughter. Indeed, Morrison traces the transmittal of the toxic, damaging beliefs
regarding race and beauty from mother to daughter as she explores the effects of those
beliefs on them both.
Pauline learns white supremacist beauty ideals from both black and white
sources. When she and Cholly move from Kentucky to Ohio in search of opportunities,
the Northern black women that Pauline encounters in her new town deride her for not
straightening her hair, or wearing high heels and cosmetics. As Maxine Leeds Craig
notes, prior to the 1960s, “Hair straightening was a beauty technique used by black
women as they made the transition from rural poverty to urban promise.”35 This method
for pursuing “upward mobility” is rooted in racist ideology, as it aims to make African

122

American hair look less “ethnic” and more white. 36 At first, Pauline tries to assimilate to
her new surroundings, but high heels “aggravated her shuffle into a pronounced limp,”
her attempts at making up her face “came off rather badly,” and the sudden loss of her
front tooth due to a cavity compels her to “settle[] down to just being ugly” (117, 118,
123). However, this is no easy task, since her time spent at the “picture show” while
pregnant with her first child (which she refers to as “the onliest time I be happy”)
watching beautiful white actors live charmed lives dictates her aesthetic preferences and
introduces her to the world of unattainable (white) physical beauty, one of “the most
destructive ideas in the history of human thought” (122). She applies these same aesthetic
standards to her assessments of both herself and her daughter, which results in selfloathing and resentment.
In Pauline’s eyes, Pecola enters the world abject. Prior to her daughter’s birth,
Pauline feels good about her second pregnancy and experiences a sense of connection
with her unborn child: “I used to talk to it whilst it be still in the womb. Like good friends
we was” (124). This pre-lingual, pre-Oedipal communication between mother and baby
exemplifies Kristeva’s concept of the semiotic chora, which is the developmental stage
prior to language, prior to signification, that begins in the womb and lasts until an infant
is about six months old. Kristeva writes, “the chora, as rupture and articulations
(rhythm), precedes evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality, and temporality.” 37 In other
words, the chora is experienced as sheer fluidity, timelessness, and connectedness. When
mother and daughter are engaged in this bodily, visceral connection, Pauline “felted good
about that baby” (124). Significantly, however, her feelings change after the birth.
Though she promises to “love it no matter what it looked like,” she seems to change her
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mind once she sees her daughter, who “looked like a black ball of hair” (124). In the
semiotic chora, before the baby enters the realm of signification and language, she can be
a loving companion, a “good friend,” but once Pauline sees her outside of her body and in
the world, she rejects her, perhaps because some part of her recognizes that there is no
place for Pecola in the realm of the Symbolic—there is no method for signifying an ugly,
dark black girl in a society that refuses to see her.
Moreover, Pauline projects her “contempt for her own abjected blackness” onto
Pecola from the moment she is born.38 Even though Pecola is a “right smart baby,”
Pauline decides right away that she is a disappointment: “But I knowed she was ugly.
Head full of pretty hair, but Lord she was ugly” (126). Notably, Pauline is reminded of
her “abjected blackness” shortly before she gives birth to Pecola, when the white doctors
in the hospital animalize her and dismiss her pain: “When he got to me he said now these
here women you don’t have any trouble with. They deliver right away and with no pain.
Just like horses” (124). Therefore, she associates Pecola’s birth with the doctors’
dehumanization. Additionally, seeing Pecola for the first time is an uncanny experience
for Pauline:
Anyways, the baby come. Big old healthy thing. She looked different from what I
thought. Reckon I talked to it so much before I conjured up a mind’s eye view of
it. So when I seed it, it was like looking at a picture of your mama when she was a
girl. You knows who she is, but she don’t look the same. They give her to me for
a nursing, and she liked to pull my nipple off right away. (125)
Even after seeing her baby and learning its sex, Pauline continues to refer to Pecola as
“it” (“So when I seed it”), which suggests that she objectifies her daughter, as the doctors
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have just objectified her. The sight of Pecola is unsettling, both familiar and unfamiliar,
like “looking at a picture of your mama when she was a girl…but she don’t look the
same,” which resonates with Freud’s description of the uncanny as that which “proceeds
from something familiar which has been repressed.” 39 In this instance, it is the abject,
“the ‘object’ of primal repression,” that has resurfaced for Pauline in the figure of her
newborn baby girl, who reminds her of her own abjection and invisibility in a society
where “the black female body has not been interiorized as ideal but localized as thing.” 40
Also, Pauline views the relationship as adversarial from the very beginning, as evinced
by the fact that her first comment about Pecola after noting how uncanny she looked is
that “she liked to pull my nipple off right away” during their first nursing encounter. For
Pauline and Pecola, daughter abjection frames the very foundation of their relationship.
Pauline’s fetishization of white beauty alienates her from her daughter and traps
her in an impossible fantasy. Her “education in the movies” contorts her sense of
aesthetics, teaching her that the flawless white actors she sees on the “silver screen”
represent the pinnacle of both “absolute beauty” and virtue, and since those standards are
impossible for her to achieve, she “collected self-contempt by the heap” (122). Her job as
a domestic servant for the affluent, white Fisher family places her in close proximity to
the “beauty, order, cleanliness, and praise” that she so craves (127). Their small, young
daughter with “corn yellow” hair is like a living baby doll, and caring for her becomes
one of Pauline’s obsessions: “Then she brushed the yellow hair, enjoying the roll and slip
of it between her fingers” (127). When Claudia MacTeer, who serves as one of the
novel’s narrators, and her sister Frieda seek out Pecola at the Fisher home one day, a brief
altercation reveals the extent to which Pauline has transposed her maternal affection from
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her own daughter to her little blonde ward. Claudia is furious when she overhears the
Fisher girl call Pauline “Polly,” indicating a level of both disrespect and intimacy,
because “even Pecola called her mother Mrs. Breedlove” (108). After Pecola accidentally
tips over a hot berry cobbler, splashing most of the juice on her legs and burning herself,
Pauline enters the room and begins beating her: “In one gallop she was on Pecola, and
with the back of her hand knocked her to the floor. Pecola slid in the pie juice, one leg
folding under her. Mrs. Breedlove yanked her up by the arm, slapped her again, and in a
voice thin with anger, abused Pecola directly and Frieda and me by implication” (109).
Pauline’s monstrous reaction to the accident (and her obliviousness to her daughter’s
pain) contrasts remarkably with the maternal way that she soothes and consoles “the little
pink-and-yellow girl,” who begins to cry after witnessing the violent outburst and demise
of her precious pie (109). This mother/daughter exchange throws into sharp relief
Pauline’s rejection of Pecola, whose daughter abjection momentarily ruptures the fantasy
of whiteness and white beauty in which Pauline engages during her time with the Fishers.
Just as Pauline fetishizes the doll-like Fisher girl for her delicate white features
and silky blonde hair, Pecola learns to value and desire white aesthetics. When she stays
with the MacTeers after her father “burned up his house” and put his entire family
“outdoors,” Pecola becomes obsessed with a “blue-and-white Shirley Temple cup” and
takes “every opportunity to drink milk out of it just to handle and see sweet Shirley’s
face” (19, 23). Pecola wants to “handle” the “face”—similar to how Pauline enjoys
bathing the Fisher girl and brushing her hair—as she drinks “three whole quarts” of milk,
which is itself a symbol of white purity and supremacy.41 Pecola again seeks to fondle
and consume white beauty when she purchases Mary Janes from a sundries shop:
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Each pale yellow wrapper has a picture on it. A picture of Mary Jane, for whom
the candy is named. Smiling white face. Blond hair in gentle disarray, blue eyes
looking at her out of a world of clean comfort. The eyes are petulant,
mischievous. To Pecola they are simply pretty. She eats the candy, and its
sweetness is good. To eat the candy is somehow to eat the eyes, eat Mary Jane.
Love Mary Jane. Be Mary Jane. (50)
For Pecola, the candy becomes a communion wafer, a Holy Eucharist that has the power
to purify and transmogrify. Like her mother, Pecola fetishizes symbols of unattainable
white beauty: “Three pennies had bought her nine lovely orgasms with Mary Jane” (50).
She has clearly internalized and adopted the same racist belief system regarding physical
aesthetics that her mother learned while watching those movies—so much so that she
recognizes that the only way to secure her mother’s affection would be to somehow
magically comply with those same unrealistic expectations: “It had occurred to Pecola
some time ago that if her eyes…were different, that is to say, beautiful, she herself would
be different…maybe Cholly would be different, and Mrs. Breedlove too” (46). Therefore,
“Each night, without fail, she prayed for blue eyes” (46). Pecola knows that, as a dark
black girl with “small eyes set closely together under [a] narrow forehead” and “straight,
heavy eyebrows which nearly met,” she is a disappointing daughter to a mother who
worships her antithesis, “the little pink-and-yellow girl” (38).
As aforementioned, in her afterword to the 1993 edition of The Bluest Eye,
Morrison explains that the impetus for writing the novel came from the disconnect she
witnessed between the 1960s Black Power movement and its imperative to celebrate all
the ways that “Black is Beautiful,” and the internalized racism that she witnessed in the
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African American community. She shares the story of overhearing an elementary school
classmate express a desire to have “blue eyes”; Morrison writes, “Implicit in her desire
was racial self-loathing” (210). As J. Brooks Bouson (and many other critics) have
observed, The Bluest Eye “points to the pernicious effects of internalized racism.” 42
Moreover, intraracial discrimination features prominently in the novel; Pecola is often
targeted by her peers for having very dark black skin, like when a group of boys surround
her after school and chant “Black e mo Black e mo,” an act motivated by both
internalized and intraracial racism: “It was their contempt for their own blackness that
gave the first insult its teeth” (65). In her essay “Back to Black: Ending Internalized
Racism,” bell hooks explains the inherent hierarchy that colorism causes in the African
American community: “to be born light meant that one was born with an advantage
recognized by everyone. To be born dark was to start life handicapped, with a serious
disadvantage.”43 For the Breedlove family (which, ironically, “breeds” self-loathing
rather than “love”), their dark skin and ethnic facial features provide proof of their
“unique” ugliness, a belief that they subscribe to wholeheartedly: “No one could have
convinced them that they were not relentlessly and aggressively ugly” (38).
Claudia and Frieda are also acutely aware of the advantages of light skin; when a
“high-yellow dream child” named Maureen Peal begins attending their school, the sisters
envy and resent her (62). Notably, when Maureen is introduced to Pecola, she asks,
“Wasn’t that the name of the girl in Imitation of Life?”, which she explains is a film about
“this mulatto girl [who] hates her mother cause she is black and ugly but then cries at the
funeral” (67). This allusion to Imitation of Life seems intentionally ironic, given the fact
that in The Bluest Eye it is the daughter who is rejected by her mother for being “black
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and ugly,” rather than the mother who is rejected by the daughter. While Claudia and
Frieda recognize that “Maureen Peal was not the Enemy,” and that “[t]he Thing to fear
was the Thing that made her beautiful, and not us,” they are unable to name this “Thing,”
and they are powerless to stop it (74). This unnamable, unstoppable force exists in “the
honey voices of parents and aunts, the obedience in the eyes of our peers, the slippery
light in the eyes of our teachers when they encountered the Maureen Peals of the world”
(74). In other words, the forces of internalized and intraracial racism are systemic,
pervasive, and invisible.
One method Morrison uses to convey just how deep racist ideology regarding
beauty ideals resides in the collective unconscious is through white baby dolls. 44 Early in
the novel, Claudia scoffs at Frieda and Pecola as they bond over their shared obsession
with Shirley Temple, and the exchange inspires her to reflect on her fierce and longstanding hatred of dolls. Gifted a “big, blue-eyed Baby Doll” every year for Christmas,
Claudia is repulsed by the symbol of white beauty and compulsory heterosexuality (“I
had no interest in babies or the concept of motherhood”); she feels compelled to
“dismember it” in an attempt to figure out why “all the world had agreed that a blueeyed, yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured” (20). Given
her family’s poverty and Pauline and Cholly’s neglectful and abusive parenting, Pecola
likely never received a doll for Christmas, but based on her adoration for the Shirley
Temple cup and the Mary Janes, there is little doubt that she would have indeed
“treasured” such a gift. Morrison’s decision to position white baby dolls as the epitome of
beauty for young girls appears to allude to the Clark Doll Experiment of the 1940s, in
which African American psychologists Kenneth Clark and Mamie Clark gave young
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black children the option to choose between black dolls and white dolls, and the subjects
overwhelmingly chose the white ones. 45 Notably, colorism seemed to have been a factor
in the children’s choices, as the results showed that the tendency “to prefer the white doll
and to negate the brown doll…is most pronounced in the children of light skin color and
least so in the dark children.”46 In addition to its racial implications, Morrison’s emphasis
on dolls in The Bluest Eye underscores the ways in which young girls are taught
hegemonic expectations regarding femininity and beauty through childhood toys, and
encouraged to transpose their longing (for friendship, for connection with others, etc.) to
those toys. Atwood also portrays this gender conditioning in Lady Oracle; when Joan
complains to her mother that she is lonely and does not have anyone to play with, Frances
instructs her to “Play with your dolls” (75). Joan finds this solution unsatisfying: “I did
play with them, those crotchless frizzy-haired plastic goddesses, with their infantile eyes
and their breasts that emerged and receded gently as knees, unalarming, devoid of
nipples. I dressed them up for social events they never attended, undressed them again
and stared at them, wishing they would come alive” (75). Like Pecola’s Mary Janes and
Shirley Temple cup, Joan’s dolls provide both instructions regarding feminine aesthetics
and the fantasy of interpersonal connection.
For both Pecola and Joan, the daughter abjection that compels their mothers to
reject them is reinforced by society. In other words, everything around them confirms
that they are abject for their blackness and fatness. From the ways that they fail to mimic
the aesthetics of dolls, to the bullying they receive from classmates, to the prejudicial
attitudes of their teachers, Joan and Pecola have no reason to doubt that their mothers are
correct. Interestingly, a 1962 study entitled “Obese Adolescent Girls: An Unrecognized
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‘Minority’ Group?” examined similarities between the effects of fat prejudice and racial
discrimination.47 The authors argue that just as the “Negro person never forgets racial
discrimination” and “some Negro people…straighten their hair, lighten their skin and
have a social status system based in part on lightness of skin color,” obese girls also
adopt “dominant group values” because they are constantly reminded of their fatness. 48
Thus, “like other minority groups, the obese adolescent girls accept social beliefs
regarding obesity.”49 While problematic by today’s standards,50 this study offers a
glimpse of dominant beliefs in mid-century Western culture—i.e., that fatness and
blackness are generally undesirable traits. Moreover, the two traits are linked, as fat
stigma and the thin ideal were, in part, born from a desire to delineate between the
“savage,” excessive black body and the “civilized,” disciplined white body. In Fearing
the Black Body: The Racial Origins of Fat Phobia, Sabrina Strings notes that “the fear of
the black body was integral to the creation of the slender aesthetic” among white
people.51 Therefore, Frances’s obsession with Joan’s weight may also be fueled by
anxieties about racial identity and social class. This fear of fat black bodies is also present
in The Bluest Eye. After Frieda is sexually molested by her parents’ boarder and
overhears a neighbor pronounce that she has been “ruined,” she explains to Claudia that
“ruined” is being like “the Maginot Line,” a fat black prostitute that lives in an apartment
with two other prostitutes above the Breedloves’ home. Claudia considers her sister’s
future: “An image of Frieda, big and fat, came to mind. Her thin legs swollen, her face
surrounded by layers of rouged skin. I too begin to feel tears. ‘But, Frieda, you could
exercise and not eat’” (101). Here, fatness is a fate worse than being sexually assaulted,
because it would distance Frieda even further from achieving the “high-yellow” ideal of
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someone “civilized” and thin like Maureen Peal. Also, Claudia’s suggestion to “exercise
and not eat” frames fatness as a choice (or, at least, as potentially avoidable), which is
also how Atwood portrays fat in Lady Oracle. Ironically, Pecola’s prayer for blue eyes
implies that she believes her ugliness is also potentially optional. Though not framed as a
“choice” per se (since she has to pray for the eyes and ask Soaphead Church to help
answer her prayer), Pecola’s desire for God to alter the color of her eyes so that she can
be beautiful and loved suggests that she has internalized the racism passed down to her
by her mother to such a degree that she believes her abjection is, in some way, her fault.
Framing fatness and blackness as traits that Joan and Pecola believe are somehow
within their control insinuates that the daughters are responsible for their own abjection
when, in actuality, systemic societal problems are the root cause of their oppression and
abuse. Frances obtains and maintains her precarious social position by adhering to
patriarchal expectations of feminine beauty (which demand thinness), and those same
expectations compel her to surveil and suppress her daughter’s body. Pauline learns from
blacks and whites alike that her blackness is ugly and her body is an object, and these
beliefs inform her parenting (or lack thereof) of Pecola. Both mothers reject their
daughters because they believe they must, or else risk being rejected themselves by a
misogynistic and racist society that considers their primary job as mothers to be
conforming their daughters to its dictates. Significantly, Frances’s and Pauline’s
rejections of Joan and Pecola have profound consequences for their daughters’
subjectivity. As the next section will show, Joan’s and Pecola’s daughter abjection
fragments their sense of self and queers their experience of time.
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“The Formal Beginning of My Second Self”: Temporality, Subjectivity, and
Abjection
After Aunt Lou dies, Joan discovers that she stands to inherit some money, but
she can only claim her inheritance on one condition: she must lose one hundred pounds.
Initially she resists, feeling like Aunt Lou’s final message is a betrayal or rejection (“Did
it mean she hadn’t really accepted me for what I was, as I thought she had…?”), but once
she recognizes that her aunt offered her the money “to escape from [her] mother,” she
decides to overlook the cruelty of her aunt’s condition and “reduce” (117). Joan engages
in a cycle of disordered eating—sometimes starving herself through a diet of “fat pills,”
appetite-suppressing candies, crackers, and black coffee, other times binge eating and
then purging after each “relapse”—and watches her body “dwindle” (118, 119). Rather
than pleasing her mother, as Joan had always expected, her weight loss causes Frances to
become “frantic” and erratic. She leaves cakes and pies around the house for her daughter
to find, and Joan realizes that “in a lesser way she had always done this” (119). In their
final confrontation, Joan confesses that she intends to move out as soon as she turns
eighteen and has lost enough weight to claim her inheritance; Frances responds with “an
expression of rage, which change[s] quickly to fear,” and says, “‘God will not forgive
you! God will never forgive you!’” right before plunging a paring knife from the kitchen
counter into Joan’s upper arm (120). Joan walks out, loses the final pounds while living
in a boarding house, claims her money, and then moves to London. Regarding this
transition, Joan pronounces, “This was the formal beginning of my second self” (135).
Ever since figuring out at the age of six that her mother believes she “would not
do” in her current form, Joan adopts and sheds personae based on the environments in
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which she finds herself—a process that Atwood reflects through the different writing
styles that she mimics in the novel. As Eleonora Rao observes, by parodying the Gothic,
the Harlequin Romance, Victorian poetry, concrete poetry, and the Picaresque, Atwood
“probes notions of unity in generic classification,” and Joan’s use of different identities
destabilizes the notion of a unified self.52 However, I would argue that Lady Oracle’s
“polyhedric protagonist” vacillates between different personae not out of a desire to
subvert or rebel against societal norms or static conceptions of the self, but rather because
of the dramatic and sustained ways that her mother abjected her throughout her
childhood.53 Joan’s daughter abjection splinters her subjectivity, ultimately altering her
experience of temporality.
As aforementioned, abjection has the power to both create and destroy an
individual’s identity, as it is comprised of the forces against which we establish our
selfhood, yet it is also a primal part of us that constantly threatens to dismantle the
division between subject and object. Therefore, if fatness is abject, then it becomes one of
the forces against which subjectivity is formed and delimited. Growing up with a mother
who constantly reminds her of her fatness, Joan learns that abjection is who she is, not
simply aspects of physicality to suppress or avoid. This is why her former fat body
continues to haunt her, even long after she loses weight: “The outline of my former body
still surrounded me, like a mist, like a phantom moon, like the image of Dumbo the
Flying Elephant superimposed on my own” (213). Like her mother’s astral body, the
specter of Joan’s fat body continues to insert itself into her life at inconvenient moments,
like when she encounters a childhood acquaintance who once bullied her: “Wads of fat
sprouted on my thighs and shoulders, my belly bulged out like a Hubbard squash…Like a
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virus meeting an exhausted throat, my dormant past burst into rank life” (228). Joan is
unable to repress the abject because she formed her subjectivity in a state of abjection,
rather than against it. Significantly, Kristeva conceives of the abject as timeless and
eternal; she describes it as “a land of oblivion that is constantly remembered,” and “That
elsewhere that I imagine beyond the present.” 54 Therefore, living with a selfhood
constituted by (or, at least formed in) abjection traps Joan inside a temporal loop.
Many fat studies scholars have identified the ways in which living in an “obese”
body in a fatphobic society queers a fat person’s experience of time. Rachel Fox argues
that “the chronotypes created by narratives of personal transformation through weight
loss” are internalized by fat dieters and thus “hold [them] hostage to a future that will
never materialize while simultaneously making other ways of experiencing time
unthinkable.”55 In other words, the compulsory drive for a perfect, thin future makes it
impossible to fully inhabit the present, or to acknowledge the fat, imperfect past. In her
article “Against Progress,” Fox examines how the history of hegemonic progress
narratives in Western culture—which justify violence, oppression, and deprivation in the
present by striving for an imagined utopian future—compel fat people to “evacuate” the
present by consigning the “fat, abject body” to the past (even while still living in that
body) and reside in “an imaginary state of future achievement,” where they will have the
thin, socially acceptable body that they have been instructed to want. 56 In “Slender
Trouble,” Lucas Crawford argues that “there is, rhetorically, no such thing as a fat
present.”57 He elaborates: “When fat bodies can be permitted only if they can pass ‘onthe-way-to-thin’ (LeBesco 2004: 95), it is not possible to say that anyone is fat; fat people
are launched into the future anterior tense in which we ‘will have been’ fat.” 58 Finally, in
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“Tempo-rarily Fat: A Queer Exploration of Fat Time,” McFarland et al. draw on
Elizabeth Freeman’s concept of chrononormativity (which Freeman defines as “the use of
time to organize individual bodies toward maximum productivity”) to show how
“heteronormative temporal arrangements regulate fat bodies.”59 In other words, fat bodies
are positioned outside of temporal markers of heteronormative time—marriage,
pregnancy/parenthood, and death/inheritance—because fat subjects are expected to lose
weight before engaging in the first two markers (or are prevented from engaging in them
entirely), and their fat is perceived as the cause of their death (as it also potentially
threatens the lives of others, like their children). In Lady Oracle, Frances reinforces this
idea by framing Joan’s fat as something that will preclude her from a heteronormative
future: “Besides, who would think of marrying a mothball? A question my mother put to
me often, later, in other forms” (47).
After Joan loses weight and begins to live as “her second self,” her relationship
with both time and her body begin to change. Prior to her crash diet, her fat makes her
appear much older than she actually is: “I was quite fat by this time and all fat women
look the same, they all look forty-two” (78). During her diet, when her body is in
transitional state, she begins living in the “imagined state of future achievement” that Fox
describes, in which she focuses on a future where she “will have been fat.” The night that
she leaves her parents’ house after her fight with Frances, she stands in front of the mirror
in her hotel room and apprises her still dwindling body “much as a real estate agent might
examine a swamp, with an eye to future development” (135). Here, Joan’s body is an
unfinished commodity, one that has little value in the present but may become lucrative
in the future. Once she loses all of the weight, she experiences a sense of rebirth and feels
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compelled to create a new fictional past for herself: “it was like being born fully grown at
the age of nineteen: I was the right shape, but I had the wrong past” (139). When Arthur,
a love interest who eventually becomes her husband, sees an old picture of her with Aunt
Lou, he points to Joan in the photograph and asks, “‘Who’s the other one? The fat one?’”
(87). Joan, who has “devised an entire spurious past for this shadow on a piece of paper,”
lies to Arthur about the fat girl in the photo, and then feels like she has betrayed “[her]
own shucked-off body” (88). Joan can never admit her fat past into the present, yet she
can never fully inhabit the present because she is constantly haunted by her fat past while
simultaneously striving to achieve a utopian future of thinness. Early in her marriage, she
realizes that Arthur also lacks a unified selfhood, but his selves are linear and
chronological, whereas hers are concurrent: “But I soon discovered there were as many of
Arthur as there were of me. The difference was that I was simultaneous, whereas Arthur
was a sequence” (211). As a (former) fat woman, Joan experiences her past, present, and
future selves all at once, yet she never fully inhabits any of them. Margaret Hass writes,
“For the fat subject, selfhood itself is deferred to the future.”60 In the various aliases and
identities Joan creates, we see her perpetually deferring selfhood while remaining trapped
inside a temporal loop.
Joan learns to cope with this splintered subjectivity and queer temporality by
writing, a restorative act that also sustains her financially. Using a pseudonym, she
publishes Gothic romance novels and eventually pens an avant-garde poetry collection
that brings her notoriety and a modicum of success. As a young fat girl, Joan escapes the
misery of her home through her vivid imagination, and as a fat adolescent and teenager
she befriends thin girls with her outgoing personality, and by earning their trust she gains
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“a thorough knowledge of a portion of [her] future audience” of romance novel readers
(91). For Joan, who “always found other people’s versions of reality very influential,”
escapism becomes a way of life that leads to a career: “when it came to fantasy lives I
was a professional” (160, 215). Interestingly, in The Bluest Eye, Pecola also escapes her
circumstances by retreating into her mind, but her fate is far more tragic.
The consequences of Pecola’s daughter abjection reach an appalling climax in an
encounter with her father. When Cholly comes home in a drunken state one Saturday
afternoon, he happens upon his daughter standing at the kitchen sink washing dishes. The
sight of her “whipped” posture and her back hunched over the sink inspires a “sequence”
of emotions: “revulsion, guilt, pity, then love” (161). It is notable that his initial reaction
to his daughter is revulsion; unlike Pauline, who is repulsed by Pecola because she
reminds her of her own abjected blackness, Cholly’s aversion grows out of his inability to
communicate and connect with his daughter, whose “misery was an accusation” of his
shortcomings as a father (161). For Cholly, the vast chasm that lies between them
combined with the pitiful sight of Pecola hunched over the sink becomes the experience
of encountering the abject: “His hatred of her slimed in his stomach and threatened to
become vomit” (162). However, his nausea is quelled when Pecola scratches the back of
her calf with her toe, a gesture that reminds Cholly of his first encounter with Pauline. He
then rapes his eleven-year-old daughter on the kitchen floor. She faints when he is done,
and the sight of her lying on the floor incites revulsion once more: “Cholly stood up and
could only see her grayish panties, so sad and limp around her ankles. Again the hatred
mixed with tenderness. The hatred would not let him pick her up, the tenderness forced
him to cover her” (163). Both Cholly and Pauline abject their daughter because she
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serves as a mirror of their own abjection; whereas Pauline sees her failure to embody
Western ideals of beauty reflected back to her, in Pecola Cholly sees his impotence and
powerlessness as a black man living in a white, racist society. Neither of them see their
daughter.
Indeed, Pecola’s invisibility emerges as a reoccurring theme throughout the novel,
as the different characters she encounters either see through her or project their own
shortcomings and fears upon her. Mr. Yacobowski, the racist shopkeeper from whom she
buys the Mary Janes, is unable (or unwilling) to see the young black girl standing before
him: “At some fixed point in time and space he senses that he need not waste the effort of
a glance. He does not see her, because for him there is nothing to see. How can a fiftytwo-year-old white immigrant storekeeper…see a little black girl?” (48). When a bully
named Junior lures Pecola into his home to show her his “kittens,” he gets jealous when
his mother’s cat becomes affectionate towards her; after he violently throws the cat at
Pecola, it hits the radiator and dies. When Geraldine, his mother, returns home and
discovers the carnage, Junior blames it on Pecola. Geraldine assesses Pecola in an instant,
and in her she sees all of the low-class, “nigger girls” that she has been avoiding her
entire life: “The end of the world lay in their eyes, and the beginning, and all the waste in
between” (87, 92). She then calls Pecola a “nasty little black bitch” and banishes her from
her house (92). Significantly, both Mr. Yacobowski and Geraldine experience their
exchange with Pecola as occurring outside of linear time. The former apprehends Pecola
at “some fixed point in time and space” which unsettles and arrests his vision:
“Somewhere between retina and object, between vision and view, his eyes draw back,
hesitate, and hover” (48). The latter views Pecola as representative of the “waste,” or the
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abjection, that constitutes the “end of the world,” “the beginning,” and everything in
between. In other words, Pecola is both alpha and omega, everywhere and nowhere, and
entirely abject.
In “Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the Past,” Alia Al-Saji argues
that racism is a social pathology that can result in “aberrations of affect, embodiment and
agency that are temporally lived.”61 Drawing from Frantz Fanon’s 1952 Black Skin,
White Masks, Al-Saji examines how the racialization of the past—configured as a white,
open, “civilized” past positioned against a black, closed, “colonized” past—in hegemonic
linear progress narratives affects the lived experiences of black people in the present. She
coins the term “racialized time” to describe the “temporal structure of racialized
experience.”62 In essence, the “historico-racial schema” (Fanon’s term for “the
unconscious racial imaginary”) relegates black people to a black past, in which they were
colonized, oppressed, and viewed as inferior, thereby limiting their lives in the present. 63
Al-Saji explains that, for black people, the “past is no longer lived at a distance, as past,
but is experienced as a fixed and overdetermining dimension of the present.” Pecola
experiences this sense of racialized time when she is under the gaze of the white
shopkeeper: even though “All things in her are flux and anticipation,” to Mr. Yacobowski
“her blackness is static and dread” (49). In that moment, he can only see her blackness
(which Pecola understands causes his “distaste” for her) and the stereotyped,
overdetermined black past that he associates with her skin color. Therefore, even though
young Pecola is full of “flux and anticipation,” her dark skin color consigns her to an
imagined, anachronistic past that is “static.” Helen Ngo builds on Al-Saji’s work and
argues that if blackness is rooted in a past that is positioned as happening prior to
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“civilized” time, then whiteness may be viewed as “temporally present, or even, futurally
directed.”64 Interestingly, this conception of whiteness as “futurally directed” aligns with
the idea of fat temporality, where the fat subject is always projected into an imaginary
future of thinness and heteronormative progress—a similarity that supports Sabrina
Strings’s argument regarding the association between the compulsory thin ideal for white
women and anxieties about racial identity. However, since the fat subject can never really
achieve that utopian future, nor inhabit the present (since, as Crawford notes, there is “no
such thing as a fat present”), Joan, like Pecola, keeps getting pulled into the past.
Significantly, though, for Pecola there is no future, imagined or otherwise.
Pecola wishes for blue eyes because she recognizes that no future exists for ugly
black girls: “As long as she looked the way she did, as long as she was ugly, she would
have to stay with these people [i.e., her family]” (45). James Bliss refers to “Black
reproduction” as “a mode of reproduction that is not reproductive futurism,” and observes
the “queer capacity of Blackness to reproduce without being productive.” 65 In other
words, because Pecola is a black, unattractive girl, society deems her invisible and
unimportant, and therefore even if she did reproduce, neither she nor her children would
be part of the teleological futurity that Lee Edelman critiques through his concept of
reproductive futurism. As José Esteban Muñoz points out, Edelman’s theory centers on a
“monolithic figure of the child that is indeed always already white,” which leaves out
children like Pecola: “The future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer
kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity.”66 Furthermore, black and brown children
are often precluded from the category of “childhood.” Jacob Breslow argues that
“childhood was (and continues to be) multiply, incoherently, and ambivalently distributed
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to black bodies.”67 Breslow contends that childhood can be deadly for African Americans
living in a racist society because of its “ambivalent and discrepant stickiness to black
bodies, and its positioning of blackness within differing relations to futurity and
temporality.”68 That is, unlike white children, who are usually insulated and protected by
virtue of their age, black children are not always seen as children with the same potential
for a productive future, and therefore are not entitled to the same treatment as their white
counterparts (Breslow cites studies that show that police officers, juries, and doctors often
assume black children are older than they actually are).69 We see this dynamic at work in
The Bluest Eye when word gets out that Pecola is pregnant with her father’s child. People
in the community believe that “[s]he carry some of the blame” for the pregnancy, even
though she is only eleven years old (189). Additionally, they believe that there “[o]ught
to be a law: two ugly people doubling up like that to make more ugly” (190). In other
words, there should be a law about reproducing ugliness, not a law prohibiting incest or
child rape. Here we see the differential application of childhood protections, even in the
black community, which serves as another example of the power of internalized racism.
Whereas the blonde, “pink” Fisher girl is worthy of safety and care, Pecola is not, even
when her own mother is the one making that determination.
In Lady Oracle, as an adolescent and teenager Joan also appears older than she is
to the rest of the fatphobic society in which she lives. For instance, the Italian immigrant
cook at a café where she works wants to marry her, and she believes it is because “I was
the shape of a wife already, I was the shape it took most women several years to become”
(97). However, even though society perceives Joan as older because of her fatness, her
white privilege insulates and shields her. In the novel, this protection is portrayed as a by-
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product of her fat (in other words, strange men do not harass her in public because they
see her body as off-putting), but I would argue that a black or brown fat girl would likely
have a very different experience. As Pecola’s tragic end shows, when an abject black girl
is precluded from the present (i.e., childhood), denied a future (per Bliss and Muñoz), and
consigned to a static, anachronistic past (i.e., racialized time), her only other option is to
exist outside of time.
The fate of Pecola’s baby seems to confirm Bliss’s claim that blackness has the
queer capacity to “reproduce without reproducing.” When, as a result of her father’s rape,
Pecola’s body does attempt to reproduce, “the baby came too soon and died”; shortly
thereafter, in the final line of the novel we learn that “it’s much, much, much too late” to
help Pecola (204, 206). Both “too soon” and “too late,” Pecola’s life exemplifies AlSaji’s point that racialized time and Fanon’s work exposes “a sense of…temporal
discontinuity, the experience of coming too late to a world that appears overdetermined
and far too real.”70 Because others see Pecola as existing outside of linear time, she
eventually sees herself that way, too. After the traumatic experience of the rape and
pregnancy, Pecola “step[s] over into madness” (206). In the final chapter of the novel,
Pecola and “a friend” (who is clearly imaginary) engage in a conversation that Vanessa
Dickerson refers to as “a self-reflexive dialogue of italicized and roman print that
constitutes a fleshing out of double consciousness.”71 Through this conversation we learn
that Pecola is now so abject in her mother’s eyes that Pauline will not even look at her
anymore: “Ever since I got my blue eyes, she look away from me all the time. Do you
suppose she’s jealous?” (195). Cholly’s rape and Pauline’s rejection destabilize Pecola’s
subjectivity and queer her experience of temporality; in essence, daughter abjection
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pulverizes her sense of self and time. Also, as Angela Connolly observes, “severe trauma
and shame can lead to a loss of the sense of temporality.”72 Indeed, we are told that
Pecola spends the rest of her days “walking up and down, up and down, her head jerking
to the beat of a drummer so distant only she could hear” (204). Because of both the
trauma and shame caused by her childhood experiences, Pecola forever resides in a place
outside of linear time, responding to a rhythm that only she can hear. Significantly, for
Morrison, this psychotic break is the result of racism. In “Unspeakable Things
Unspoken,” she writes, “The trauma of racism is, for the racist and the victim, the severe
fragmentation of the self, and has always seemed to me a cause (not a symptom) of
psychosis.”73 Morrison positions Pecola as the vulnerable scapegoat of a racist society,
and because of the result—psychosis and a fragmented self—The Bluest Eye can be
viewed as a cautionary tale about the psychological consequences of both internal and
external racism.
However, there is a way in which these two tales of daughter abjection can be
read as recuperative as well. In Extravagant Abjection, Darieck Scott proposes that
“blackness-as-abjection,” which is typically perceived as disempowering, actually has the
ability to empower black subjects. 74 The source of this power lies in the very nature of
abjection itself; since the abject can both create and destroy subjectivity, blackness-asabjection exists beyond the “ego-protections” of “identity, body, race, nation” and can
therefore rupture those constructs. 75 Significantly, Scott argues that the trauma
experienced by virtue of being black and abject can offer “a liberating escape from linear
time.”76 In other words, escaping chrononormativity through abjection can be a freeing
experience. He notes that representing the “body-psyche nexus” where blackness and
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abjection is “experientially lived” is difficult, “because the marvelous fictions of I, self,
linear temporality, or coherent perspective on which narrative usually depends are in the
state of abjection awash in those fictions’ opposites.” 77 That is, the concepts of a unified
self and linear time are actually falsehoods, which blackness-as-abjection reveals, yet
portraying this dynamic is difficult since narratives depend on such fictions. However, I
would argue that this is exactly what Morrison sets out to accomplish in The Bluest Eye.
Through her use of postmodern literary techniques, Morrison attempts to lay bare the
myth of a coherent self. She accomplishes this not just through Pecola, but also in the
ways that she portrays the paradoxes and complexities of characters like Cholly and
Pauline. The entire Breedlove family is “awash” in abjection, and one way that Morrison
conveys this is by rendering them as subjects in a constant state of “becoming” who
never cohere as unified selves. Pecola, of course, provides the most dramatic example of
the effects of blackness-as-abjection on subject formation. In her afterword to the novel,
Morrison notes that Pecola “is not seen by herself until she hallucinates a self” (215).
Thus, it takes “liberating” herself from linear time to finally recognize herself as a
subject, as a beautiful being worthy of love and friendship. While abjection is the root
cause of Pecola’s greatest traumas, Scott’s theory of the empowering nature of blacknessas-abjection, coupled with Morrison’s interpretation of Pecola’s mental breakdown,
offers us a potentially recuperative counter-reading of a postmodern classic.
As for Joan, fatness-as-abjection—and the queer temporality it causes—may also
be viewed as potentially liberating and empowering. Like Pecola, Joan experiences a
sense of double consciousness as a result of her daughter abjection: “But hadn’t my life
always been double? There was always that shadowy twin, thin when I was fat, fat when

145

I was thin, myself in silvery negative, with dark teeth and shining white pupils glowing in
the black sunlight of that other world” (245). However, unlike Pecola, Joan possesses the
ability to see this multiplicity as an asset that can possibly enrich her life: “But not twin
even, for I was more than double, I was triple, multiple, and now I could see that there
was more than one life to come, there were many” (245). In their article about
heteronormative temporal arrangements and fat, McFarland et al. conclude by positing,
“In failing, subjects find an escape from hegemonic norms that seek to discipline
subjectivities. Falling outside of a chrononormative timeline, fat subjects are well
positioned to critique the norms upon which their exclusion is predicated.” 78 In other
words, failing to adhere to heteronormative temporal markers of progress may be
liberating for fat individuals, as such failure opens up more possibilities for the formation
of the self. Indeed, at the end of the novel Joan seems ready to reinvent herself again,
after confessing the truth about her faked death to a reporter who finds her hiding out in
Italy. She decides to stop writing romance novels, the “Costume Gothics” that she has
been publishing under a pseudonym, and considers switching to science fiction, even
though “[t]he future doesn’t appeal to me as much as the past, but I’m sure it’s better for
you” (345). Joan may never escape the temporal loop caused by her fat past, but perhaps
she would not even want to, since she has learned to harness the multiplicity and fluidity
that result from a subjectivity formed in a state of abjection and apply them to creative
ends.
The mother/daughter relationships at the center of The Bluest Eye and Lady
Oracle exemplify both the potential tragedy and the possible empowerment of a selfhood
formed in abjection. In addition to revealing the ways in which patriarchal ideals
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regarding physical aesthetics can invade and poison the mother/daughter relationship,
these texts also illustrate the dangerous ways that discriminatory cultural beliefs about
fatness and blackness can sexualize and victimize children, denying them the presumed
innocence that is typically afforded their thin and white peers. However, perhaps the fact
that Joan and Pecola are precluded from a chrononormative experience of temporality
should give us hope, for a life lived outside of the institutionalized, regimented machine
of linear time, in which human bodies are organized and driven to “maximum
productivity,” may provide the spaciousness and freedom to truly “see” a self (as
Morrison suggests of Pecola), and possibly even learn to love and embrace the self that
they see.79
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CHAPTER 4
CARRYING THE MOTHER IN EDWIDGE DANTICAT
AND JAMAICA KINCAID
The novels of Caribbean-American authors Edwidge Danticat and Jamaica
Kincaid share a preoccupation with the ways in which women are affected by
colonialization and imperialism. In particular, mothers and daughters serve as the central
focus in Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory (1994) and Kincaid’s The Autobiography of
My Mother (1996). Both bildungsromans that trace their protagonist’s relationships with
problematic and/or absent mother figures, the two novels depict the effects of
intergenerational trauma as they explore the blurred boundaries between mothers and
daughters in the process of identity formation. As products of their countries’ violent,
colonial pasts, the women in these texts experience the difficulty of achieving and
maintaining bodily and psychical autonomy when mothers and the motherland seek to
suppress their identities and personal liberties. Sophie (Breath, Eyes, Memory) and Xuela
(The Autobiography of My Mother) both attempt to reclaim and embrace the abjection of
their feminine bodies and to establish a positive connection to their matrilineage while
simultaneously asserting their own subjectivity, yet various obstacles—both material and
psychological—threaten their success. In these two post-colonial novels, institutional
misogyny and imperialist ideology infiltrate the relationships between mothers and
daughters. While the tone and circumstances of their relationships with their mothers are
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quite different, both Sophie and Xuela carry their mothers around like “living corpses,”
unable to commit the symbolic matricide that Kristeva claims is necessary for
individuation, in part because they never know their mothers as fully “living.” 1 However,
an exploration of a paradox at the heart of feminist object-relations theory will reveal that
such pathological conceptions of the mother-daughter relationship are rooted in
phallocentrism, and that for two subaltern women living in societies that seek to
subjugate and silence them, “carrying” the mother may be a form of resistance, a
necessary component of subject formation, and an act of love.
Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory is a story of diasporic mothering. The action of
the novel bounces back and forth between New York City and Haiti, the protagonist
Sophie Caco’s country of origin. Raised in Haiti by Tante Atie, her mother’s sister,
Sophie grows up receiving limited information about her mother, Martine, from her aunt
and Grandmè Ifé. Sophie only knows her mother through recorded messages on cassette
tapes that they receive monthly from the United States and a picture of Martine that sits
beside Tante Atie’s bed. The picture gives Sophie nightmares, wherein Martine chases
her through a field: “When she caught me, she would try to squeeze me into the small
frame so I could be in the picture with her. I would scream and scream until my voice
gave out, then Tante Atie would come and save me from her grasp.” 2 When her mother
summons her to Brooklyn at the age of twelve, her nightmares intensify: “She opened her
arms like two long hooks and kept shouting out my name. Catching me by the hem of my
dress, she wrestled me to the floor. I called for Tante Atie as loud as I could” (28).
During her first night in Brooklyn, Sophie discovers that her mother is also haunted by
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“horrible visions” in her sleep when she must wake Martine from a violent nightmare
(48).
It is only after Sophie has lived in New York for a few months that she learns the
truth about her origin: Martine was raped by a member of Haitian dictator Francois “Papa
Doc” Duvalier’s Tonton Macoutes (a state-sponsored terrorist organization) at the age of
sixteen, and left Haiti for the United States after Sophie’s birth in an attempt to ensure her
safety and preserve her sanity. However, Martine relives the experience of the rape at
night while she sleeps (“it’s like getting raped every night,” she says), and her mental
health continues to deteriorate throughout the course of the novel (190). Sophie and
Martine’s shared problem with nightmares foreshadows a central theme in Danticat’s
text: trauma is passed down through the Caco martrilineage—a fact that Sophie discovers
as an adult once she realizes that her mother’s “nightmares had somehow become [her]
own,” when she starts having dreams of “a man with no face, pounding a life into a
helpless young girl” (193).
The other great trauma that Martine passes down to her daughter is the Haitian
ritual of “testing.”3 She explains to Sophie that by regularly inserting her pinky finger
into her daughter’s vagina to check for a hymen until she is married, a Haitian mother
fulfills “her responsibility to keep her [daughter] pure” (61). Grandmè Ifé performed the
same “test” on her daughters, and it traumatized them both; Atie “used to scream like a
pig in a slaughterhouse,” and Martine considers the experience to be tantamount to the
trauma of being raped: “The one good thing about my being raped was that it made the
testing stop. The testing and the rape. I live both every day” (60, 170). When Martine
discovers that eighteen-year-old Sophie has been secretly dating Joseph, their next-door
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neighbor who is the same age as Martine, she begins testing her. As many scholars have
noted, the act of testing is a form of sexual abuse; in what Carole Sweeney refers to as
“the familial domestic simulacrum of rape,” Martine effectively “rapes” her own
daughter by sexually violating her against her will. 4 Perhaps equally disturbing is the
Haitian folktale about the “Marassas” that Martine tells Sophie while she tests her. The
“Marassas” are two inseparable lovers who, Martine explains, “were the same person,
duplicated in two,” and who loved each other deeply, in part because they were
indistinguishable from the other (84). She tells Sophie that the “love between a mother
and daughter is deeper than the sea,” and then threatens that her relationship with Joseph
could destroy that perfect, symbiotic love: “You would leave me for an old man who you
didn’t know the year before. You and I we could be like Marassas. You are giving up a
lifetime with me” (85). In essence, Martine desires to erase or subsume Sophie’s
subjectivity so that they can live together in narcissistic bliss. Clare Counihan has argued
that the act of testing combined with Martine’s expressed wish for Sophie to be her “twin
lover” is “a literalization of homoerotic desire.”5 However, I would argue that both the
testing and Martine’s choice to tell Sophie the Marassas story during the sexual abuse
“literalize” the blurred boundaries that exist between mothers and daughters in identity
formation. As Kristevan scholar Kelly Oliver has noted regarding a child’s process of
separating from the mother, “The boundaries between body and not-body are controlled
by the mother.”6 In other words, it is the mother who delineates the physical boundaries
between herself and her child. Here, Martine, who was absent from Sophie’s childhood,
tries to assert her claim over her daughter’s body and identity by literally trespassing a
bodily boundary (i.e., her vagina). Even though the justification Martine gives for the act
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is fundamentally rooted in patriarchal oppression and surveillance (that is, the cultural
expectation that women remain virgins for their future husbands), the Marassas folktale
that accompanies the violation suggests that maternal possessiveness and narcissistic
overidentification also motivate her actions.
Examining Martine and Sophie’s history through the lens of feminist
psychoanalysis may help to shed light on Martine’s abusive behavior, and on the
codependent relationship that she develops with her daughter. As aforementioned, after
her birth Sophie does not see her mother again until she is twelve years old.
Consequently, the aunt who raises her provides the nurturing and care typically
associated with the mother. Prior to the age of twelve, Sophie only knows her biological
mother in the semiotic chora phase of development, which, Kristeva explains, is “no
more than the place where the subject is both generated and negated.” 7 This is the stage
prior to language, prior to signification, when an infant feels inseparable from her mother,
which lasts from our time in the womb until about six months of age. The chora is
experienced as sheer fluidity, timelessness, and connectedness; during this stage, the
subject cannot perceive herself as being separate from her mother. The acquisition of
language and the recognition of the self as a separate, finite being complete the transition
from the semiotic to the symbolic phase of development. Since Sophie’s only prior
experience of Martine was in the womb, she never experiences a proper thetic break from
the mother. The effects of this rupture are evident in the difficulties that Sophie
encounters when attempting to communicate verbally with her mother. When Martine
picks Sophie up at the airport, she begs her silent daughter to talk to her: “‘Say
something,’ she urged. ‘Say something. Just speak to me. Let me hear your voice’” (41).
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However, hours later Sophie remains mute: “I still had not said anything to her” (42).
Years later, at the age of eighteen, Sophie still has trouble speaking to her mother: “I
leaned over and kissed her cheek to show her that I appreciated her trying to be a good
mother. I wanted to tell her that I loved her, but the words would not roll off my tongue”
(79). Martine also finds communicating with Sophie to be difficult; near the end of the
novel when the two reconnect after a period of estrangement, Sophie asks her mother
why she did not respond to the pictures she had sent her of her new granddaughter, and
Martine replies, “I couldn’t find the words” (161).
Indeed, oftentimes language seems to serve as a barrier between the two women
rather than a bridge. However, Martine intimates that she and Sophie experienced a level
of communication when Sophie was in the womb. After confessing that she had tried to
“destroy” Sophie before she was born with various poisons and by “beating [her]
stomach with wooden spoons,” Martine says, “When I was carrying you, you were
brave…You wanted to live…You were going to kill me before I killed you” (190). This
prenatal dynamic between mother and daughter portrays their earliest exchanges (which
were purely corporeal and non-verbal) as roiling and volatile, which aligns with
Kristeva’s descriptions of the chora as “rupture and articulations” and “infinite
‘conjunctions’ and ‘disjunctions.’”8 Martine and Sophie’s relationship reflects its
tumultuous beginnings; since both women were denied the opportunity to progress
through the typical stages of mother-child separation and psychosocial development (and
since Martine was essentially a child herself when she was raped and impregnated by a
soldier), it is perhaps unsurprising that they have a troubled relationship with the
symbolic, or the realm of language, especially in regards to each other. Also, Sophie’s
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childhood nightmares of Martine trying “to squeeze her into the small frame” so that they
could be in the same picture, and “open[ing] her arms like two long hooks” and wrestling
her to the floor seem to suggest that she sensed her mother’s possessiveness and
narcissistic overidentification before meeting her in New York, which supports the idea
that the two achieved some form of communication when they shared the same body.
The root cause of the two traumas that Martine passes down to her daughter (i.e.,
the specter of the rape and the abuse of the testing) is the misogynistic society of Haiti. In
the novel, Danticat focuses on the period during which the Duvalier regime terrorized the
country, but, as Donette A. Francis points out, poor Haitian women were also
“systematically raped and sexually harassed” by the US Marines that occupied the
country from 1915 to 1934.9 Much of the history of twentieth-century Haiti involves the
oppression and disenfranchisement of women, through strategies such as the denial of
basic rights (like the right to vote) and the use of state-sponsored rape to punish
dissidents and spread fear through the countryside. Paradoxically, while Haitian women
were frequent targets of sexual violence inflicted by Haitian men, those same women
were expected to remain “pure” and virginal for marriage to a Haitian man. Counihan
observes that “the logic of testing provides a fiction in which women exert a degree of
sexual agency.”10 In other words, testing upholds the myth of female promiscuity and
erases the realities of male violence. Moreover, the “mothers of the nation” 11 are
conscripted into this process of erasure and surveillance by virtue of the fact that both
their daughters’ social status and their own are determined by their ability to police their
daughters’ virginity. As Grandmè Ifé explains to Sophie, “If a child dies, you do not die.
But if your child is disgraced, you are disgraced….If I give a soiled daughter to her
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husband, he can shame my family, speak evil of me, even bring her back to me” (156).
Thus, the patriarchy infiltrates the mother-daughter relationship, enlisting mothers as
“enforcers” who “emulate the Tonton Macoute” by surveilling and violating their
daughters’ bodies.12 This indoctrination is so strong that it follows Sophie to America,
where Martine, who was severely traumatized by her own testing experience, decides to
test her daughter. When Sophie confronts her mother about the testing once she is an
adult, Martine cannot give her a good reason: “‘I did it,’ she said, ‘because my mother
had done it to me. I have no greater excuse’” (170). The same oppressive values and
historical trauma that damaged Martine in her youth migrate with her to the US, which,
as Counihan points out, “complicates the narrative of the American immigrant’s perfect
rebirth.”13
Like the Caco women who came before her, Sophie sustains both psychological
and physical wounds as a result of institutionalized misogyny. To end the testing abuse,
Sophie takes matters into her own hands. One night she searches the kitchen for her
mother’s mortar and pestle; she brings the pestle to her bedroom and uses it to break her
hymen: “My flesh ripped apart as I pressed the pestle into it. I could see the blood slowly
dripping onto the bed sheet” (88). When she fails the test that night, her mother throws
her out and tells her to go to Joseph: “You just go to him and see what he can do for you”
(88). After this act of self-mutilation, Sophie spends two days in the hospital and four
weeks “with stitches between [her] legs,” and thereafter sex with Joseph is painful (130).
She marries Joseph and gives birth to their daughter Brigitte via Caesarian section (since
a vaginal birth “would have totally destroyed [her]”), and does not have contact with her
mother for two years (196). When Brigitte is still an infant, emotional and sexual

159

intimacy problems with Joseph compel Sophie to return to Haiti to visit Tante Atie and
Grandmè Ifé. The trip becomes an opportunity for her to reexamine some of the familial
and cultural wounding that has ravaged her body and psyche. The effects of her mother’s
emotional and physical abuse have manifested as body dysmorphia, bulimia, anxiety, and
self-loathing. She tells her grandmother, “‘I hate my body. I am ashamed to show it to
anybody, including my husband. Sometimes I feel like I should be off somewhere by
myself. That is why I am here’” (123). However, the visit to Haiti only reopens old
wounds, especially once Martine arrives (at Grandmè Ifé’s request, because she believes
that conflict between a mother and daughter “puts a curse on the family”) (162). When
Sophie attempts to explain her bulimia to her mother, Martine dismisses it: “‘Why would
you do that? I have never heard of a Haitian woman getting anything like that’” (179). In
the eyes of the other Caco women, Sophie’s bulimia threatens her cultural identity,
because Haiti is a country where food is a “luxury” that one cannot “waste” (179).
Once Brigitte is born, Sophie commits to a path of self-healing as a method of
breaking the cycle of intergenerational trauma and abuse in her matrilineage. She joins a
sexual phobia group and begins seeing a therapist. For Sophie, the most daunting and
immediate challenge is to overcome her fear of her abject feminine body. Childbirth
increases her bodily self-loathing; she admits that “Even though so much time has passed
since I’d given birth, I still felt extremely fat,” and that she feels “both fat and guilty”
after eating meals (112, 122). The changes to her body caused by pregnancy and
childbirth mortify her: “I almost refused to let Joseph take pictures of me with [Brigitte].
I was too ashamed of the stitches on my stomach and the flabs of fat all over my body”
(129). It is notable that Sophie’s experience of cultural and familial intergenerational
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trauma manifests as bulimia and a fear of fat, because these issues set her apart from her
ancestors in a very Americanized way. As Sabrina Strings and Amy Erdman Farrell have
observed, the fat black body has long been a signifier of inferiority and primitivism in the
United States.14 As a Haitian immigrant in the US, Sophie already has to work to defy
stereotypes and misconceptions about her country (for instance, the American kids at
school “accused Haitians of having HBO—Haitian Body Odor,” and believe that all
Haitians have AIDS), and a fat body would only further stigmatize her (51). Interestingly,
when she returns to Haiti as an adult, she seems hyperaware of Tante Atie’s fat body,
noting “her pudgy face” and “wide buttocks” (100). In addition to inheriting the trauma
associated with the misogynist traditions of her home country, Sophie has internalized the
(also misogynist) fat prejudice of her adopted country. This cross-cultural trauma also
intrudes on her romantic relationship. Sophie dreads sexual intimacy with Joseph, both
because of the emotional and physical consequences of the testing abuse, and because of
her disgust with her “fat,” abject body (even though she is “so tiny, so very petite”) (179).
After returning from Haiti, she “doubles,” or disassociates, during sex with Joseph—a
coping mechanism that she first developed during her mother’s testing—and then binges
and purges after he falls asleep (200). In her sexual phobia group, Sophie works with an
incest survivor and a victim of female genital cutting as she tries to learn how to embrace
her body and move on from her abuse; the three women regularly burn pieces of paper
containing their abusers’ names and repeat chants like, “We are beautiful women with
strong bodies” (202). Despite the steps that Sophie takes to heal, by the end of the novel
it is still unclear whether she will ever be able to accept her body and her sexuality.
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Xuela, on the other hand, celebrates and asserts the abjection of her body in
defiance of the cultural imperative to loathe and submit herself. Whereas Breath, Eyes,
Memory depicts the struggles of subaltern women enduring the effects of a violent
postcolonial regime, Kincaid’s The Autobiography of My Mother imagines a world where
one such woman defies her would-be oppressors by taking ownership of her sexuality
and refusing motherhood. The novel follows the life of Xuela Claudette Richardson, the
daughter of a Carib mother and a half African, half Scot father. The remnants of
Dominica’s colonial past pervade every aspect of her life, a painful reality that is
epitomized in the first words she ever learns to read: “THE BRITISH EMPIRE.” 15 The
novel opens with what will become a familiar refrain: “My mother died at the moment I
was born” (3). The repetition of this information throughout the text feels compulsive—
as if Xuela keeps repeating the fact of the originary trauma of her life in an unsatisfying
attempt to experience a moment that would be impossible to experience, since, as Elissa
Marder observes, “We remain both bound to and exiled from our own birth.” 16 After
Xuela is born and her mother dies, her father Alfred, a taciturn policeman who later
becomes a rich and corrupt government official, places her “in the care of the same
woman he paid to wash his clothes,” and only visits her every fortnight when he comes to
pick up his clean clothes (4). While this arrangement appears to indicate that her father is
neglectful and indifferent, he also insists that Xuela be sent to school—an “unusual
request…[because] girls did not attend school” (12). She continues to attend school until
she is fifteen years old, during which time she learns “the history of an array of people
[she] would never meet…Romans, Gauls, Saxons, Britons, the British people,” and she
recognizes that this colonialized education has a “malicious intent”: “to make me feel
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humiliated, humbled, small” (59). Indeed, most of the people and situations she
encounters in the novel endeavor to belittle and subjugate her due to both her gender and
her ethnicity.
As the daughter of a Carib mother and a half-African father, Xuela is doubly
conquered—the Other of the Other. Xuela tells the reader that the Caribs, the precolonial
indigenous inhabitants of the island, are now “extinct, a few hundred of them still living,”
mostly on a reservation (197). She then clarifies that seemingly contradictory statement:
“They were like living fossils, they belonged in a museum” (197). Her African
classmates perceive her as an oddity; she notes that “these boys looked at me and looked
at me,” focusing on her Carib features and ignoring her African ones (15). The French,
who colonized Dominica before the British, were the first to bring enslaved Africans to
the island; Britain took control of the island in the late eighteenth century and abolished
slavery in its colonies in the nineteenth century, yet those of African descent continued to
be oppressed and disenfranchised, even though they constituted the majority of the
population. As her all-male classmates glare at her ethnic facial features, Xuela reflects
on the fact that the Africans consider it a point of pride that the Caribs “had been defeated
and then exterminated,” while “the African people had been defeated but had survived”
(16). Xuela’s ethnic identity is further complicated by the fact that her paternal
grandfather was a red-headed rum trader from Scotland who married the daughter of
slaves. At every turn, Xuela is ostracized and precluded from a sense of belonging.
However, instead of internalizing and succumbing to this oppression, she develops into a
fierce, sensual, autonomous force. As Kathryn E. Morris writes, Xuela is “a subject who
defies the colonizer’s gaze and who does not permit any surrender of her self to that
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gaze.”17 Through Xuela, Kincaid pivots the center, so that it becomes a subaltern who
speaks; even though as a woman and a subaltern she is “doubly effaced,” Xuela submits
her oppressors to the same “gaze” with which they attempt to circumscribe her. 18
The source of Xuela’s defiant power and singular vision seems to originate from
her lack of fear and the strength she draws from resurrecting her mother through
imagination and narrative. She tells the reader that when she was young, “I was not
afraid, because my mother had already died and that is the only thing a child is really
afraid of” (14). Her mother, also named Xuela, was also motherless; the younger Xuela
repeats the story of elder Xuela being left outside a convent’s gates “wrapped in pieces of
clean old cloth” containing her first name (79). Xuela mourns the fact that the
“attachment, spiritual and physical, that a mother is said to have for her child, that
confusion of who is who, flesh and flesh, that inseparableness which is said to exist
between mother and child—all this was absent between my mother and her own
mother…[it was] also absent between my mother and myself” (199). This longing for a
connection with the mother she never knew compels Xuela to effectively give birth to her
mother by channeling her spirit, recreating her story, and intertwining her story with her
own. She exemplifies Audre Lorde’s idea that black women “can learn to mother”
themselves, which means that they “must establish authority over [their] own
definition.”19 Moreover, as Kim Chernin writes in The Woman Who Gave Birth to Her
Mother, a daughter can “re-create[] her real mother or…a symbolic mother to hold and
foster her psychological and emotional development,” and that “[t]here are times when a
woman must give birth to her own mother by becoming a mother to herself.” 20 Xuela
accomplishes both of these things as she “authors—and authorizes—her mother’s story,
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which becomes part of [her] self-narration.”21 The paradoxical title—The Autobiography
of My Mother—encapsulates the blurred boundaries between mothers and daughters in
subject formation. In a sense, the novel is a realization of Martine’s Marassas myth, as
“[Xuela’s] subjectivity is marked as both supplement and substitute to her mother’s.” 22
Unlike the Caco women in Breath, Eyes, Memory for whom the body becomes the central
site of trauma and estrangement, Xuela’s matrilineage is one of extra-bodily mothering.
Without the “flesh” and inseparableness of the pre-Oedipal stage, the daughters in
Xuela’s family line must “re-create” the one who came before them, thus giving body to
their mother by housing her in their own.
Notably, Xuela seems to retain corporeal knowledge of her mother, even though
the two never met outside of the mother’s body. The “resurrection” of the mother occurs
most frequently in Xuela’s dreams, where she can only ever see one part of her mother’s
body: “I never saw her face, and even when she appeared to me in a dream I never saw it,
I saw only the back of her feet, her heels, as she came down a ladder” (198). Xuela’s
dream visions of her mother always focus on the same spot: “Night after night I saw her
heels, only her heels coming down to meet me” (19). Interestingly, in various Eastern
religions, the lower body represents the root chakra, which connects us to family and
tribe: “[The root chakra] is our connection to traditional familial beliefs that support the
formation of identity and a sense of belonging to a group of people in a geographic
location.”23 Xuela’s unconscious obsession with her dead mother’s feet bespeaks her
desire for a sense of tribal and familial belonging. However, without a mother, Xuela
feels that such belonging is impossible: “since the one person I would have consented to
own me had never lived to do so, I did not want to belong to anyone; I did not want
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anyone to belong to me” (104). Regarding this sense of cultural isolation, Daniel Arbino
observes, “the absence of [Xuela’s] mother…becomes conflated with her lack of
motherland.”24 Also, the synecdochal conception of the faceless mother as “heels coming
down” a ladder emphasizes the fact that Xuela only ever knew her mother when she was
a fetus, never as a fully formed being separate from herself. In one of her dreams, her
mother “sang a song, but it had no words; it was not a lullaby, it was not sentimental, not
meant to calm me when my soul roiled at the harshness of life” (31). This song nestled
deep in Xuela’s unconscious that “was not a lullaby” and had “no words” signifies the
semiotic chora; similar to the exchanges that transpired between Martine and Sophie
when they shared a body, the prenatal connection between Xuela and her mother was not
simply encouraging and loving. Also denied a proper thetic break from her mother,
Xuela, like Sophie, experiences difficulty communicating with others later in life (“my
voice felt as if it were trapped in my hand”) and expresses a desire to never have to
communicate verbally: “and I found this, the difficulty of speaking, the possibility that it
might be a struggle for me to ever speak again, delicious” (151, 51). In fact, she does not
even speak until she is four years old (6). Although she avoids talking with others, she
speaks to herself in an act of self-mothering: “I spoke to myself because I grew to like the
sound of my own voice. It had a sweetness to me, it made my loneliness less” (16). Even
though her precarious position as a motherless, female ethnic minority in a misogynist,
racist society means that there is “no one between [her] and the black room of the world,”
Xuela finds ways to access and utilize the bodily memory of her mother buried in her
unconscious to both care for herself and resist conforming to societal norms (3).
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Xuela learns proper social codes through her years of formal education and her
relationships with various other-mother figures, yet she chooses to reject such lessons. In
school she learns the “wearying demand” of modesty, which “was only one of many
demands made on [her] simply because [she] was female” (42). When she is older and
attends a school with other girls, “their bodies, already a source of anxiety and shame,
were draped in blue sacks made from course cotton” (80). The social conditioning of her
school years aligns with the demands placed on her mother by the French nuns who
raised her, “that she be a quiet, shy, long-suffering, unquestioning, modest, wishing-todie-soon person” (199). When her father remarries and brings Xuela to live with him and
his new wife (who has “the face of evil” and attempts to kill Xuela with a poisoned
necklace), her stepmother endeavors to teach her that her body and its natural smell are
abhorrent: “My human form and odor were an opportunity to heap scorn on me” (28, 32).
When Xuela is fifteen, Alfred sends her to Roseau, the capital of Dominica, for further
schooling and places her in the house of his acquaintance Monsieur LaBatte. His wife,
Madame LaBatte, invites Xuela “to regard her as if she were [her] own mother,” and
proceeds to attempt to properly feminize and train her “to make a gift of [her] to her
husband”; since Madame LaBatte’s own “womb was like a sieve,” she tries to groom her
new ward for her husband’s sexual pleasure and to give her a child (66, 68, 76). Xuela
ignores the gender conditioning she encounters from schoolteachers, surrogate mothers,
and peers regarding the need for modesty, subservience, and self-loathing, and instead
comes “to love [herself] in defiance” (56). Additionally, she takes note of the ways in
which the social norms of her community have been dictated by their colonizers. When
Alfred and his new wife drive their new “motorcar” to a Christian church and then eat a
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Sunday meal “made up of meat cooked in the English style,” Xuela observes that “it also
signified defeat yet again, for what would the outcome have been of all the lives of the
conquered if they had not come to believe in the gods of the people who had conquered
them?” (119, 133). Much of The Autobiography of My Mother traces Xuela’s process of
developing a sense of self in the face of such imperialist ideology without her mother to
guide her. As Alexandra W. Schultheis writes, “Xuela is socially denigrated and mentally
strong, but not necessarily good; her story is not one of triumph over adversity or of
unremitting oppression, but of building subjectivity out of lack and historical trauma.” 25
In Xuela, Kincaid creates a fierce visionary who objectifies and conquers her would-be
conquerors, in part by drawing power from the abjection of her body.
Without a mother to control “the boundaries between body and not-body,” Xuela
forges a selfhood rooted in corporeality. 26 She exhibits what Elizabeth Grosz has termed
“embodied subjectivity,” or a non-dualistic conception of the self that admits both the
mind and the body into the process of identity formation. 27 When her new stepmother
tries to teach her that her body is shameful and disgusting, she responds
in a fashion by now characteristic of me: whatever I was told to hate I loved and
loved the most. I loved the smell of the thin dirt behind my ears, the smell of my
unwashed mouth, the smell that came from between my legs, the smell in the pit
of my arm, the smell of my unwashed feet. Whatever about me caused offense,
whatever was native to me, whatever I could not help and was not a moral
failing—those things about me I loved with the fervor of the devoted. (32)
For Xuela, bodily abjection becomes not only acceptable but desirable and holy. In yet
another act of self-mothering, she decides to embrace the parts of herself that she is
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instructed to despise. Consequently, she comes to define herself through not only her
thoughts and feelings, but also through her smells, sensations, sexual desires, and bodily
waste. When she gets her first period, she is “not surprised and not afraid,” even though
she “had never heard of it,” and believes that “it was just its real self, my menstrual
flow,” and that its appearance “had the force of destiny fulfilled” (57). As she goes
through puberty, she enjoys how the odor of her underarms and vagina becomes
“pungent, sharp,” and for the rest of her life, her “hands almost never left those places”
(58). When Monsieur LaBatte catches her sitting under a tree and playing with herself,
she does not cover herself in shame and run away, but rather meets his gaze and
continues the act: “This scene of me placing my hand between my legs and then enjoying
the smell of myself and Monsieur LaBatte watching me lasted until the usual sudden
falling of the dark” (70). She proceeds to have sex for the first time, and when “he was
through with [her] and [she] with him,” she relishes the physical ecstasy of the
experience, free of emotional attachment or guilt: “He was not a man of love, I did not
need him to be” (71). Indeed, in all of her sexual encounters with men, Xuela asserts and
fulfills her desires, at times practically “conquering” the men who would seek to conquer
her. Xuela’s relationship to her sexuality exemplifies Audre Lorde’s argument that the
erotic is a kind of power, “a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply female and
spiritual plane.”28 Regarding the inherent human “impulse to possess,” she tells the
reader, “some people choose husbands; I chose to possess myself. I resembled a tree, a
tall tree with long, strong branches” (174). Xuela’s embodied subjectivity gives her a
sense of autonomy, rootedness, empowerment, and self-ownership.
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However, Xuela also remains perpetually isolated and alone (even when she is in
a relationship with someone else), and the cause of this loneliness and emotional
alienation may be connected to the same source as her power: her inability to release her
mother. In Black Sun, Kristeva argues that we must “split” with the mother in order to
fully individuate and enter into society and healthy (hetero)sexual relationships. To
separate from the maternal “Thing” (which she defines as “the real that does not lend
itself to signification,” and which can also be imagined as the maternal body), we must
commit a symbolic “matricide,” which Kristeva calls “the sine-qua-non condition of our
individuation.”29 This process is much more difficult for daughters than for sons, because
within a heterosexual psychoanalytic development narrative, the daughter must transpose
her erotic desire for the mother to the other gender, whereas the son must only transfer
that longing to another woman. For a daughter, this process also fractures her identity:
“Whereas the son splits the mother in order to unify himself, if the daughter splits the
mother, she splits herself.”30 However, according to Kristeva, if a daughter never breaks
with her mother (in other words, if she never devotes herself to the symbolic order and
develops defenses against her mother), she risks carrying her mother around inside her
like a “living corpse” that “no longer nourishes.” 31 Oliver writes, “For women, matricide
is a form of suicide. A woman cannot properly mourn the lost object. She cannot get rid
of the maternal body. Kristeva woefully claims that she carries the maternal Thing with
her locked like a corpse in the crypt of her psyche.” 32 For Xuela, whose mother literally
becomes a corpse the moment she is born, splitting from the maternal Thing becomes an
impossible task, because she is never able to properly mourn the profound loss.
Therefore, she locks her mother up within herself. As Nicholas Abraham and Maria
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Torok write, “Inexpressible mourning erects a secret tomb inside the subject.
Reconstituted from the memories of words, scenes, and affects, the objectal correlative of
the loss is buried alive in the crypt as a full-fledged person, complete with its own
topography.”33
By introjecting her dead mother into her psyche, Xuela “interrupts desiring
metonymy,” thereby retaining her erotic desire and longing for the maternal object. 34 As
aforementioned, Xuela imaginatively recreates her mother coterminously with the
development of her own subjectivity; as a result, she resurrects her mother inside herself
as a living corpse: “In me is the voice I never heard, the face I never saw, the being I
came from” (227). This internal resurrection confuses Xuela’s desiring economy. As
Marder observes, “Swallowing the dead other in order to keep that dead other alive
within can also be read as a kind of primitive inverted confusion between giving birth,
burying, and being buried.”35 In other words, Xuela not only gives birth to her mother,
she also buries her mother within herself, wherein she is buried with her dead mother.
Significantly, her recognition of her motherless state as a young child coincides with the
discovery of her hand:
Who was I? My mother died at the moment I was born. You are not anything at
the moment you are born. This fact of my mother dying at the moment I was born
became a central motif of my life. I cannot remember when I first knew this fact
of my life, I cannot remember when I did not know this fact of my life; perhaps it
was at the moment I could recognize my own hand. (225)
Xuela’s hand becomes the way she both comforts and pleasures herself. After she comes
to live with her father and stepmother, she masturbates in her bed to calm herself when
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the sounds of predatory wildlife in the night frighten her: “And it [i.e., her fear] ended
only after my hands had traveled up and down all over my own body in a loving caress,
finally coming to the soft, moist spot between my legs, and a gasp of pleasure had
escaped my lips which I would allow no one to hear” (43). Xuela conquers her body
before anyone else can, in an act of both self-mothering and autoeroticism. Notably, it is
her hand—not the phallus—that seems to serve as the object of her sexual desire. The
first time she has sex with Philip, her future husband (who she does not love), he enters
her room to discover her playing with herself. When he says her name, she “want[s] to
respond in a normal way,” but cannot because her “voice felt as if it were trapped in [her]
hand, the hand that was trapped in the hair between [her] legs” (151). Here, her difficulty
speaking after she has sexually aroused herself with her hand serves as another sign that
she has failed to separate from the maternal Thing. Oliver writes, “The child must agree
to lose the mother in order to be able to imagine her or name her.” 36 In other words,
losing (or “killing”) the mother is necessary to enter into the realm of language, which is
the only place where the subject can recognize and articulate the mother as separate from
herself. As the opposite of (and complement to) the feet that continually appear in Xuela
dreams, her hands become a symbol of (and connection to) her dead mother. Therefore,
by fetishizing her hands, Xuela’s autoeroticism becomes homoeroticism—an erotic
exchange with the lost mother. Morris supports this hypothesis of a queer dynamic in
Xuela’s relationship with her dead mother when she observes that “Kincaid romanticizes
the mother in a sexualized reverie,” and that the “mother/daughter relationship in
Kincaid’s work may be considered a symbolically sexually transgressive relationship in
the fashion of a S/M relationship….the moment of birth, from the daughter’s perspective,
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might be considered a moment of sexual connection with and disconnection from the
mother’s body.”37 Xuela imagines her hand performing the nurturing acts that her mother
would have performed if she had lived, and because she never commits the necessary
“matricide” that would have separated her from her mother, Xuela never fully transposes
her erotic desire for the mother to another person, and therefore her hand also becomes
the locus of her queer desire for the dead mother. Consequently, Xuela lives an
emotionally stunted and isolated life—motherless, childless, and loveless—forever trying
to achieve “that inseparableness which is said to exist between mother and child” (199).
In Breath, Eyes, Memory, Sophie also carries her mother around like a “living
corpse,” for Martine’s brutal rape causes a spiritual death from which she never recovers.
When Sophie first meets her mother at the airport in New York, she is shocked by her
ghostly appearance: “She did not look like the picture Tante Atie had on her night table.
Her face was long and hollow. Her hair had a blunt cut and she had long spindly legs. She
had dark circles under her eyes and, as she smiled, lines of wrinkles tightened her
expression” (42). After their first night together, during which Sophie wakes Martine
from a violent nightmare and then watches over her the rest of the night, she walks into
the bathroom and encounters a new self in the mirror: “I looked at my red eyes in the
mirror while splashing cold water over my face. New eyes seemed to be looking back at
me. A new face altogether. Someone who had aged in one day, as though she had been
through a time machine, rather than an airplane. Welcome to New York, this face seemed
to be saying. Accept your new life” (49). After fewer than twenty-four hours with her
mother, Sophie already senses that Martine is her responsibility—a burden that she must
carry. As aforementioned, it is not until the age of twelve that Sophie learns that she is
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the product of her mother’s rape; after Martine tells her about a man grabbing her “from
the side of the road” and “pull[ing] [her] into a cane field,” Sophie recognizes that it is
too late to save her mother from the effects of this originary trauma: “It took me twelve
years to piece together my mother’s entire story. By then, it was already too late” (61).
Gabriele Schwab argues that “individual violent acts such as torture and rape…are
liminal experiences that bring us to the abyss of human abjection. These violent acts
cause soul murder and social death.”38 Ann J. Cahill echoes this sentiment when she
argues that rape results in “the violent destabilizing of the existing self,” and that the
victim can experience “a kind of walking social death.”39 Martine’s rape in a cane field at
the age of sixteen causes a “soul murder and social death,” and because she never
receives any form of mental health counseling or psychological support, she never heals
from the event. Sweeney writes, “Her flesh deadened by violation and her voice silenced,
Martine attempts to blot out the body, the unwitnessed site of un-voicing, and is
henceforth condemned to live as a zombie from Haitian folklore whose spirit only halfinhabits the body.”40 Like Xuela, Sophie never truly gets to meet her mother because, in a
sense, Martine is dead by the time she is born.
Therefore, Sophie is not able to perform the “matricide” necessary for her
individuation, in part because her mother is already a “living corpse” when they meet;
consequently, she is easily pulled into Martine’s Marassas myth. As aforementioned,
Sophie learns to “double” or disassociate during her mother’s testing as a defense
mechanism, and she later applies this same coping technique during sex with Joseph.
After she returns from her trip to Haiti, Joseph initiates sex while she doubles:
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I closed my eyes and thought of the Marassa, the doubling. I was lying there on
that bed and my clothes were being peeled off of my body, but really I was
somewhere else. Finally, as an adult, I had a chance to console my mother again. I
was lying in bed with my mother. I was holding her and fighting off that
man…Even though she had forced it on me, of her sudden will, we were now
even more than friends. We were twins, in spirit. Marassas. (200)
Similar to the simulated rape of the testing, Martine has “forced” the symbiotic,
psychically invasive connection of the Marassas on her daughter. Like Xuela, Sophie has
introjected the maternal Thing, thereby “interrupt[ing] desiring metonymy”; because she
has not been able to split with the mother, she has failed to transpose her erotic desire to
another person, therefore it is her mother she envisions during sexual intimacy. Counihan
echoes this idea, noting, “In response to her husband’s advances, she both interrupts and
redirects the circulation of heterosexual desire into the closed loop of incestuous
homoerotic longing.”41 Although Sophie makes steps to heal and develop a healthier
relationship with her mother, she remains ambivalent and conflicted. When her therapist
tries to get her to admit that there have been times when she has hated her mother, Sophie
will not comply: “‘You don’t want to say it. Why not?’ she asked. ‘Because it wouldn’t
be right, and maybe because it wouldn’t be true’” (207). When reading letters to their
mothers aloud in her sexual phobia group, she says, “It would be easy to hate you, but I
can’t because you are part of me. You are me” (203). Sophie is unable to hate her mother,
yet she is riddled with self-hatred. Kristeva claims that this dynamic is a result of the
failure to commit matricide: “Indeed, how can She be that bloodthirsty Fury, since I am
She (sexually and narcissistically), She is I? Consequently, the hatred I bear her is not
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oriented toward the outside but is locked up within myself.” 42 Sophie subsumes Martine’s
trauma, nightmares, and self-loathing, and in so doing she “reconstitutes” her mother
within herself, effectively “bur[ying] [her] alive in the crypt as a full-fledged person,”
because from their first day together in New York—when she meets her “zombie” or
“living corpse” of a mother—she believes that Martine is her burden to bear. 43
This responsibility becomes untenable when Martine’s mental health deteriorates
rapidly after she reveals to Sophie that she is pregnant. At this point, the focus of the
novel shifts to Martine, which subtly conveys the successful blurring of the two women’s
stories and subjectivities. Marc, Martine’s Haitian boyfriend, wants the baby and offers to
marry her, but she resists: “Of course he wants to marry me, but look at me. I am a fat
woman trying to pass for thin. A dark woman trying to pass for light. And I have no
breasts. I don’t know when this cancer will come back. I am not an ideal mother” (189).
Interestingly, all of the reasons Martine cites for why she would not be the “ideal mother”
and wife are physical characteristics. However, when Sophie presses her, Martine
confesses that her nightmares have gotten worse since she became pregnant. She believes
that having this baby will push her over the edge into madness: “I will have it at the
expense of my sanity. They will take it out of me one day and put me away the next”
(192). She says that she wants to get an abortion, but claims that the fetus will not allow
it: “It bites at the inside of my stomach like a leech. Last night after I talked to Marc
about letting it go, I felt the skin getting tight on my belly and for a whole minute I
couldn’t breathe. I had to lie down and say I had changed my mind before I could breathe
normally” (191). Like Sophie (who Martine claims was “going to kill me before I killed
[her]” during her first pregnancy), this baby serves as a reminder of the trauma of her
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rape, and appears to assert its own agency in the womb. Martine attempts to get an
abortion, but the clinic sends her away due to a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting
period; in that time, she begins “seeing him. Over and over. That man who raped me”
(199). Shortly thereafter, Martine starts hearing voices and believes that the baby is
talking to her: “Everywhere I go, I hear it. I hear him saying things to me. You tintin,
malpròp. He calls me a filthy whore. I never want to see this child’s face” (217). Finally,
she takes matters into her own hands by stabbing herself in the stomach seventeen times
“with an old rusty knife,” and then dies on the way to the hospital (224). Regarding this
self-induced abortion and suicide, Francis contends, “For Martine, her body is the only
site over which she can exercise power,” and Alexander argues that “Martine’s choice to
save herself begins the repositioning of the emphasis from child to mother.” 44 Indeed, her
last words in the ambulance, “Mwin pa kapab enkò,” which Marc translates as, “She
could not carry the baby,” get to the very heart of Martine’s decision: she cannot “carry”
the baby (as Sophie “carries” her mother’s living corpse), because to do so again would
threaten her already precarious subjectivity. Unfortunately, both her lived realities as a
subaltern woman as well as much of feminist psychoanalytic thought affirm this threat.
Kristeva, along with other object-relations theorists like Melanie Klein and Nancy
Chodorow, have been criticized for the centrality of the figure of the “child” and the
erasure or dismissal of the mother in their feminist revisions of Freud and Lacan. Janice
Doane and Devon Hodges have observed that in Kristeva’s case studies, “the mother is
defined as the problem for her female patients,” and that her work is “detached from
cultural determinants”—in other words, Kristeva fails to consider how factors like race,
ethnicity, and socio-economic class affect the experiences of women and mothers. 45
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Indeed, Patricia Hill Collins argues that white feminist theorists like Kristeva, Chodorow,
and Irigaray “are themselves participants in a system of privilege that rewards them for
not seeing race and class privilege as being important.” 46 Marianne Hirsch argues that
while feminists have admitted the female child into psychoanalysis, the adult woman who
is a mother still “continues to exist only in relation to her child, never as a subject in her
own right.”47 Amber Jacobs echoes this sentiment: “psychoanalysis remains complicit
with the reproduction of a model that relegates the mother to the realm of the
imaginary.”48 Finally, Juliet Mitchell writes, “We have a great deal of rich work on
mothering, but no place for the mother within the laws of the human order.” 49 Kristeva’s
theories regarding the necessity of separating from the abject maternal body and
committing “matricide” in order to individuate seem to reflect larger societal issues
regarding the debased position of mothers in patriarchal culture. Andrea O’Reilly
confirms this idea when she notes, “Patriarchal motherhood causes motherwork to be
oppressive to women because it necessitates the repression or denial of the mother’s own
selfhood.”50 Additionally, Collins points out that as women of color, mothers like
Martine experience further challenges to both their self-definition and their basic
survival, because “[r]acial domination and economic exploitation profoundly shape the
mothering context.”51
While debating the validity of such critiques of Kristeva and other object-relations
theorists is outside the scope of this chapter, they do seem to identify a possible reason
for the existence of an adversarial dynamic at the root of mother/daughter relationships, a
reason which proves Martine was right to worry that Sophie was going to kill her. That is,
if, indeed, there is no place for mother-as-subject in the mother-child relationship, and if

178

a woman risks “the obliteration of the self” in motherhood, then perhaps it should be
unsurprising that pregnancy and motherhood can activate a woman’s instinct for selfpreservation and self-defense.52 Therefore, it seems only logical that, in certain cases,
infanticide can become “the sine-qua-non condition” of individuation as a safeguard
against matricide, especially when the would-be mother’s subjectivity is already
threatened by other forces, which is certainly the case for subaltern women like Martine
and Xuela. Postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes, “Between patriarchy
and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman
disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the
displaced figuration of the ‘third-world woman’ caught between tradition and
modernization.”53 In other words, as subaltern women from postcolonial regimes, the
women in Danticat’s and Kincaid’s novels risk erasure and extermination from both
within and without—that is, from both the process of separating from their children, as
well as from the oppressive, racist societies in which they live.
Both Martine and Xuela perform self-abortions as acts of self-preservation and
defiance against the patriarchal cultures that would seek to subjugate them as “mothers of
the nation.” As previously noted, Martine believes that having a second child will either
drive her mad or kill her: “Marc, he saves my life every night [by waking her up from the
nightmares], but I am afraid he gave me this baby that’s going to take that life away”
(190). Schwab contends that “[t]orture and rape, the two most prominent forms of soul
murder, eradicate psychic time because time cannot heal the victim’s suffering in the
same way time heals other wounds.”54 In other words, Martine, who still gets “raped
every night” in her dreams, does not simply need “time” to get over the trauma of her
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rape, because her trauma exists outside of linear time. Also, since rape can destroy “the
intersubjective, embodied agency and therefore personhood of a woman,” Martine’s
sense of self was already “obliterated” when she gave birth to her first child, so a second
child would only further destabilize her subjectivity. 55 When considering both the
psychological effects of the rape and the objectification and rejection of the mother that
occurs as a “necessary” part of a child’s psychosocial development, Martine’s decision to
leave young Sophie in her sister’s care and her later desire for oneness with Sophie as
“Marassas,” or twin lovers, may be viewed more sympathetically. Like Xuela, Sophie’s
subjectivity becomes “both supplement and substitute to her mother’s,” since Martine is
psychically spent by the time they form a relationship.56 As such, she has nothing left to
offer a second child. Unlike her first pregnancy with Sophie, who Martine believed was
going to “going to kill me before I killed [her],” she kills both the baby and herself
concurrently to ward off the inevitable matricide that she fears. Francis sees this act as
“an instance of ‘embodied protest’ wherein resistance pathologically manifests itself on
the body,” and Alexander contends that the self-induced abortion shows that Martine
“refuses to reproduce the nation and its nationalist designation of her as an invisible,
second-class citizen.”57 Indeed, Martine fails to perform motherhood in the ways that her
home country of Haiti or her adopted country of the US demand. Even dying before
Sophie subverts the “natural” order, because, as Grandmè Ifé tells her granddaughter at
Martine’s funeral, the Caco women come from a place “where the daughter is never fully
a woman until her mother has passed on before her” (234). This sentiment appears to
confirm Kristeva’s assertion that “matricide is our vital necessity, the sine-qua-non
condition of our individuation,” since Grandmè Ifé, Martine’s mother, still lives, and
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Martine herself arguably never becomes “fully a women” after her traumatic rape at a
young age. However, Martine’s final act of killing her baby before it could kill her would
seem to flip this figuration on its head. Rather than sacrifice herself mentally and/or
physically for her child (as a good “mother of the nation” would do), Martine finally
locates and asserts her own subjectivity in her final, deliberate act of infanticide. In a
sense, she becomes a mother to herself by refusing motherhood.
Xuela also refuses motherhood, because she fears that it would disrupt the
selfhood that she has built around her mother’s “living corpse,” and because having
children would ensconce her even deeper in a nation-state that represents everything she
loathes. At her first sight of menstrual blood, Xuela senses what it signifies and worries
what its “failure to appear regularly after a certain interval” would mean: “Perhaps I
knew then that the child in me would never be stilled enough to allow me to have a child
of my own” (57). As an adolescent, Xuela already recognizes that having a child would
require her to dismantle the imagined mother/daughter relationship that she has
developed in her psyche. A few years later when Madame LaBatte tells her that the
reason she is sick is because she is pregnant with Monsieur LaBatte’s child, Xuela is
furious: “I…instantly felt that if there was a child in me I could expel it through the sheer
force of my will” (81). When her attempts to “will” it out of her fail, she visits a local
woman known as “Sange-Sange,” who she pays for a “thick black syrup to drink” that
induces a miscarriage (82). For eight days, Xuela lies in a “small hole in a dirt floor” as
her body, now a “volcano of pain,” expels the fetus; at the end of the ordeal, she
experiences a sense of rebirth and has gained new wisdom (82). Thereafter, she uses her
new knowledge to abort all of her pregnancies, thereby taking control of her reproductive
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health. Xuela believes that motherhood would threaten her subjectivity: “My own face
was a comfort to me, my own body was a comfort to me, and no matter how swept away
I would become by anyone or anything, in the end I allowed nothing to replace my own
being in my mind”—not even a child (100). Ironically, this “being in [her] mind” is
already not entirely her “own,” since she developed her subjectivity as “supplement and
substitute” to her mother’s. Because in childbirth “a mother identifies with her own
mother,” and “[t]he other cannot be separated from the self,” giving birth would alter the
dyadic configuration of Xuela’s selfhood. 58 In other words, Xuela cannot carry her
mother’s living corpse and a baby without destabilizing her entire identity.
Additionally, for Xuela reproduction signifies entrance into a society that seeks to
oppress and erase ethnic minorities. When she looks back at her life at the age of seventy,
Xuela recognizes that while her mind and heart have resisted motherhood, her body has
longed for it: “For years and years, each month my body would swell up slightly,
mimicking the state of maternity, longing to conceive, mourning my heart’s and mind’s
decision never to bring forth a child. I refused to belong to a race, I refused to accept a
nation” (226). Here, she seems to respond to her body’s grief at being denied the
experience of motherhood with an explanation: having a child would have meant
adhering to the nationalist imperative to reproduce the populace—to become a “mother of
the nation”—which would have also imposed on her the sense of cultural “belonging”
that she has so vehemently resisted. In the eyes of the misogynistic society in which she
lives, having a child would have meant fulfilling her biological “purpose” as a woman,
and that child would have been assigned a racial categorization that could later be used as
justification for discrimination and oppression. Therefore, Xuela’s refusal to reproduce is

182

both an act of self-preservation and political resistance, as it allows her to maintain her
position on the periphery of society as an ethnic hybrid who “did not want to belong to
anyone” (104).
Furthermore, Xuela reimagines and redefines the “mother” archetype in a
grotesque creation myth that subverts Kristeva’s theories of maternal abjection and
necessary “matricide.” After her first abortion, Xuela leaves the LaBattes’ home to live
by herself in a small hut. During this time, she takes stock of her life and considers her
future as a motherless woman who has refused motherhood:
My life was beyond empty. I had never had a mother, I had just recently refused
to become one, and I knew then that this refusal would be complete. I would
never become a mother, but that would not be the same as never bearing children.
I would bear children, but I would never be a mother to them. I would bear them
in abundance; they would emerge from my head, from my armpits, from between
my legs; I would bear children, they would hang from me like fruit from a vine,
but I would destroy them with the carelessness of a god. (97)
She proceeds to detail the various ways that she would “destroy” her children, like
“swallowing them whole,” covering their bodies with diseased sores, throwing them off
of cliffs, and “condem[ing] them to live in an empty space frozen in the same posture in
which they had been born” (97). In this passage, Xuela envisions herself as a perverse
fertility goddess. As Morris notes, “Kincaid writes the myth of the native woman’s
fertility and cruel maternal tendencies into a monumental hyperbole.” 59 In drawing a
distinction between “bearing children” and “becoming a mother,” Xuela separates the act
of reproduction from the “institution of motherhood” and the romanticized myths of
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motherhood that persist in patriarchal cultures. 60 Her new conception of female
reproduction repositions children as the possessions of the woman who birthed them
rather than the nation in which they were born, which is an empowering counter narrative
for subaltern women living in a postcolonial society, whose bodies are frequently seen as
possessions of the state. Also, these diseased, broken, or frozen babies—rather than the
maternal body—come to signify the abject; the child becomes “what disturbs identity,
system, order” that the woman who birthed it must reject. 61 Indeed, ultimately these
babies become “the most sickening of wastes,” the most abject object of all: the corpse. 62
Xuela says that she “would decorate them when they were only corpses and set each
corpse in a polished wooden box, and place the polished wooden box in the earth and
forget the part of the earth where I had buried the box. It is in this way that I did not
become a mother; it is in this way that I bore my children” (98). Xuela’s fantasy reverses
Kristeva’s theories of maternal abjection and matricide by figuring the child as that which
must be killed as the “sine-qua-non condition” of individuation.
This reversal completely destabilizes the mother-child relationship, for Xuela’s
conception of the child as abject corpse seems to beg the question: if the mother “carries”
the child, why shouldn’t the child “carry” the mother? In other words, is there a way in
which the ostensible impossibility of “mother-as-subject” can be tied to a daughter’s
difficulty in separating from and rejecting the mother, in letting go of her “living
corpse”? Xuela’s grotesque creation myth seems to illustrate the absurdity of the
imperative for such rejection and separation. In both Breath, Eyes, Memory and The
Autobiography of My Mother, the stories and identities of mothers and daughters become
inextricably intertwined—so much so that attempting to separate them (especially in the
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case of Xuela) would be to unravel the women’s very subjectivity. As Angeletta KM
Gourdine notes, in Breath, Eyes, Memory “Martine’s merging of mother and daughter
reflects Danticat’s narrative doubling, as the narrative diverges from a traditional
Bildungsroman that presents Sophie’s growth and it becomes Martine’s story.” 63 In a
sense, the novels become bildungsromans of both the mothers and the daughters, as we
watch Martine grow alongside Sophie, and elder Xuela grow within younger Xuela. As
Xuela confesses at the end of the novel, “This account of my life has been an account of
my mother’s life as much as it has been an account of mine” (227). Therefore, perhaps
“carrying” the mother within does not have to be as debilitating and pathological as
Kristeva proposes. Amber Jacobs posits that the reason why feminist psychoanalysis has
had so much trouble theorizing the mother/daughter relationship is because it has been
“locked into the terms of the male imaginary,” and that the relationship must be analyzed
“through the framework of a foreclosed or absent underlying maternal law.”64 Perhaps it
will take someone like Xuela—a fierce subaltern visionary who loves “whatever [she is]
told to hate”—to uncover and write this new maternal law, to envision new theories that
admit both the mother and the daughter into the process of subject formation (32).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In her 1919 essay “Notes on Thought and Vision,” modernist poet H. D. presents
a concept of creativity and intelligence rooted in mind-body synthesis that she terms the
“over-mind.” She describes this phenomenon as “a cap of consciousness” that is “fluid
yet with definite body, contained in a definite space,” and likens it to a “jelly-fish.”1
While she initially located this state of consciousness in her head, she confesses that she
began visualizing it as “centered in the love-region of the body or placed like a foetus in
the body” after her first pregnancy. 2 In other words, this viscous, gelatinous substance—
“fluid yet with definite body”—resides in her womb, which has the power to both create
life and inspire artistic vision. H. D. emphasizes that “this womb-brain or love-brain” is
“a jelly-fish in the body,” thus inseparable from a woman’s corporeality and reproductive
capabilities.3
Significantly, as I discuss in chapter two, the title of Sylvia Plath’s emotionally
charged mother/daughter poem “Medusa” may be read both as a reference to a
mythological character as well as an allusion to jellyfish, since “medusa” is another term
for the jellyfish (medusozoa). Because Aurelia, Plath’s mother’s first name, is also a
genus of jellyfish (aurella aulita), “Medusa” serves as a subtle swipe at the poet’s
overbearing mother. The jellyfish imagery in the fourth stanza (“Curve of water
upleaping/ To my water rod, dazzling and grateful,/ Touching and sucking”) portrays the
mother as invasive and clingy, sucking the life force out of her daughter. 4 The speaker
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repels her mother’s “eely tentacle,” and envisions her as a gelatinous “Blubbery Mary.” 5
Plath’s poem dramatizes the fusion and separation that occurs between mother and
daughter by depicting both women as malleable and pliant: “I shall take no bite of your
body,/ Bottle in which I live.”
Written forty-three years apart, these two different jellyfish metaphors point to a
prominent theme that I have encountered repeatedly in my research on literary
representations of mothers and daughters—that is, the conceptualization of the female
body (particularly the maternal body) as fluid and indeterminate, viscous and leaking.
While the tentacles of the jellyfish (like the snakes that comprise Medusa’s hair) evoke
the image of the phallus, it is the gelatinous, gooey bell—the creature’s central feature—
that gives the jellyfish its name, and that incites revulsion in those who cross its path.
This same textural quality has traditionally been associated with female corporeality. As
Elizabeth Grosz observes in Volatile Bodies, throughout Western history, the feminine
body has been socially constructed as “a formlessness that engulfs all form…[and] a
mode of seepage.”6 Specifically, I have found that many women writers portray mothers’
bodies as “jelly”—a substance which, in addition to being neither solid nor liquid, brings
to mind the gendered expectation that mothers serve as the suppliers of nutritional
sustenance. However, these gelatinous depictions of mothers are far from positive and
wholesome. Rather, they underscore cultural beliefs regarding the fluidity of the female
body and illustrate Kristeva’s theories about the off-putting nature of maternal abjection.
The jelly metaphor is often used to emphasize a mother’s uselessness and
insignificance. For instance, in Plath’s The Bell Jar, Esther Greenwood compares her
mother to jelly when she visits her in the hospital: “‘They said you called for me.’ She
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seemed ready to cry. Her face puckered up and quivered like a pale jelly.” 7 Throughout
the novel Plath presents Mrs. Greenwood as clueless and unhelpful, and in this scene,
which is the first time Esther sees her mother following her suicide attempt, the
description of Mrs. Greenwood’s face quivering “like a pale jelly” renders her weak and
repellent. As I note in chapter two, in Gwendolyn Brooks’s poem “Jessie Mitchell’s
Mother,” a daughter’s internal monologue when entering a room to tend to her pregnant
mother reveals her resentment:
Into her mother’s bedroom to wash the ballooning body.
“My mother is jelly-hearted and she has a brain of jelly:
Sweet, quiver-soft, irrelevant. Not essential.
Only a habit would cry if she should die.
A pleasant sort of fool without the least iron….
Are you better, mother, do you think it will come today?”8
In this poem, Jessie Mitchell’s mother is so insignificant that she does not even have a
name of her own; she is only defined through her relationship to her children. The
daughter believes that her mother’s heart and brain are made of jelly, which denigrates
both her emotional and intellectual abilities. The “quiver-soft” quality of the pregnant
mother contrasts sharply with the hard “iron” that Jessie perceives as proof of strength,
intelligence, and relevance. In both The Bell Jar and “Jessie Mitchell’s Mother,” the
daughters assign jelly-like characteristics to their mothers to justify rejecting them.
In Margaret Atwood’s Lady Oracle, this same gelatinous quality illustrates
shifting power dynamics in the mother/daughter relationship. In chapter three, I discuss
how Joan’s fat body is portrayed as jiggly and unwieldy until she loses weight, and her
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desire to “become solid, solid as stone so [her mother] wouldn’t be able to get rid of
[her]” shows her recognition that her soft, squishy body incites revulsion. 9 However, in
moments when Joan gets the upper hand over Frances, this dynamic shifts. For instance,
when Joan arrives home wearing a flashy, unflattering green coat that makes her look like
a “neon melon,” she finally establishes dominance over her mother: “She cried
hopelessly, passively; she was leaning against the banister, her whole body slack as if she
had no bones. My mother has never cried where I could see her and I was dismayed, but
elated too at this evidence of my power, my only power.”10 Joan’s description of
Frances’s body going “slack as if she had no bones” gives it a fluid, formless quality,
indicating that, like Jessie Mitchell and Esther Greenwood, Joan perceives a weak mother
as gelatinous. When Joan attends a meeting of Spiritualists with her Aunt Lou and first
learns about the concept of an “astral body” that can “float around by itself, attached to
you by something like a long rubber band,” she immediately assigns a textural quality to
her mother’s astral body: “I particularly didn’t like the thought of my mother, in the form
of some kind of spiritual jello, drifting around after me from place to place.” 11 Joan fears
that the aspect of Frances that will haunt her is the same fluid, jelly-like weakness she
perceived in her mother’s “boneless” body the day she finally made her cry. Joan also
fears her former fat body, which continues to haunt her throughout the novel: “For a
moment she hovered around me like ectoplasm, like a gelatin shell, my ghost, my angel;
then she settled and I was absorbed into her. Within my former body, I gasped for air.” 12
Since the fat female body conjures images of the prenatal or postnatal body, this “gelatin
shell” (like Frances’s haunting “spiritual jello”) also signifies the return of the repressed
maternal.
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Finally, in Toni Morrison’s Sula, this indeterminate, viscous material associated
with the maternal body takes on racial significance. When Helene, an attractive, “pale
yellow” woman, and her daughter Nel accidentally board a train through the car reserved
for whites, her deferential and coquettish response to the admonishments of the white
conductor inspire ire in two black soldiers who witness the exchange. 13 Nel notices the
glare of their “midnight eyes” and their skin hardening into “marble.” Suddenly ashamed
of her mother, Nel avoids Helene’s eyes and focuses instead on the hem of her dress:
She could not risk letting [her eyes] travel upward for fear of seeing that the
hooks and eyes in the placket of her dress had come undone and exposed the
custard-colored skin underneath. She stared at the hem, wanting to believe in its
weight but knowing that custard was all that it hid. If this tall, proud woman, this
woman who was very particular about her friends, who slipped into church with
unequaled elegance, who could quell a roustabout with a look, if she were really
custard, then there was a chance that Nel was too. 14
Following a moment of disempowerment and public humiliation, Helene’s body becomes
“custard” in Nel’s eyes—weakness dissolves her flesh into a gooey, formless mass.
Significantly, whereas jelly is transparent and light, custard is opaque and heavy. Since
Helene’s humiliation at the hands of the white conductor is specifically racialized, the
opacity of the gelatinous substance that Nel assigns her mother seems to convey
intersectional revulsion—disgust for her fluid female form as well as loathing for her
light brown skin. Nel declares right then and there that she will never suffer the same
fate: “It was on that train, shuffling toward Cincinnati, that she resolved to be on guard—
always. She wanted to make certain that no man ever looked at her that way. That no
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midnight eyes or marbled flesh would ever accost her and turn her into jelly.”15 The fact
that it is the men who have the power to “turn her into jelly” exemplifies the misogyny
behind the conceptualization of the female body as leaking, indeterminate, and
gelatinous. In projecting such qualities onto their mothers, daughters like Nel, Esther,
Jessie, and Joan reveal that they have internalized these same hegemonic beliefs. Nel’s
fear that there is “a chance” that she is “really custard” like Helene is the fear that her
feminine body will circumscribe her life, like it has for her mother.
These jelly/custard metaphors offer an entry point for unraveling the misogyny at
the heart of Western conceptions of the female body. In Being and Nothingness, JeanPaul Sartre examines the revulsion that viscous substances instinctively incite (he uses
the French term “visqueux,” which has no exact English equivalent but is often translated
as “slimy” or “sticky”). 16 He claims that “the slimy” has a quality “which is neither
material (and physical) nor psychic, but which transcends the opposition of the psychic
and the physical, by revealing itself to us as the ontological expression of the entire
world.”17 As neither solid nor liquid, viscous substances are “a phenomenon in process of
becoming,” and thus unsettle us because they resist categorization, as well as
solidification.18 Additionally, they threaten our own solidity. Whereas diving into the
water is safe because “I remain a solid in its liquidity,” submersion in the slimy initiates
an existential crisis: “If I sink in the slimy, I feel that I am going to be lost in it; that is, I
may dissolve in the slime precisely because the slimy is in process of solidification.” 19 In
Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas draws from Sartre’s work on viscosity to support her
arguments regarding the role of dirt in different contexts and cultures. She writes,
“stickiness is a trap, it clings like a leech; it attacks the boundary between myself and it,”
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and claims that Sartre’s theory of viscosity “makes the point that we can and do reflect
with profit on our main classifications and on experiences which do not exactly fit them.
In general these reflections confirm our confidence in the main classifications.” 20 In other
words, the disgust and horror we experience when encountering a viscous substance—
which does not fit neatly into any of our cultural categorizations—affirms and reifies the
societal boundaries and classifications that help us make sense of the world.
Significantly, Sartre imagines the slimy as specifically feminine. He writes, “It is
a soft, yielding action, a moist and feminine sucking, it lives obscurely under my fingers,
and I sense it like a dizziness; it draws me to it as the bottom of a precipice might draw
me.”21 Like the “Touching and sucking” maternal jellyfish figure in Plath’s “Medusa,”
Sartre’s slime “draws me, it sucks at me.” 22 Also like Plath’s fierce Medusa, the viscous
is vengeful: “Slime is the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly-sweet, feminine revenge
which will be symbolized on another level by the quality ‘sugary.’” 23 Regarding how to
contend with anomalies that do not fit neatly into any of our established cultural
categories, Douglas writes, “Negatively, we can ignore, just not perceive them, or
perceiving we can condemn. Positively we can deliberately confront the anomaly and try
to create a new pattern of reality in which it has a place.”24 Notably, the first example
Douglas presents of one of these “anomalies” is the case of a “monstrous birth,” which is
also inescapably feminine. 25 Grosz points out the misogynistic underpinnings of both
Sartre’s and Douglas’s theorizations of viscosity, and identifies what she believes to be
the true cause of our aversion: “It is not that female sexuality is like, resembles, an
inherently horrifying viscosity. Rather, it is the production of an order that renders female
sexuality and corporeality marginal, indeterminate, and viscous that constitutes the sticky
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and the viscous with their disgusting, horrifying connotations.” 26 Here, Grosz reverses the
causality: in other words, women’s bodies are not repellant because they are sticky and
viscous—the sticky and viscous are repellant because they are affiliated with women’s
bodies.
Douglas’s discussion of viscosity as an “anomaly” to either ignore, condemn, or
confront and conform, along with her and Sartre’s association of the viscous with
femininity, begs the question: how can the female body be an “anomaly,” when at least
half of the population inhabits one? Of course, to attempt to adequately address the
origins of this absurd inequality, we would need to delve into the very origins of Western
philosophical thought itself (which is beyond the scope of this dissertation), but perhaps
this question can help us better understand the mother/daughter relationship, because, to
use Douglas’s formula, the patriarchy has devoted considerable energy to ignoring,
condemning, and confronting and conforming the “anomaly” of the female body for
centuries, and since, as Adrienne Rich observes, “the relationship between mother and
daughter has been profoundly threatening to men,” perhaps it should come as no surprise
that the patriarchy has made sure that the job of suppressing and controlling the
“anomaly” of feminine corporeality has infiltrated (and often poisoned) the
mother/daughter relationship. 27 Because at the root of this male hysteria over the leaking,
viscous female body is fear—not of weakness, but of strength.
While Sartre discusses the repellant quality of the “slimy,” he also emphasizes its
power. He writes that it is “the image of destruction-creation…Only at the very moment
when I believe that I possess it, behold by a curious reversal, it possesses me.” 28 Sartre
presents viscosity like a material manifestation of the Hindu god Shiva—tricky and
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deceptive, as well as able to destroy and create in order to remake the world. This
destroyer/creator archetype also brings to mind Kristeva’s theories regarding maternal
abjection, wherein the maternal body is both the giver of life and a horrifying threat to the
subject’s sense of self. Indeed, Kristeva draws from both Sartre and Douglas in her
writings on abjection, and Grosz has observed the sexism in her work, too. 29 According
to Sartre, not only can the viscous destroy and create, it is also, as aforementioned, “the
ontological expression of the entire world.” 30 He goes even further, claiming that “it
transcends all distinctions between psychic and physical, between the brute existent and
the meanings of the world; it is a possible meaning of being.” 31 For Sartre, the
consummate existentialist, to define viscosity as “a possible meaning of being” is
significant. He seems in awe of its power, yet distrustful of it at the same time. Therefore,
it is notable that, in addition to overtly assigning viscosity feminine qualities, the
language he uses to describe its danger has misogynistic undertones: “like the supreme
docility of the possessed,” “there exists a poisonous possession,” “it is a trap,” “there is a
sly solidarity and complicity of all its leechlike parts.”32 There is little doubt that, for
Sartre, the viscous is female…and terrifying.
To return to our jelly-averse daughters for a moment, I want to propose that the
young women’s fear of the gelatinous mother is not only the result of internalized
misogyny, but also a fear of the vulnerability inherent in feminine strength. If Grosz is
correct that the sticky and viscous are repulsive because they have historically been
associated with the female body (and not the other way around), then the indeterminate,
fluid quality of a body capable of creating and birthing other bodies—arguably the most
powerful, awe-inspiring ability of any body—has inspired a fear so great that any
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substance that even approximates the same textural quality has the power to destabilize
our sense of self. But, as Sartre notes, the power of the viscous lies in its indeterminacy
and mutability. In other words, because it lacks solidity, yet still retains its coherence,
viscosity is both vulnerable and resilient, susceptible and tenacious. That this
simultaneous vulnerability and strength is fundamentally necessary for the female body’s
most awe-inspiring and powerful act (i.e., birth) confuses and frightens men like Sartre,
who prefer to think in binaries, and who have traditionally been the ones writing the
philosophical tracts that tell us how to feel about bodies. When daughters like Esther,
Jessie, Joan, and Nel compare their mothers to jelly or custard in moments of perceived
weakness, perhaps it is because they sense this double bind—that fully stepping into
strength as a woman requires inhabiting vulnerability, which is far scarier than
embodying strength alone.
H. D.’s imagining of the dualistic “over-mind” capable of intellectual brilliance
and artistic vision as a jellyfish in the womb presents a recuperative and subversive
interpretation of the malleability and power of the feminine body. She seems to recognize
this subversion when she writes, “The world of vision has been symbolised in all ages by
various priestly cults in all countries by the serpent. In my personal language or vision, I
call this serpent a jelly-fish.”33 In Judeo-Christian cosmology, the serpent, of course,
evokes Eve in the Garden of Eden, disobeying the law of the Father in her pursuit of
knowledge. H. D.’s “jelly-fish consciousness,” then, threatens the patriarchal order
through both its creative and intellectual potential and its indeterminate materiality.
Therefore, H. D.’s approach to the “jelly” of femininity provides a helpful way of

199

theorizing the simultaneous vulnerability and strength of female corporeality that has
unsettled men for centuries.
But, of course, it is not just men who have been unsettled by this duality. It has
unsettled women, too. It has unsettled me. From a very early age, I wanted nothing to do
with it. I dreaded the onset of my period, hoping that I would somehow magically be
spared from experiencing that disturbing female rite of passage, and I first realized that I
never wanted to have children around the same time that I stopped playing with dolls.
Raised in a matriarchal home, I was dominated by the fleshy bodies and indomitable
personalities of my mother and grandmother, whose power and strength I found
breathtaking and, at times, terrifying. Even more terrifying were their moments of
weakness, when the veil of indestructibility dropped and, like Nel, I saw the custard
concealed underneath. They instilled in me the compulsion to regulate and control my
body—a mostly impossible task that they themselves did not seem capable of
accomplishing—because they knew, like Jessie Mitchell, that iron was more culturally
palatable than jelly.
Perhaps I took the easy way out. Like Eudora Welty’s Miss Eckhart, or Jamaica
Kincaid’s Xuela, I chose to remain a perpetual daughter, never participating in the
ultimate female rite of passage that would have rendered me “a horrifying, devouring
body…that evokes rage and fear.”34 I have thus had the privilege of analyzing and
theorizing maternal abjection without having to wade into its viscous muck. I will try to
remember this fact as I write my next creative nonfiction book about my relationships
with my mother and grandmother, and I will keep in mind Rich’s observation, “Easier by
far to hate and reject a mother outright than to see beyond her to the forces acting upon
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her.”35 Indeed, the process of writing this dissertation has changed the central question
that will guide the book I intend to write about the women in my matrilineage. For a long
time, I thought I already knew the question I needed to answer through my writing: Why
did the women in my family hate each other so much? However, the last few years of
researching the “essential female tragedy” has helped me find a more fitting (and
possibly more heartbreaking) one: Why couldn’t we love each other? 36 In other words,
what prevented us from openly expressing our love? Why was it so dangerous to be
vulnerable with the one person with whom we had been the most vulnerable?
In Sula, Morrison seems to address this paradox in two exchanges between
Hannah and her mother Eva, the three-legged matriarch of the family. When Hannah
asks, “Mamma, did you ever love us?”, Eva’s hand instinctively travels down to her
stump of a leg, insinuating that she has made corporeal sacrifices for love that her
children do not even know about. 37 After admonishing Hannah for asking the question
and telling stories of the misery and deprivation that she pulled her and her brother
through as young children, Eva says, “what you talkin’ ‘bout did I love you girl I stayed
alive for you.”38 The next day, when Eva sees Hannah catch on fire in the yard from her
second-floor bedroom, she breaks the window and hurls herself out of it in an attempt to
“cover her daughter’s body with her own,” but misses her mark and fails. 39 With these
two scenes, Morrison poignantly conveys the complex, visceral, and tacit love that exists
between a mother and daughter. Perhaps a mother “cover[ing] her daughter’s body with
her own” to try to protect it is the perfect metaphor for the tragedy of the mother/daughter
relationship: a mother attempts to smother her daughter to save her, yet only loses her in
the process.
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The two women in my life who sought to cover my body with their own never
had to hurl themselves out of a window for me, but I have no doubt that they would have,
if such a situation had arisen. Instead, their attempts to save me manifested in everyday
interactions in which they tried to teach me how to become the woman that they wanted
to be—one who “marries rich” and never gets mocked or rejected for her fat body. My
mother and grandmother did their best to instill in me a hatred of the feminine jelly
associated with fatness—with the jiggly bellies, bulbous bottoms, and overall gelatinous
physiques that are culturally coded as weak and evidence of a lack of self-control—
because they feared that inhabiting such jelly would only limit my choices in life. While
they may have been correct during their lifetimes, cultural beliefs about women’s bodies
have been changing in the early twenty-first century. From the explosion of the body
positivity and fat activism movements, to a growing acceptance of and appreciation for
ethnically diverse bodies, to the increased visibility of fat bodies in popular culture, the
stage has been set for a massive ideological shift regarding the utility, beauty, and power
of gelatinous bodies. Perhaps society is finally on the verge of embracing the
vulnerability inherent in feminine strength—of admitting viscosity as “the ontological
expression of the entire world.” Notably, the R&B group Destiny’s Child seemed to
anticipate this cultural shift in their 2001 song “Bootylicious,” when Beyoncé challenged
America, “I don’t think you’re ready for this jelly.”40
Maybe we are, Beyoncé. Maybe we finally are.
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